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Introduction
Ben Kochan
London’s population has changed dramatically over the last decade.  Press coverage
of results from the 2011 Census took many people by surprise with its estimate of
London’s population growth and the importance of international migration within it –
even though annual population surveys had been providing a very similar picture for
some years. This was the backdrop for LSE London mounting a two year project (with
HEIF funding) to improve our understanding of what has been happening, how it is
changing the city, and what the implications are for practitioners and policy-makers.
The project looked at the scale and character of in-migration from overseas (in the
context of changing control regimes) together with its impact on both the London
economy and the lived experience of the city’s workers and residents. It promoted
knowledge exchange through a range of activities bringing together academics, pro-
fessionals and policy makers to look both at broad patterns of change and more spe-
cific impacts of migration (and migration control) on different sectors of the London
economy – notably higher education, finance, IT and servicing activities. 
This research came at the same time as London Mayor Boris Johnson was initiating
a major review examining the needs of the capital’s growing population. Over the
decade from 2001 to 2011 the population grew by an average of 88,000 a year made
up of increased natural growth and international migration offset by out-
migration to the rest of the country. The rate of growth increased in the latter part of
the decade partly as a result of the financial crisis which slowed out-migration to the
rest of the country. In the 2011 Census almost 37 per cent of London’s population was
foreign born compared to around 1 in four in 2001. The decade also saw rapid change
in the ethnic mix of the capital with 60 per cent of the population classifying them-
selves as white, compared to 70 per cent a decade earlier. Most important for many
commentators is the numbers of white British living in the capital which declined by
600,000, a proportionate drop from 60 per cent to 45 per cent over the same period.   
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displaced. Their movement seems to be a series of responses to common processes
of change rather than attempts at consolidating or expanding the space they once
occupied in the city.
Ian Gordon looks at the processes through which a growing migrant population has
been accommodated within London's rather inelastic housing stock. In part this has
been achieved through displacement of others into nearby regions, but for those arriv-
ing from poor countries he finds that this has largely been accomplished through
acceptance of much higher levels of crowding. This is a key reason why London's over-
all population has been able to grow substantially but it is not a factor which can be
expected to continue. As these migrants become better integrated economically and
socially, density standards seem to converge towards those of the UK-born population. 
Paresh Shah demonstrates how international students make an important contribu-
tion to higher education providing diversity to the student body, contributing to HE
income and local and regional economies, benefiting the academic community.  He
suggests many will become future sources of ‘soft power’ for London and the UK. He
raises concerns that new visa regulations will deter students from coming to London
and limit their capacity to find first jobs in London, thus restricting their benefit to the
UK economy. 
Jon Beaverstock highlights the important role which international recruitment plays
for financial services in the City, suggesting that a constant through-flow of talent is
key if London is  to remain at the top of the leader board of financial centres.   He sug-
gests that all financial centres have cadres of highly-skilled foreign workers, who are
intrinsically extremely mobile, and regularly move between different centres within
and between the internal labour markets of transnational firms.
Aymo Brunetti puts Switzerland’s transition from a rural economy to a world financial
centre down to the agreement on the freedom of movement of labour with the EU in
2002. He is concerned that the recent referendum result in favour of immigration quo-
tas would endanger this role – and issues that as a warning if there is a referendum
in the UK about leaving the EU.
Ian Gordon looks at the relation between migration, low pay and work incentives in
London. He shows that there is a general tendency for the newly arrived migrants
from poor countries to get crowded into the bottom tier of jobs, where they depress
the level of wages in the short-medium term. The impact of this process around the
years of peak migration was much greater in London than elsewhere – not only
because of its large share of the inflow, but also because the (uniform) National
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The GLA expects the growth to continue. Its current projection, which is contested by
some commentators, suggests that London’s population would increase by 37 per
cent between 2011 and 2050 from about 8.2 million to 11.3 million. These projections
are based on the trends over recent decades. The GLA has acknowledged there were
many factors which could affect the growth. One was the economy – during the last
recession out-migration fell whilst in-migration rose. The recovery could mean that
migration patterns revert to traditional norms or, alternatively, that the changes are
structural and are here to stay. 
The size of households is another uncertainty. Between 2001 and 2011, it was pro-
jected that the size of households would fall significantly and the number of one per-
son households would increase by about 1.5 million.  In fact they only rose by 480,000
and the number of households with couples and one or more other adults rose by
220,000 against a projection of a 365,000 fall, bucking both national and longer term
trends. The cost of housing and the state of the employment market affected house-
hold formation, but the question is whether these figures represent a structural adjust-
ment in behaviour given demographic, economic and housing markets changes. .
This book seeks to examine the experiences of different migrant groups within this
growth context and the impact and contribution which they make to London – so pro-
viding an increased understanding of the changing pattern of London’s population and
the challenges in planning and developing policies for the capital. 
Kerwin Datu’s paper highlights how ‘poor country’ migrants are no longer especially
concentrated in inner areas and that, driven by a variety of pressures particularly
associated with housing, they are increasingly settling in outer London boroughs. The
drivers for many may be the need to find affordable housing, while other more estab-
lished migrants are moving out to find improved housing opportunities. There has
been a substantial increase in the number of towns outside London’s green belt which
have become focal points for ‘poor-country’ migrants. Meanwhile migrants from ‘rich
countries’ are tending to move into the western inner boroughs, as well as parts of
outer west London boroughs and beyond the green belt.
Antoine Paccoud has used the last two censuses to analyse the pressures on
migrant communities in the areas where they first settled. Looking at the experiences
of the Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Black Caribbean, Black African and Indian migrants, he
considers  whether these groups have managed to carve out a permanent space of
their own in the city or whether they have settled and then been displaced.  With the
exception of Indian migrants, the conclusion is that those migrant groups have been
6
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over-achieve, and others significantly under-achieve. Settled disadvantage carries
risks of more serious social alienation and the potential for oppositional cultures to
take root particularly among black Caribbean and black African communities. He
points to the political ramifications of the most recent migration, particularly from
Poland, which has highlighted the economic and social implications of the free move-
ment of labour associated with the EU. 
Tony Travers highlights political and electoral impacts which the changing population
have had on London.  So far, the Labour Party appears to have benefited electorally
from the arrival of migrants and the growing minority ethnic population, the
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats appear to have lost vote share.  As the city’s
population becomes less white British, this trend is likely to continue but other factors
could assume more dominance in influencing voting patterns.
John Mollenkopf demonstrates how New York’s minority groups are exercising an
increasing influence on the city’s politics which started off from increasing conflicts
with the white dominated structures. After seven decades of struggle he points to the
ratio of the share of minority elected officials to the share of minority population in New
York which is substantially better than in London.
The chapters included in this text reflect some of the many themes that were exam-
ined in the two-year project on migration and the transformation of London. Details
of the events and findings of the overall project ‘Migration and the Transformation of 
London’ are at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/research/london/events/HEIF/HEIF5
_12-14/hief5_migration.aspx
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Minimum Wage offered very little protection in this high cost region. Depressed wages
in these entry-level jobs also seem to have significantly reduced interest in job-seek-
ing among groups of Londoners who are unlikely to get anything better. Mitigating
these negative labour market repercussions provides an economic reason, over and
above the social justice one, for seeking an enhanced statutory Minimum Wage in
London, set at a level matching the higher living costs faced by London workers. 
Jonathan Portes points to the lack of detailed research into the impact of migration
on the London economy but argues that, where analysis has been possible, the
impact has been at least neutral, or in some cases positive. Immigrants create about
as many jobs as they occupy, he says, but  the impact on local services, notably hos-
pitals and schools, is significant and he raises questions  about whether the increased
fiscal revenues from migrants balances out the additional public expenditure.
Robert Kloosterman contrasts the two faces of migration in Amsterdam – the low-
paid cleaners and the high-flying CEOs of multinationals from all over the world who
have all contributed to the rebirth of the city – and its role as a global centre. He rais-
es concerns about the many migrants who are barely able to get a decent job and also
established citizens who feel they face unfair competition from newcomers or who feel
alienated by the rapid demographic changes in their neighbourhoods.
Christine Whitehead clarifies that the demand for housing from international
migrants is generally less than that from equivalent UK born households although
those who stay longer will increase demand as incomes rise. She places the concern
about competition for London’s scarce housing supply in the context of a continuing
failure to invest in sufficient homes for London’s overall increasing population.  Rising
rents and house prices are an inevitable outcome which can only worsen if London
remains a successful world city.
David Goodhart suggests that London has become more economically and political-
ly divided, and argues that for ordinary families it is probably the least good place to
live in Britain. He describes London as an insecure, congested transit camp which, he
says, is a result of the unmanaged mass immigration of the past two decades. The
challenge to London politicians, he says, is to make it a more decent place for the mid-
dling majority without losing the economic dynamism and cultural vigour that mass
immigration has brought.
Shamit Saggar points to a new cosmopolitan identity emerging in London where no
one group is now in the majority. The term ethnic minority as a shorthand for deprived
migrant communities has, he says, become less relevant as some groups massively
8
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Settlement patterns of migrants from rich and
poor countries into the London metropolitan
region since 2001 
Kerwin Datu
1. Introduction
This chapter is concerned with where migrants from various types of countries find
themselves settling in the London area, especially in the years between the 2001 and
2011 Censuses. This offers an insight into important socioeconomic questions, such
as whether migrant groups are assimilating into the fabric of society or staying in
racialised neighbourhoods; to what extent one generation of migrants follows their
forebears into the same areas or settles independently, and how migration is impact-
ing on housing and labour markets across the city.
Much debate about migration into London — whether in politics, in the tabloids, on
social media or elsewhere — tends to focus on migrants moving from poorer coun-
tries to London to find economic opportunities not available in their countries of origin.
Yet there are also many thousands of migrants coming from quite wealthy countries
each year, such as European and North American professionals working in finance,
law, design and media. Each of these cohorts need to be looked at separately, and
their distinct geographies compared to understand where migrants are settling and
how they are impacting on broader trends across London.
We also argue that studies of how migrants settle into the London area must now
broaden their view beyond the territory of Greater London itself into the districts and
boroughs outside the green belt from which large numbers of residents now commute.
In addition the geographies of migration into these districts and boroughs outside
1110
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Section 1. The changing pattern of London’s population
Two views of migration in London’s east end:  “Much debate about migration into
London tends to focus on migrants moving from poorer countries to London to find
economic opportunities not available in their countries of origin. Yet there are also
many thousands of migrants coming from quite wealthy countries each year, working
in finance, law, design and media.“
Fulham. Japanese migrants, another wealthy group, established a slightly broader
distribution, settling along a corridor of western boroughs that stretched into
Wimbledon (Merton) in the south and Golders Green (Barnet) in the north (White,
1998; White & Hurdley, 2003).
The question now is whether  these patterns still stand up or need to be re-thought in
the light of the new detailed evidence produced by the 2011 Census and after a
decade with an unprecedented scale of influx. For the first time this Census provides
information on the residential distribution of the foreign-born population broken down
by when they arrived in the UK, as well as by their regions of origin.  This chapter sum-
marises the results of a mapping exercise using the data to chart outcomes of a
dynamic process of settlement by those from successive cohorts of migrants who
have remained in the UK, and were living in the London metropolitan region at the
time of this Census.  The maps (of which a small selection are included here1) provide
snapshots of the latest residences of people who arrived in different waves of immi-
gration from particular regions.  Groups continuing  to  concentrate in one area reflects
both patterns of connectedness and cultural affinity which link one cohort to another;
they may occupy some typical economic niches, of greater/lesser advantage or con-
straint.  Apparent shifts between successive cohorts also reflect a mixture of factors.
These include varying propensities for diffusion as groups become more integrated in
economic and cultural terms, together with some of the lifecycle-related shifts familiar
among those born within the UK – and some differences in the types of people com-
ing to the UK from a given region in different political/economic circumstances.
Interpreting the contributions of each involves a combination of judgment and contex-
tual knowledge. 
A limitation with the local census data available for mapping on this basis is that it only
provides a rather coarse grouping of overseas regions of origin.  Thus, for example,
we cannot distinguish between the countries of South Asia, nor separately identify the
Caribbean as another of the major regions of origin of migration to London in past
decades.  Following Peach, and the evidence on differences in patterns of economic
integration and durations of stay in Gordon et al. (2007), the main emphasis here is
on contrasts between migrants originating from  poor countries (in the global ‘south’
and the European ‘east’) versus those coming  from (other) relatively rich countries.
For this purpose, though we cannot separate out, for example, Japan/Korea or South
Africa from  their poorer neighbours, the only  major problem is presented by the cen-
sus’s conflation of the (‘poor country’) Caribbean with (‘rich  country’) North America.
In this case, we use an approximation based on differences in the time profiles of
13
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Greater London are not simply an extrapolation of the geographies of migration into
Greater London itself; settlement into the two areas exhibit very different patterns,
which needs to be understood in order to predict their distinct impacts on the labour
and housing markets.
2. The pre-census consensus and the 2011 evidence on patterns of settlement
in the metropolitan region
Existing research into the geographies of migration into the London area has been
concerned with how various migrant groups settle into and disperse within the Greater
London area over time, and thus with the related question of the degree to which
groups assimilate within the fabric of London society or remain within specific locali-
ties. These two tendencies are what the geographer Ceri Peach (1997) calls the
“assimilationist” or ‘melting pot’ and the ‘pluralist’ models of ‘ethnic minority adjust-
ment’ to a new city. It has long been held that ethnic populations as a whole have been
dispersing from their initial settlement areas, partly as white populations disperse
beyond the green belt (Peach, 1999; Stillwell, 2010).
However there are important differences between individual migrant groups. Peach
(1997 p20) identifies that “in London, the Caribbean population is following the melt-
ing pot route in spatial and marital terms, while the Bangladeshi population is follow-
ing the pluralist route. Indian patterns contain elements of each, but [the data] sug-
gests more pluralist than melting pot trajectory”. The casual observer may see in
Brixton the perfect example of a melting pot where Caribbean and white populations
have become completely intermingled, while in Neasden or Whitechapel they see
quite homogeneous communities of Indians and Bangladeshis respectively.
But the casual observer may also visit South Kensington and remark upon the great
numbers of French, Italians and North Americans living there. We are prone to think-
ing of migrants to cities like London as coming from relatively poor countries, yet there
is also an important history of migrants from rich countries to be traced. Geographer
Paul White (1998) identified that migrants from North America, Australasia and
Europe had together established a distinct concentration pattern that differs substan-
tially from those created by other, poorer ethnic groups. It was generally understood
that migrants from poorer countries tended to be found in London’s less expensive
inner boroughs such as Tower Hamlets (Bangladeshis), Southwark and Lewisham
(Caribbeans) as well as throughout outer boroughs north of the river (Indians).
Migrants from wealthier countries tended to concentrate in more expensive inner-west
boroughs such as Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea and Hammersmith and
12
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in relation to migrant flows from poor countries, including specifically South Asia, the
Caribbean and Eastern Europe; and in section 4, I look at migrants  from rich coun-
tries, with specific reference to North America and Australia/New Zealand; and finally,
I look at the most distinctive new pattern, the increasing number of urban centres in
the outer metropolitan ring now with large numbers of migrants from poor countries.
3. ‘Poor country’ migrants
In the decades before 2000, the spatial pattern of settlement of migrants into this
region from poor countries was seen mostly in terms of migrants from the Caribbean
and from South Asian countries – with growing inflows from various parts of Africa
often treated as following something like the Caribbean pattern.  The very rapid emer-
gence of large scale migration from the EU accession countries of Eastern Europe
from 2004 was quite distinct from those who came before or during the Communist
era. It seems to involve a quite distinct pattern of settlement but was constrained by
some economic factors rather similar to those faced by others coming from poor coun-
tries to this expensive city-region. 
Southern Asians
Southern Asians arriving between 2001 and 2011 have settled into three major areas
of concentration within Greater London, and in a number of discrete urban centres
outside it. Within London, one area spans the western outer boroughs of Brent,
Harrow, Ealing, Hounslow and Hillingdon, with focal points in Wembley (Brent),
Southall (Ealing) and Hounslow Central. Another area spans the eastern boroughs of
Newham, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Barking and Dagenham, and
Greenwich, with focal points in Upton Park-East Ham (Newham), Ilford (Redbridge),
Barking, and Plumstead (Greenwich). A third, lighter area spans the southern outer
boroughs of Croydon, Merton, Sutton, Kingston and Wandsworth, with a focal point in
Croydon. Outside London, focal points are in several urban centres to the west and
south, in particular Slough, Aldershot (Rushmoor), Reading, Crawley and Luton.
Southern Asians who arrived before 2001 are now distributed across only slightly
more diffuse versions of the same major areas of concentration within London and of
the urban centres outside it. There is an almost continuous diffuse zone of settlement
across the north of outer London, from Slough and South Buckinghamshire in the
west, driving through Hillingdon, Ealing, Hounslow, Brent and Harrow, spreading
across Barnet and Enfield, and into Waltham Forest, Redbridge, Newham and Tower
Hamlets, with focal points in Southall-Hounslow, Wembley and Kingsbury (Brent-
15
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arrival. Though both migrant flows have been continuous, the Caribbean inflow was
clearly dominant before 1981, and the North American one thereafter.  Up to a cut-off
point of 1980, we have assigned all migrants from this combined ‘region’ to our ‘poor-
country’ set, and migrants arriving afterwards to our ‘rich-country’ set.  Overall we then
assigned each census regional category to either a ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ country  as set out
in table 1 below:
Much of the existing scholarship on migration into the London region is concerned
only with migration into Greater London, without regard for the districts and boroughs
beyond the green belt. In the first decades of the 21st century, this restrictive view is
becoming increasingly untenable, as a number of commuter towns within these dis-
tricts begin to play a role in receiving recent generations of migrants. One indication
that a wider metropolitan view is required is the consensus mentioned earlier that
white populations have been moving out to areas beyond the green belt round
London. If this is so, are these all British populations, or are there also migrants set-
tling in these areas? And what geographies of settlement arise amongst them? To
explore this dimension, this paper expands its geographic frame to the London met-
ropolitan region (LMR) using a definition of this region common in the literature (since
Hall, 1963), adding to Greater London some 53 local authority areas in adjoining
counties in a ring running (roughly) from Reading in the west to Southend/Medway in
the east, and Stevenage in the north to Horsham in the south.  2011 census data in
the LMR 2011 is mapped in terms of  region of birth and arrival period at neighbour-
hood (lower super output area) level.  The remainder of this chapter presents a selec-
tion of the maps, with a summary of what these show. In section 3, this is  discussed
14
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‘Rich countries’ ‘Poor countries’
EU pre-2001 member states EU post-2001 member states
Australasia European countries not in the EU
North America and the Caribbean (post-
1980) North America and the Caribbean (pre-
1980
Central and South America
Middle East, Africa, and Asia
Table 1 The ‘rich-country’ and ‘poor-country’ categories used in this chapter
Caribbeans
Peach (1997) argued that, in contrast to the Southern Asians, Caribbeans exhibited
an assimilationist mode of integration into London. It is difficult to assess this state-
ment based on the 2011 census data since many of these groups have been estab-
lished in London for several decades, yet one can suggest that the nature of disper-
sion here is the opposite to that seen amongst the Southern Asians; more recent
arrivals appear more spatially dispersed than their predecessors. Those arriving
before 1961 are concentrated in three major areas of London, as well as lightly scat-
tered across districts to the west outside Greater London. One area spans the west-
ern boroughs of Brent, Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, Ealing
and Harrow, particularly along the Harrow Road crossing the boroughs of Brent,
Hammersmith and Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea. Another spans the northern bor-
oughs of Enfield, Haringey, Hackney, Waltham Forest, Newham and Redbridge, along
the A10 (the ancient Ermine Street) to the west of the Lea Valley between Edmonton
and Hackney. A third forms an incomplete ring spanning the south London boroughs
of Croydon, Merton, Wandsworth, Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham, with focal
points in Thornton Heath (Croydon), Brixton (Lambeth) and Catford (Lewisham). The
few major focal points outside London for this generation of Caribbeans are Luton,
High Wycombe and Reading.
Those arriving between 1961 and 1980 find themselves occupying the same areas of
concentration and focal points both within London and in outlying towns such as
Luton, High Wycombe and Reading, but have spread out into neighbouring areas
(see figure 2). Peach (1997) might argue that this demonstrates a process of assimi-
lation in contrast to the Southern Asians’ isolation. Here there might  simply be a dif-
ferent kind of assimilation process, notably one in which later generations attempt to
settle in the same areas as their predecessors, but find themselves spread further out.
This may be because of weaker social ties or less emphasis on maintaining geo-
graphic proximity with social ties enabling successive generations of Caribbeans to
spread further out than Southern Asians. It may also have been a result of market
forces pushing later arrivals away from their social connections despite the strength
of those ties. It is  important to be cautious in deciding whether assimilation or isola-
tion is occurring based purely on absolute changes in the numbers of different ethnic
groups in each location from one census to another. In any case, in general any dis-
persion  in the Caribbean population from one generation to the next is extremely
slight. Like the Southern Asians, the geography of Caribbean migrants into London
exhibits remarkable constancy over time.
17
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Harrow) in the west, and Upton Park, Ilford, Redbridge central and Whitechapel
(Tower Hamlets) in the east. Outside London, migrants have diffused slightly away
from the urban centres of Luton, Reading, Crawley and Slough, with other focal points
appearing in High Wycombe and Watford.
Compared to  Peach’s study (1997) using 1991 census data which shows an almost
identical geography of concentrations, notably of Indians in Brent-Harrow, Ealing-
Hounslow, Redbridge-Newham and Croydon-Wandsworth, and of Bangladeshis in
Tower Hamlets, the geography of Southern Asian migrants into London exhibits
remarkable continuity from decade to decade, seemingly in keeping with Peach’s
(1997) thesis that these groups have followed an isolationist or ‘pluralist’ mode of inte-
gration (see figure 1). This phenomenon of highly localised chain migration exists
even in towns outside the green belt such as Luton, Reading, Slough and Crawley.
Yet there is another way to read this data which contradicts the ‘pluralist’ hypothesis,
which is that this reflects the nature of their arrival only, not the nature of their disper-
sion or lack of it after arrival. Recent generations arrive in the same locations as their
predecessors due to chain migration, while their predecessors assimilate slowly over
time, evidenced by their slow dispersion away from these locations.  
16
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Figure 1 South Asian-born residents, arriving after 2000, as a proportion of all
2011 local residents
by a third area of concentration in the east London borough of Newham, focused on
Beckton, north of the Royal Docks; this is associated with a wave of Lithuanians.
In the 2000s these patterns have transformed into a general arc of settlement
throughout the outer boroughs, stretching from west of London, through to Hillingdon,
Hounslow, Ealing, Brent, Barnet, Haringey, Waltham Forest and Newham. Other focal
points exist south of the Thames around Colliers Wood (Merton) and Streatham
(Lambeth) (see figure 3). More recent waves of migrants from post-2001 EU member
countries are therefore not significantly following their predecessors  as a chain migra-
tion phenomenon. Rather, the fact that these groups now mimic the geography of
other ‘poor country’ migrant groups such as Southern Asians suggests that econom-
ic forces rather than social forces are now the stronger determinants of the location of
their settlement within Greater London.
The 2000s also saw the emergence of several strong poles of immigration in urban
centres throughout the local authority areas outside Greater London, in particular
Slough, Luton, Reading, Crawley, Watford, Hatfield, and, in the east, Thurrock,
Gravesend, Southend-on-Sea, Gillingham (Medway) and Maidstone. Being a very
19
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East Europeans
A comparison of recent migrants from EU post-2001 member states with their prede-
cessors shows a strong break in settlement patterns between the generations, both
within London and outside. This is indicative of several distinct waves of migration
related to major historical developments in central and eastern Europe, such as the
end of the Second World War, the fall of the Iron Curtain, and  accession to the
European Union; it is also a symptom of the heterogeneity of this category.
In the sequence above we can see how one pattern of settlement transformed into
another. In the 1970s, most migration in this category was concentrated in the outer
north London boroughs of Enfield, Haringey and Barnet, spilling into adjacent areas
of Hertsmere, Welwyn Hatfield and Broxbourne, with a focal point stretching across
Palmers Green, Winchmore Hill and Cockfosters, associated with a wave of Greek
and Turkish Cypriots. In the 1980s this pattern was slowing down, and a new area of
concentration was developing in the outer western borough of Ealing, focused along
the West Ruislip branch of the Central Line - North Acton, Hanger Lane and Perivale
stations - associated with a wave of Polish migrants. In the 1990s these were joined
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Figure 2 Caribbeans (and North Americans), arriving before 1961 as a proportion
of 2011 local population
Figure 3 East Europeans born in post-2001 EU member countries arriving 2001 –
2011, as a proportion of 2011 local residents
the first decade of the 21st century.  The reason for this cannot be simply understood
from the maps. It may be that strong demand from other groups with more purchas-
ing power (including rich country migrants and UK-born gentrifiers colonising inner
areas) are effectively ‘ghettoising’ recent migrants in cheaper neighbourhoods,
already dominated by poorer migrants. It may also be that recent arrivals are most
affected by ‘chain migration’ processes, using pre-existing social ties with people who
settled earlier to determine the location of their (initial) settlement within the region.
The other side of that picture, however, is of a substantial diffusion of more estab-
lished migrants, spreading out from the areas of initial concentration, in search of
improved housing opportunities. Overall, however, it is a different mixture of each for
specific migrant groups.
In the 1990s a small number of towns outside the green belt —  Luton, Slough,
Reading and High Wycombe —  were focal points for ‘poor country’ migrants but in
the last ten years they have been joined by Hatfield, Watford, Crawley, Aldershot and
Farnborough (Rushmoor), Guildford, and, in the east, Thurrock, Gravesham,
Gillingham (Medway) and Maidstone. This new geography will probably become an
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heterogeneous category, this new regional pattern is also most likely a result of eco-
nomic rather than social forces, indicative of a new pattern where “poor country”
migrants are being sorted into the inexpensive outer boroughs and outlying urban
centres rather than concentrating in the expensive inner boroughs.
All ‘poor country’ migrants  
When we map ‘poor country’ migrants together, we see not only a combination of the
historically distinctive settlement patterns of the South Asians on the one hand and the
Caribbeans on the other, but also some broader housing market influences, which
also shaped the settlement pattern of the most recent wave of East European arrivals.
It is clear now, in contrast to observations about previous migration into London that
‘poor country’ migrants are not especially concentrated in inner areas.  Rather they
seem to be generally settling into the outer London boroughs. This is seen both
among the post-2001 arrivals and those who came earlier, though more notably
among the latter, who are strongly represented almost throughout outer London – with
the notable exception now of the eastern/south eastern fringe (from Havering to
Bromley).  Patterns of concentration seem more tightly drawn among those arriving in
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Figure 4 Residents born in ‘poor countries’ arriving before 2001 as a proportion of
all local residents in 2011
Figure 5  Residents born in ‘poor countries’ arriving 2001-2011 as a proportion of
all local residents in 2011
ent mix of people from those who have been there longer.  However, as well as signs
of local diffusion around the areas of initial concentration, there seems to be a quite
distinct manner of dispersal (or selection) for this group into the districts outside
London. While ‘poor country’ migrants move out only to specific, (relatively) inexpen-
sive urban centres,  ‘rich country’ migrants permeate rural areas throughout the west-
ern half of the outer metropolitan area which reflects their higher incomes, greater
capacity for mobility and a preference for larger spaces. Once again however this is
a pattern perceived only when the metropolitan region is taken as a whole.
5.  Beyond the M25
Overall, at the metropolitan scale a slightly complex concentric pattern emerges
focused on the western inner London boroughs. At the centre is the wealthy City of
Westminster and immediate surrounding areas, home to wealthy migrants from North
America, Australasia and Western Europe. Outside these areas, in the inner east
London boroughs and throughout the outer boroughs, is a thick band of poorer
migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Asia, and Africa.
Beyond the green belt is a wide expanse of wealthy villages and towns set in rural
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increasing feature of migration into the London metropolitan region, and demonstrates
the need to continue to examine migration at this regional level.
‘Rich country’ migrants 
North Americans 
The wave of North Americans migrants settling in London towards the end of the 20th
century exhibits a very different geography to the ‘poor-country’ migrants reviewed
thus far. Those arriving in the 1990s concentrated throughout the inner London bor-
oughs, with focal points in St John’s Wood, Marylebone, Mayfair, Kensington,
Hampstead and the City of London, all very wealthy residential areas. The geography
of North Americans’ settlement outside the green belt proves very different as well,
with focal points emerging to the south west in the wealthy villages of Cobham
(Elmbridge) and Virginia Water (Runnymede), both associated with American private
schools which opened in Cobham in 1975 and in Egham (Runnymede) in 1995.
Another focal point is in Beaconsfield (South Bucks).
Australasia
The long history of migration between London and the Antipodes has seen many
Australians and New Zealanders very deeply assimilated within the London metropol-
itan region. Amongst those arriving before 2001, many have ended up in Richmond
and Kingston and throughout the counties surrounding Greater London. There are
also similar inner London settlement patterns to their North American counterparts,
with focal points in St John’s Wood and Mayfair. This reflects a tendency, greater than
that of North Americans, to assimilate within the wealthy outer residential areas of
Greater London as well as some inner London areas.
All ‘rich country’ migrants
When all ‘rich country’ migrants are taken together, they appear to saturate the inner
west London boroughs, with strong concentrations throughout Westminster,
Kensington and Chelsea, Camden and Lambeth. The areas of concentration of new
arrivals in particular are generally quite distinct from most of those coming in from
poor countries, with a bias toward neighbourhoods which are both central and rela-
tively ‘desirable’ which is reflected in higher house prices. Differentiating location pat-
terns between post-2001 arrivals and those who have been in the UK longer is a bit
more problematic for this group. They include young professionals who move on after
a few years, which means that the recently arrived group may include a quite differ-
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Figure 6 Residents born in other ‘rich countries’ arriving 2001-2011 as a 
proportion of all local residents in 2011
6. Conclusion
Migration into the London area is now a phenomenon to be appreciated at the metro-
politan scale, not because settlement patterns once confined to the 33 boroughs of
Greater London are now expanding into surrounding districts, but rather because
these outlying districts, now integral to the dynamics of migration into London, are
exhibiting a different pattern to Greater London entirely, which we have churlishly
termed ‘ghettoisation in the countryside’.
If ‘poor-country’ migrants are now living in great numbers in these commuter towns
outside the green belt, there will be policy implications for the metropolitan region.
First, the potential demands this places on rail services between these commuter
towns and Greater London need to be understood, as do the impacts that this com-
muting has on the disposable incomes and social well-being of the ‘poor country’
migrants making these long journeys every day. Second, the emergence of larger
concentrations of lower-cost labour in otherwise rural areas may gradually cause
changes in the structure of the regional labour economy.
1This is an edited version of a paper prepared for LSE London which includes a full set
of maps and can be found at
http://lselondonmigration.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/datu_settlement-patterns-of-rich-
and-poor-country-migrants-into-the-london-metropolitan-region-since-2001.pdf
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landscapes, though studded at intervals across these landscapes are a few commuter
towns where many poorer migrants now find themselves, as living in London has
become increasingly difficult. This belt of rural settlement is however lopsided; due to
the lower population densities (and lower levels of transport infrastructure) in counties
to the east of London such as Essex and Kent, there has been little cause for migrants
to cluster on the eastern fringes of the region.
Extrapolating this concentric pattern around London to the counties outside the green
belt, one might easily have hypothesised that as the population of the London area
expands beyond the capacity of Greater London this simple pattern might simply have
enlarged in diameter. Wealthy migrants might push further into the outer boroughs,
and poorer migrants would be pushed beyond the green belt, but this has not hap-
pened. Instead wealthy populations have leapfrogged the outer boroughs to settle
throughout the counties outside London. In addition, these wealthy populations
appear to have settled only throughout the western half of the region outside London,
just as they began in the western inner boroughs of London. We could have imagined
that poorer migrants might be pushed towards the eastern half of the region outside
London, just as they are in the  inner eastern boroughs. This has not happened either.
Instead, the pattern is that as larger numbers of poorer migrants find themselves set-
tling beyond the green belt, they are doing so in a highly localised way, concentrating
in the centres of a number of commuter towns, mainly in the west rather than in the
east of the counties outside London. To caricature this slightly, this is a kind of ‘ghet-
toisation in the countryside’ phenomenon that could not easily have been extrapolat-
ed from the geography of migration into Greater London. This is the most distinctive
feature of migration into the London area to emerge between the 2001 and 2011
Censuses.
Looking at this sequence in detail, there are really only four towns outside Greater
London that are prominent focal points for ‘poor-country’ migrants who arrived in the
1980s and 1990s: Luton, Crawley and Slough. (Moor Park in Three Rivers district
could also be included but this comprises more well-to-do Southern Asians enjoying
direct access into London on the Metropolitan Line.) A great number of focal points
bloom however for ‘poor country’ migrants arriving throughout the 2000s, including
Aldershot, Farnborough, Guildford, High Wycombe, Hatfield, Watford, Thurrock,
Gravesham, Gillingham and Maidstone. This is important, since it indicates that a tip-
ping point has been reached since the beginning of the 21st century, and that migra-
tion directly into commuter towns outside the green belt is likely to be an increasingly
important feature of migration into the London area.
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Migrant trajectories in London - ‘spreading
wings’ or facing displacement? 
Antoine Paccoud
Introduction
This chapter is based on an empirical investigation into the settlement patterns of
migrant groups in Greater London. It uses an estimation procedure that draws on both
country of birth and ethnicity data from the 2001 and 2011 censuses to compare the
movements of those born overseas to those of second generation migrants in
London. The focus is on the experiences of five particular migrant groups for which it
is possible to differentiate between those born overseas and second generation
migrants: migrants of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Black Caribbean, Black African and
Indian origin. Separating out and comparing the movements of those born in the UK
and of those born overseas from those migrant groups allows me to test two compet-
ing explanations of migrant trajectories. The first can be called ‘spreading wings’ and
is identifiable by the two parallel movements of consolidation of areas of first settle-
ment by those born overseas and of local expansion by those born in the UK. The sec-
ond is displacement, identifiable by the similarity of the movements of those born
overseas and of second generation migrants across the London space. These two
explanations present contrasting trajectories. The first suggests that a migrant group
has managed to carve out a piece of its own in the city while the second signals an
inability by the migrant group to stay in the areas where it first settled. The first sec-
tion outlines the estimation procedure and discusses its limitations, while the follow-
ing sections discuss the trajectories of these five migrants groups in terms of these
two models.
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“Migrants of Bangladeshi origin are the most spatially concentrated of all migrant
groups, with 41% of those born in Bangladesh and 40.5% of  UK born Bangladeshis
living in Tower Hamlets in 2001. These percentages fell quite dramatically between
2001 and 2011.”
because only 52.8% of migrants born in Africa identify as Black African. These percent-
ages are lowest for those born in North Africa (12.2%) and South and Eastern Africa
(34.1%). In contrast, 87.4% of those born in Central and Western Africa self-identify as
Black African. To disaggregate between those born in Africa and second generation
migrants, the focus has to be limited to migrants from Africa who are black. As a pre-
cautionary measure, migrants born in North Africa and South and Eastern Africa (with
the exception of Somalia) are not considered when distinguishing between Black
Africans born in the UK and those born in Africa. 61.9% of those who identified as the
mixed category ‘White and Black African’ in London in 2011 were born in the UK and
73.1% were born in Europe. While adding this category to second generation Black
Africans is slightly problematic, it was preferable to discarding this group altogether.
This estimation procedure is possible for migrants of Irish and Chinese origin but for
reasons of space this analysis was restricted to the five largest migrant groups in
London. A limitation of this methodology is the existence of a number of ethnicity cat-
egories that cannot be specifically linked to one of the five migrant groups discussed
here but which may include significant numbers of their second generation migrants.
For example, the 2011 Census showed that in London, 70.2% of those who selected
Black Other as their ethnicity were born in the UK but it is not possible to distinguish
those who may be second generation migrants from the Caribbean from those who
may be second generation migrants from Africa. Likewise, 71.9% of the Mixed White
and Asian category were born in the UK but this cannot be attached to a particular
Asian community. Another ethnicity category in this situation is that of Other Mixed,
with 64% of those who chose this ethnicity born in the UK.2 This analysis thus
assumes that the percentage of second generation migrants from the five migrants
groups discussed here that have selected either Black Other, Mixed White and Asian
or Other Mixed as their ethnicity is relatively constant across London OAs. 
This analysis is also unable to differentiate between those born in the country of ori-
gin on the basis of their date of arrival in the UK. The only information available here
is the comparison of the numbers of those born in a particular country in 2001 and
2011. Most of the increase in those born in a particular country at the OA level in this
period can be assumed to have recently arrived in the UK. The remainder of the paper
will look at the changes in the settlement patterns of individuals of the five largest
migrant groups to test the usefulness of the notions of ‘spreading wings’ and displace-
ment in conceptualising migrant trajectories. 
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Separating out those born overseas from those born in the UK
This paper uses two data sets from the 2001 and 2011 censuses: usual residents
grouped by country of birth and usual residents grouped by ethnicity. The estimation
procedure distinguishes between those born in the UK and those born overseas with-
in the same migrant group. While information on country of birth clearly provides a fig-
ure for those born overseas, the difficulty is in obtaining the number of second gener-
ation migrants given that ethnicity is not linked to country of birth. The procedure used
here starts with a particular ethnicity and subtracts from that figure the number of indi-
viduals born in the corresponding country of origin. For example, there were 77,715
individuals born in Bangladesh in London in 2001. In that same year, there were
141,879 individuals who selected Bangladeshi as their ethnicity. The number of those
of Bangladeshi origin born in the UK was obtained by simply taking out those born in
Bangladesh from those who self-selected Bangladeshi as their ethnicity. This proce-
dure was performed at the output area (OA) level, the lowest geographical level at
which census estimates are available – there are 23,406 output areas in Greater
London that are comparable between 2001 and 2011 with an average population of
328 in 2011. Working at this scale allows more precise calculations of correlation coef-
ficients between the movements of those migrant groups born in the UK and of those
born in the country of origin. This will become clear when the differences between cor-
relation coefficients at the borough and all-OA levels are discussed1. 
This procedure is most straightforward for migrants of Indian, Pakistani and
Bangladeshi origin because the census provides a country of birth category and an
ethnicity category for each of these groups. Another group for which it is relatively
straightforward is migrants of Caribbean origin. Those born overseas can be assumed
to be represented by those migrants born in Jamaica and in ‘other Caribbean coun-
tries’, while second generation migrants can be estimated by subtracting these from
the black Caribbean ethnicity category. This relies on the assumption that most
migrants born in the Caribbean would select Black Caribbean as their ethnicity which
seems justified as the populations of English speaking Caribbean islands are predom-
inantly of black ethnicity (91.4% in Jamaica in 2011, a country which makes up 61%
of all migrants born in the Caribbean in London). 90.2% of those who selected the
mixed category ‘White and Black Caribbean’ as their ethnicity in London were born in
the UK in 2011. It thus seems possible to add those who selected this ethnicity to the
second generation migrants of Caribbean origin.  
With the greater racial heterogeneity of the African continent, things are a little more
complicated. The census only identifies a Black African ethnicity, which is problematic
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and 2011: from 13.9% to 19.4% for those BIB and from 13.7% to 14.8% for UKBB.
The settlement pattern of both those groups in Newham is more diffuse, with lower
correlation coefficients, both between groups (0.869 in 2001 and 0.739 in 2011) and
within groups (0.673 in 2001 and 0.686 in 2011). This could indicate a more ad hoc
movement into Newham from those, mostly BIB, who left (or had to leave) Tower
Hamlets. But the movement out of Tower Hamlets is also having repercussions fur-
ther east, with increases of both those BIB and UKBB in Redbridge and Barking and
Dagenham. In Redbridge, the proportion of the BIB population increased from 2.9%
to 6.9% and that of UKBB from 2.9% to 8.2%. In Barking and Dagenham, the corre-
sponding figures are from 0.4% to 3% for those BIB and from 0.5% to 4% for UKBB. 
Overall, the high correlation coefficient between the changes in settlement of those
BIB and UKBB both at the borough and all-OA level can be explained by their similar
movements out of Tower Hamlets and into the boroughs further eastwards, even
though Newham seems to be preferred by BIB migrants (see maps below). There is
also a strong similarity in the movements within these boroughs, as shown by the high
intra-borough correlation coefficients between the movements of those BIB and
UKBB: the highest correlations are in Barking and Dagenham (0.847), Tower Hamlets
(0.825) and Redbridge (0.686) with a lower figure for Newham (0.489). The data also
shows a higher vulnerability of those BIB to processes of change, with greater falls in
the proportion of their population in central London boroughs and especially in
Camden, the borough with the third highest concentration of both groups in 2001
(-3% for those BIB and -1.8% for UKBB). It seems quite clear that the large fall in the
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An evaluation of five migrant trajectories
The empirical discussion that follows focuses on assessing the extent to which the
‘spreading wings’ or displacement models offer cogent explanations of the trajectories
of migrant communities in London. The first model would, for a given migrant group,
be corroborated by lower correlations between the movements of those born in the
UK and overseas and the existence of boroughs in which these two groups are mov-
ing in opposite directions. This would signal that different sections of this migrant
group are moving to different areas of the city. In contrast, in the displacement model,
higher correlations between the movements of those born in the UK and overseas and
boroughs in which these are moving in the same direction would signal a common
response by both groups to wider processes of change. This displacement model is
thus predicated on the inability of particular migrant groups to maintain their hold over
the areas of the city in which they first settled. Continuity of settlement in these areas
is broken and migrants of different generations tend to gravitate to similar spaces in
the city. The next five short sections will test these ideas on the experiences of the
Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Caribbean, African and Indian migrant groups.
Bangladesh
Between 2001 and 2011, the population category Born in Bangladesh (BIB) increased
from 77,715 to 98,671 while the population of UK Born Bangladeshis (UKBB) went
from 65,946 to 100,791. The addition of close to 21,000 individuals BIB indicates a
continued migration flow to London, though most of the increase in the Bangladeshi
migrant population has come among those born in Britain. The movements of individ-
uals BIB and UKBB in London over 2001 to 2011 period exhibit the highest level of
correlation among the five groups looked at here, at both the all-OA level (0.725) and
the borough level (0.889). Part of the reason for this is the fact that migrants of
Bangladeshi origin are the most spatially concentrated of all migrant groups, with 41%
of those BIB and 40.5% of the UKBB living in Tower Hamlets in 2001. These percent-
ages fell quite dramatically between 2001 and 2011: down to 33.2% for those BIB and
35.2% for UKBB. This fall has been biggest in the 100 OAs where both of these
groups were most concentrated in 2001. These 100 Tower Hamlets OAs housed
19.3% of all those BIB and 19.4% of all UKBB in 2001, but the corresponding percent-
ages for 2011 were 12.2% and 12.8%. There was almost no change in the proportion
of these groups in the remaining 459 Tower Hamlets OAs. 
After Tower Hamlets, Newham has the second highest concentration of this migrant
group and this borough’s share of their total population has increased between 2001
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Migrants born in Bangladesh Bangladeshis born in the UK
the UK and in Pakistan thus share the same broad spaces within the city. But they are
also moving in a very similar manner. When seen from the borough level, both groups
are showing a slight movement towards the edges of outer London, with the largest
increases in borough share of total population in Redbridge (+3.6% for those BIP and
+3.3% for UKBP), Barking and Dagenham (+1.6% and +1.3%) and Hillingdon (+1.9%
and +1.1%) and the largest decreases in the more central boroughs of Ealing (-1.5%
and -1.1%) and Brent (-1.2% and -0.6%). In Newham, however, the number of UKBP
decreased by 1.2% while those BIP remained stable. But the map above reveals sim-
ilar movements by these two groups of Pakistani migrants in Newham and its two
neighbouring boroughs – Waltham Forest and Redbridge. It seems as though both
groups are responding to similar processes of change, with no group clearly more or
less vulnerable than the other. 
The relatively lower correlation in the movement of the two types of Pakistani migrants
when all OAs are taken into consideration hides significant variations in borough by
borough correlations at the OA level. While the correlation for all 23,406 London OAs
is at 0.384, this figure climbs to 0.572 for Barking and Dagenham and to 0.557 for
Merton. There are eight boroughs in which the borough level OA correlation coefficient
between the movements of those BIP and for UKBP is higher than the coefficient for
all London OAs. Two of these are Barking and Dagenham and Redbridge, the two
boroughs which have seen the largest increase in their shares of both those BIP and
of UKBP, and the neighbouring Waltham Forest. It thus seems that there is a strong
similarity in the way in which those born overseas and those born in the UK move in
this population cluster at the north eastern edge of London. There also seems to be
a similarity in the movements of these two groups in Merton and Wandsworth. It is not
clear why the three remaining boroughs show such similarity in the movements of the
two groups, but it is significant that all three (Brent, Haringey and Greenwich) show
departures of both groups between 2001 and 2011. Perhaps both groups are facing
similar processes of displacement in these three relatively central boroughs. Overall
it is clear  displacement is a cogent explanation of the movement of Pakistani migrants
in London.
Migrants of Caribbean origin
There does not seem to be an increase in migrants who were Born in the Caribbean
(BIC) between 2001 and 2011: there were 136,477 such individuals in 2001 and
136,851 in 2011. This could be due to some moving out of London during that period,
or it may also be a sign that migration from the Caribbean has come almost to a halt.
In contrast, there are 35,572 more UK Born Caribbeans (UKBC) in 2011 than in 2001
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concentration of migrants of Bangladeshi origin in Tower Hamlets and their similar
movements eastwards corresponds to the displacement model. 
Pakistan
While migrants of Bangladeshi origin are overwhelmingly in inner London, those of
Pakistani origin are predominantly in outer London. The number of those Born in
Pakistan (BIP) and of UK Born Pakistanis (UKBP) has increased over the 2001 to
2011 period: from 63,944 to 105,862 for the former and from 75,932 to 105,561 for the
latter. There has thus been a larger increase of those BIP (41,918) than of UKBP
(30,629) which signals a continued and significant migration flow into London. After
migrants of Bangladeshi origins, BIP and UKBP had the second most similar change
in their patterns of settlement between 2001 and 2011, with a correlation coefficient of
0.384. This may not indicate very similar movements, but at borough level the corre-
lation coefficient shoots up to 0.915 (the highest among all groups), an indication that
whatever variation exists may be occurring at a very local level. 
This can be seen by looking at the distribution of these two groups by borough: the
same seven boroughs house roughly 62% of those BIP and of UKBP, and this is true
for both 2001 and 2011 figures. The four boroughs with the larger proportion are:
Newham (14% of those BIP and 12.9% of UKBP), Waltham Forest (11.6% and
12.2%), Redbridge (9.6% and 11%) and Ealing (8.2% and 7.9%). Pakistanis born in
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borough to a much greater extent than that of UKBC. Could it be that UKBC have cho-
sen to leave the borough altogether? In general, it is clear that both first wave
migrants from the Caribbean and their children have felt displacement pressures in a
number of the central London boroughs where they concentrate and that they seem
to have responded in roughly similar ways – evidence which points towards a dis-
placement type explanation even though the all-OA correlation coefficient was rela-
tively low. If any hypothesis is to be made it is that the data indicates that UKBC are
facing stronger displacement pressures than those BIC, with higher departures from
the inner London boroughs of Lambeth, Newham, Haringey, Southwark and
Lewisham. 
Migrants of African origin
In contrast to migrants from the Caribbean, migrants of African origin are the group
with the strongest increase in those born overseas: the number of African Born Blacks
(ABB) has almost doubled between 2001 and 2011, from 157,783 to 300,520. They
are also the only group whose born overseas outnumber those born in the UK. UK
Born Black Africans (UKBBA – including those who selected White and Black African
as their ethnicity) did still increase significantly between the censuses: from 234,552
in 2001 to 292,253. These figures indicate a vibrant flow of migrants into London.
Migrants of African origin present a very similar pattern to those of Pakistani and
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- which includes those who selected White and Black Caribbean as their ethnicity.
There were 264,817 of them in 2001 and 301,389 in 2011. It is thus possible to
assume that the individuals BIC mostly arrived in the UK during the periods of
strongest flow of migrants from the Caribbean in the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly to
migrants of Pakistani origin, migrants of Caribbean origin have a high correlation in
the change in settlement pattern between 2001 and 2011 at borough level (0.758).
When all London OAs are considered the correlation between the changes in these
two groups is the lowest of the five migrant groups looked at in detail (0.221). Again,
this highlights a similar broad movement with important local differences in emphasis. 
This group is more spread out than either the Bangladeshi or Pakistani migrants:
there are eleven London boroughs with more than 4% shares of migrants of
Caribbean origin, with the largest concentrations in 2011 in Croydon (8.4% of those
BIC and 9.3% of UKBC), Lewisham (9% and 8.6%) and Lambeth (8.8% and 8.1%).
There has been a notable shift from inner to outer London between 2001 and 2011,
and this can be seen in the largest departures from Brent (-1% and -1.2% of the share
of the total populations of those BIC and UKBC between 2001 and 2011), Lambeth 
(-0.5% and -1.1%) and Newham (-0.5% and -1.1%). In fact, the proportion of migrants
of Caribbean origin has been falling in most inner London boroughs (13 out of 15 for
those BIC and 11 out of 15 for UKBC). The largest increase was in Croydon (+2% for
those BIC and +1.2% for UKBC), with smaller increases in Barking and Dagenham,
Bromley and Enfield.
At the individual OA level, any strong correlation between the settlement patterns of
those BIC and of UKBC disappears (correlation coefficient of 0.221). But again, this
hides a variety of experiences within boroughs. There are 7 boroughs in which the
correlation coefficient is higher than the all-OA figure, with the highest correlations in
Lewisham (0.338), Redbridge (0.314) and Brent (0.302). The case of Brent (where
both groups saw similar population losses) seems to point towards a common
process of displacement which can be linked to similar configurations of relatively high
correlations at the OA level within boroughs and common loss of population in three
more of these 7 boroughs: Lambeth, Southwark and Hackney. There also seems to
be a similar shift from Redbridge to Barking and Dagenham for these groups.
The case of Lewisham is intriguing because of divergent patterns at borough level:
those BIC had an increase in their share in this borough (+0.9%) while UKBC saw a
decrease (-0.3%). However, a more detailed look (see maps) indicates that both
groups have felt displacement pressures from the north and the west of the borough
but that the population of those BIC has increased in the south and east of the 
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receiving boroughs for both African migrants groups. In contrast, all of the sending
boroughs (some of which were highlighted above) have coefficients that range from
0.345 in Lambeth down to 0.122 in Camden. This seems to indicate a heterogeneity
of departing conditions but a homogeneity of spatial solutions which involves relocat-
ing to the eastern and northern fringes of Greater London (see map above).  It is strik-
ing that a group that may be composed of individuals from a large number of nation-
al contexts is responding in a similar way to displacement pressures in inner London.
Both groups of black African migrants seem to be similarly affected by these pres-
sures, nonetheless there was a greater fall in the proportion of the UKBBA population
in Southwark and Newham and a small increase in the Lewisham share of ABB. As in
the case of the migrants of Caribbean origin, it is intriguing that those born in the UK
are facing relatively more intense displacement pressures than those born in the orig-
inating countries. Two hypotheses are possible here. First, those born in the UK may
be less attached to the areas of high concentration of their migrant group and may be
more willing to move out to outer London. Second, selective migration may mean that
more recent arrivals are of a higher socioeconomic class than those who arrived in
the first migratory waves. In any case, the overall picture here is of a general move-
ment (with a few exceptions) of both of these groups from very centrally located areas
into very similar areas at the edge of Greater London, a movement which clearly
favours the displacement explanation.
Indians
Migrants of Indian origin are the only group looked at here that have relatively low cor-
relations coefficients at both the borough level (0.436) and at the all-OA level (0.234)
in terms of the change in their settlement patterns between 2001 and 2011. Both
those born in India (BII) and UK Born Indians (UKBI) are heavily concentrated in outer
London and the share of their populations in outer London has increased slightly
between 2001 and 2011: from 76.2% to 77.1% for those BII and from 80.4% to 81.8%
for UKBI. This concentration in outer London may explain why Indian migrants are
also the only group for which the number of UK born is relatively constant (260,002 in
2001 and 268,018 in 2011) while the number of those born overseas has increased
significantly (167,526 in 2001 and 242,427 in 2011). Indeed, it is possible that there
has been movement out of Greater London by a portion of the UK born. The majority
of these two groups is concentrated in 9 boroughs but the share of those BII and UKBI
in each of these borough varies. The boroughs with the largest shares of BII in 2011
were: Brent (with 10.9% of the BII population), Hounslow (10.1%) and Ealing (10.4%).
For UKBI, these were: Harrow (15.1%), Brent (10.4%) and Redbridge (8.7%). 
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Caribbean origin: a strong correlation in the movements of ABB and UKBBA at bor-
ough level (0.867) but a weaker correlation when all OAs are considered (0.372). 
In contrast to migrants of Pakistani origin, but like those of Caribbean origin, these two
groups tended to concentrate in inner London boroughs in 2001. The boroughs with
the highest share of these populations were Southwark (10.1% of ABB and 9.2% of
UKBBA), Lambeth (8.1% and 8.3%) and Newham (8.1% and 7.6%). However,
between 2001 and 2011 many of the inner London boroughs where they were 
concentrated have seen falls in their share, including Lambeth (-1.7% of both ABB
and UKBBA), Newham (-1.4% of ABB and -2% of UKBBA) and Southwark (-0.5% and
-3% respectively). This has led to a fall in the overall proportion of these groups living
in inner London: inner London boroughs had 55.4% of ABB in 2011 compared to
62.7% in 2001 and 51.3% of UKBBA in 2011 compared to 63.1% in 2001. 
When the focus shifts to the correlation between the movements of those born in the
UK and overseas between 2001 and 2011 for the OAs of each borough, it becomes
clear that the highest correlation coefficients are reached in boroughs into which these
two groups are moving. There are five boroughs where the correlation coefficient is
above the all OA average (0.372). Four of these are at the eastern border of Greater
London: Bexley (with a correlation coefficient of 0.698 and an increase in the share of
ABB of +1.5% and of UKBBA of +1.6%), Havering (respectively 0.503, +0.8% and
+1.1%), Greenwich (0.454, +1.7% and +1.3%) and Barking and Dagenham (0.416,
+3.2% and +2.9%). The fifth is Enfield, with a correlation coefficient of 0.390 and an
increased share of both groups of +1.6%. Apart from Croydon, these are the five main
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bers. This process explains the relatively lower correlation coefficients observed
between the movements of these two groups, at the borough and all-OA level. The low-
est correlation between OAs at borough level is in Newham (-0.112), a borough sec-
ond generation migrants seem to have decided to leave for neighbouring Redbridge.
Conclusion
The ‘spreading wings’ model of migrant trajectories is a good explanation for the
movements of the two groups of migrants of Indian origin. Each of these groups is
now carving out its own space in the city: those BII in the historical cores of this
migrant group and UKBI in the western and north eastern edges of Greater London. 
The trajectories of the other four migrant groups looked at in detail here seem to cor-
respond more closely to the displacement model, with significant movement by both
those born in the UK and those born in the countries of origin away from the areas in
which they most concentrated in 2001. The movements of these groups seem to be
responses to common processes of change rather than attempts at consolidating or
expanding the space they once occupied in the city. And this does not simply reflect
the fact that groups which originally settled in inner London are more vulnerable. The
case of migrants of Pakistani origin shows that groups in both inner and outer London
are as vulnerable to displacement pressures. What this analysis also shows is that
some London boroughs are serving as receptacles for a significant number of those
displaced migrants, most notably are Barking and Dagenham (with significant increas-
es in the share of every migrant group) and Redbridge (Bangladeshi and Pakistani
migrants). The competition for space in these boroughs between these incoming
migrant groups is certainly worthy of study. Further empirical work is needed into the
links between the processes of displacement uncovered here and the extensive work
carried out on the notion of gentrification in the London context.
Endnotes
1The small geographical level at which the estimation procedure was conducted means that in some
cases there was a higher number of overseas-born than of UK-born individuals of a particular group
in a cell, thus yielding a negative number for those born in the UK. In these cases (ranging from
2.7% of OAs for migrants of Bangladeshi migrants to 6.5% for those of Indian origin), a value of
zero was substituted for the negative values.
2The other ethnicity categories cannot be used for an estimation of the second generation migrant
population in general because the percentages of those who selected these categories and who
were born in the UK in 2011 are too small: 15% for White Other, 25% for Other Asian and 31% for
the other ethnic groups (including the ethnicity Arab which was only introduced for the 2011
Census). This analysis can also not say anything about those who haven’t completed the censuses.
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The proportion of the total population of Indians born in the UK and overseas in those
boroughs changed in different ways between 2001 and 2011. Three of these bor-
oughs have seen an increase in their share of those BII but a decrease in their share
of UKBI: Newham (+2.6% for those BII and -0.8% for UKBI), Hounslow (+1.1% and 
-0.7% respectively) and Brent (+0.5% and -0.9%). When looking at UKBI alone, only
three of the nine boroughs have seen increases in their share of this population, sig-
nalling a clear movement of concentration clearly visible on the right hand map above.
These three boroughs are Harrow (+2.6%), Hillingdon (+2%) at the extreme western
edge of Greater London and Redbridge (+0.7%) in the north east. In parallel, the map
on the left above shows an increase of those BII in the boroughs which have seen a
loss in their share of UKBI: Newham in inner north east London (+2.6% for BII and 
-0.8% for UKBI) and Hounslow and Brent in west London, with increases in the share
of those BII of 1.1% and 0.5% respectively and losses in the share of UKBI of 0.7%
and 0.9% respectively. 
Migrants of Indian origin thus seem to be the only group looked at in detail here for
which the observed spatial patterns corresponds to the ‘spreading wings’ model of
migrant trajectories. Second generation migrants of Indian origin seem to be moving
further out into outer London, leaving the more central borough of Brent to those born
in India. It is striking that the large increases in the population share of those born over-
seas are in the same areas which those born in the UK are leaving in greatest num-
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Fitting a quart in a pint pot? 
Development, displacement and/or 
densification in the London region
Ian Gordon
Introduction
Since the creation of a (mayoral) Greater London Authority in 2000, it has encouraged
a view of London as an autonomously dynamic economy with minimal impacts on the
rest of the Greater South East.  One side-effect is to encourage a city-state mytholo-
gy among external critics, identifying London with the interests of its problematic
financial sector, and/or treating Londoners’ relaxed attitude to diversity and interna-
tionalism as a deviant distortion of broader national sentiments.
However prejudiced such outside perceptions might be, exaggeration of London’s
effective independence has actually produced some substantively distorting effects in
relation to the strategic responsibilities with which the GLA is charged. Under both
Mayors these have included tendencies for planning documents (including the 2014
draft ‘further alterations’) to understate both:
the extent to which the turnaround in London population trends since the late•
1980s has been attributable to international migration (largely independent of the
city’s economic dynamism); and 
the degree of integration of housing markets across the wider metropolitan region,•
and indeed the whole Greater South East, with its implications for how such pop-
ulation growth effects are likely to be diffused.     
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“The scale of population growth achieved in London since 2001 has depended upon
increases in crowding of the dwelling stock by new migrants from poor countries,
which should not be expected to be repeated over the London Plan period.”
in turn, for London and other parts of the Greater South East (sections 3-5), and final-
ly identifying significant differences that these suggest for patterns of change in pop-
ulation and housing need in London and other parts of the Greater South East rela-
tive to those implied by projections of recent migration trends.  A central message is
that the scale of population growth achieved in London since 2001 has depended
upon increases in crowding of the dwelling stock by new migrants from poor countries,
which should not be expected to be repeated over the Plan period. In the very recent
period, taken as the basis for projection of migration trends, a further important factor
- which also should not be assumed to continue - has been the impact of
stagnant/falling real incomes on the average Londoner’s ability to secure additional
living space.  
2. Accommodating migrants in a dense city
In broad terms the accommodation of migrants in an area is achieved through a com-
bination of:
altering the density at which residential space is occupied (densification1);•
inducing additions to the local stock of accommodation (development); and/or•
displacing some demand to other areas (displacement).•
Densification
Densification can be seen as occurring in two ways: through the willingness of
migrants themselves to occupy particular spaces more densely than other local resi-
dents would choose to (migrant densification); and through responses across the
broader local population to intensified  competition for residential space (market den-
sification).   Actually the first of these could operate in reverse (migrant de-densifica-
tion) where a more affluent group of incomers chooses a less dense pattern of occu-
pation – with conspicuous examples among recent foreign migrants into
Kensington/Chelsea (or earlier domestic gentrifiers into Islington).  But migrant densi-
fication is likely to be very much more common for those arriving in this region from
overseas.
Development
Operationally, residential space is defined here in terms of the stock of rooms.
Development thus includes home extensions as well as infills, conversions from other
uses/vacancy etc. – all of which might otherwise be seen as involving densification –
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In purely statistical terms, there is a clear recognition of the importance of both
London’s positive migrational balance from international flows and of the net outflow
of migrants to other parts of the UK (preponderantly to areas within commuting reach
of London) as components of the (past and future) balance of demographic change –
and thus of housing need. These are treated, however, as independent elements to
be forecast (or mechanically ‘projected’) on the basis of recent trends. What is lack-
ing is any serious consideration of the processes underlying these two kinds of flow -
including the dynamics of settlement among migrant communities – or the possible
implication of these for how such ‘trends’ may be affected by the set of policies (of the
GLA, central government and other authorities within London’s extended region)
impinging on available housing market opportunities.. 
The latest round of planning work (MoL, 2014) seems to be more seriously concerned
over the question of how the large population growth now forecast for London is to be
accommodated within its borders – if not whether it actually will be.  Given that these
forecasts simply project forward recent trends, from a period when construction rates
have not been particularly high, two fundamental questions seem to have been
begged, namely: how has this recent growth actually been accommodated within the
city; and how likely are the processes which enabled this actually (and acceptably) to
continue operating in the same way. The research summarily reported in this short
chapter starts to address these questions, focusing particularly on evidence on
recorded changes between the 2001 and 2011 Population Censuses. 
Two particular reasons for emphasising the need to understand how recent popula-
tion growth within London has been accommodated are that: 
it has occurred despite a clear failure to secure the rates of growth in the dwelling•
stock that earlier GLA estimates of housing need would suggest were required;
and that
in the decades before the turnaround, London’s steady population contraction was•
widely understood as the consequence of constraints on the ability to satisfy ris-
ing demands for living space from increasingly affluent Londoners. 
Taken together, these suggest a serious possibility that this recent population growth
may have been enabled by factors and processes – perhaps linked to the circum-
stances of newly arrived international migrants – which will not necessarily continue
to operate in the same way.  In the rest of this paper, we investigate this, firstly by
making a statistical distinction between three ways in which population changes in
any area get accommodated (section 2), then examining evidence on each of these
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ed, leading to larger impacts in terms of displacement, induced development and
some market densification as (poor) migrants’ space standards converge on those of
the native population.  If large cohorts of such migrants continue to appear, they too
may be packed in densely within the existing housing stock of destination areas such
as London, but it cannot be assumed that those arriving earlier can still be accommo-
dated in that way.     
Patterns of Change 2001-11
Evidence on the  roles of  densification and development in accommodating recent
population growth of different kinds can be found by looking at the detailed pattern of
change at neighbourhood scale (Local Super Output Areas as identified by the cen-
sus) across the Greater South East between the last two Censuses.  This analysis
focuses particularly on changes between 2001 and 2011 in:
the total number of rooms in each area, and •
its relation to numerical changes in each of five population groups: •
the UK-born; •
migrants who had arrived in the country before 2001•
from poor countries and •
from rich countries; and •
migrants entering the country between 2001 and 2011•
from poor countries and •
from rich countries.•
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the broad patterns of change in these terms at a sub-
regional level, for four broad rings of the (administratively defined) Greater South East
(GSE)2.  Specifically table 1 shows that over this decade there was significant popu-
lation growth right across the GSE super-region, though it proceeded most rapidly in
areas near the core (Inner London particularly).  Over the GSE as a whole, and for
Greater London too, this was entirely attributable to growth in numbers of the foreign-
born – principally among those born in poor countries (most strikingly in Outer
London) but also for those born in other rich countries (particularly in Inner London).
For the UK-born a significant outward shift was evident, from Outer London both to
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provided that the net additions to the room stock were attributable to migrant-induced
additions to demand for residential space.
Displacement
The third (arithmetical) contributor to the accommodation equation is displacement,
defined here in terms which do not entail either duress or a necessary loss of welfare,
but simply some shift in the balance of residential movement into/out of an area (by
people other than new overseas migrants) attributable to the impacts of international
migrants on local markets.  In principle these markets could be labour markets, with
displacement reflecting competition for an inelastic supply of jobs, but in this context
at least it is very much more likely to be the inelasticity of residential space supply that
is responsible for displacement between areas.  
Such displacement clearly raises second-order issues of accommodation in the areas
to which demand is diverted  - to be resolved (again) by a combination of market den-
sification, induced development and a further round of displacement. The ramifica-
tions of what is not absorbed through migrant densification within the neighbourhood
of their settlement, or matched by induced development in relatively close areas with
supplies of unconstrained land, are thus liable to be reflected in both market densifi-
cation and development effects spread across surrounding regions.
Dynamics
Migration of any kind has evolving impacts over time, as each cohort of migrants
moves through their life cycle, and the preferences/ aspirations/information shaping
their residential decisions evolve.  Where rates of primary migration are fairly stable,
the familiar outcome is one in which there is a great deal of residential flux, and steady
expansion in the urbanised area, but with much more stability in aggregate patterns
of movement and of areal differentiation (by age, family/social status etc.).  
Where waves of overseas migration are involved, with many coming from much poor-
er countries - as in the London region over recent decades – the dynamic effects may
be a good deal more complicated, requiring closer attention in order to judge how
future patterns of population and household change are likely to evolve.  One reason
is simply that these flows are a great deal more volatile, both because of the role of
external crises in triggering particular waves, and because the impact of migration
controls has been quite variable/uncertain.  The other is that the large initial differ-
ences in aspirations and economic power that underlie migrant densification at the
time of settlement are liable to be substantially eroded as migrants become integrat-
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numbers of rooms grew more rapidly than the population, lowering average densities
of occupation – as might be expected with rising living standards.  
Table 2 introduces a distinction between those of the foreign-born who had arrived
post 2001, and who might thus be in their areas of original settlement, and those who
were already in the country before then, and whose net changes will tend to reflect
dispersals away from such areas3. For those from rich countries there seems to have
been a dispersal from Inner to Outer London, modestly off-setting the strong concen-
tration of arrivals in inner areas. The contribution of new arrivals from poor countries
to growth over the decade was the dominant factor in all sub-regions, adding 15% to
the Greater London population, and around 5% to that in the rest of the GSE. 
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the outer metropolitan ring and beyond to the Rest of the Greater South East. Inner
London saw virtually no net change in the numbers of UK born, though this may well
have concealed significant inward flows of young people from other UK regions, bal-
anced by an outward shift of more mature groups to rings further out in the GSE.
As this table also shows, this population growth was accompanied in each sub-region
by significant increases in the stock of rooms (in occupied dwellings), though with less
variation in this than in rates of population growth – even though both were greatest
in Inner London.  For London as a whole the growth rate in rooms fell 5% below that
in residents of private households which implies a substantial increase in crowding.
However, in other parts of the GSE, particularly beyond the outer metropolitan ring,
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New  arrivals  in UK from Estimated net effect of dispersalof pre 2001 arrivals
Other rich 
countries Poor countries
Other rich 
countries Poor countries
Inner London 8.2% 16.2% -0.8% -4.9%
Outer London 2.6% 14.4% 1.1% -1.2%
Greater London 4.7% 15.1% 0.4% -2.6%
Outer Metro
Area 1.3% 5.5% 0.5% -0.5%
Outer GSE 1.3% 4.3% 0.2% -0.6%
Greater South
East 2.5% 8.4% 0.4% -1.3%
Table 2 Net change between 2001-11 in foreign born as per cent of total 2001 pop-
ulation by UK new arrival and estimated dispersal effects
Notes
1.  See table 1
2. ‘new arrivals’ are those resident in 2011 who reported arriving in the UK in/after 2001; 
3. The dispersal estimate is calculated by deducting these new arrivals from the net change in
numbers between 2001 and 2011, and an estimated correction for exits (by death/emigration)
based on national rates for poor/rich country origin and entry cohort (derived from the Labour
Force Survey).  
Rooms in
occupied
dwelling
All persons
in private
households
Average
persons
per Room 
Persons born in:
UK Other richcountries
Poor 
countries
Inner
London 10.2% 14.7% 4.5% 0.3% 5.3% 9.3%
Outer
London 5.9% 11.3% 5.4% -2.3% 2.5% 11.4%
Greater
London 7.5% 12.6% 5.1% -1.3% 3.5% 10.6%
Outer
Metro Area 6.6% 6.5% 0.1% 1.3% 1.0% 4.3%
Outer GSE 9.0% 6.8% -2.2% 2.7% 0.8% 6.7%
Greater
South East 7.8% 8.8% 1.0% 0.1% 1.8% 8.8%
Table 1 Rates of change in populations, rooms and density of occupation by sub-
region 2001-11
Source: 2001 and 2011 Published Tabulations – summarised from (unchanged) LSOA figures
Notes
1. All population change rates are calculated relative to overall local resident numbers in 2001;
2. Residents in communal establishments have been excluded from figures for overall change but
not from the breakdown by country of birth;   
3. The operational definition of rich countries includes Western Europe, the USA and the Old
Commonwealth.
know that this is a very diverse group with many people staying for only short dura-
tions – whereas arrivals from poor countries are much more likely to be permanent.
In the rich country case we are likely therefore to be observing a difference between
a population of new arrivals including a (relative affluent) group of short-term stayers
and longer-term residents with different characteristics.  In the case of migrants from
poor countries, who represent the bulk of those coming to London, the evidence is
consistent with an expectation that, as many of them advance beyond the bottom-tier
jobs, in which half will initially have been employed, that their densities of occupation
will also converge toward those of the UK-born population (as other evidence has
suggested to be true for per capita household headship rates of migrants; Whitehead,
20116).
The relation between the incidence of recent in-migration from poor countries and
densification appears consistent across the sub-regions of the GSE.  For those from
rich countries, however, there are substantial differences, probably reflecting the het-
erogeneity of this group.  Thus across Inner London, where the main concentrations
are found, the effect of adding migrants from these countries appears the same as for
growth in the UK-born, while in Outer London it is substantially higher, and in the rest
of GSE about as strong as that of poor country migrants.    
Controlling for these local effects of migration on densities, there is evidence also of
a ‘market densification’ effect via population growth at the LHMA level adding to the
overall pressure of demand for local housing.  Taking account of this also raises the
estimated proportion of the poor country migrant effectively absorbed by densification
(rather than development or displacement) to 80% .  Because there still seems to be
some tendency for densities to rise in areas with better job accessibility, this is not the
only cause of the disparity in room density trends between inner and outer parts of the
GSE.  But in the short-medium term the concentration of recent arrivals from poor
countries in areas within Greater London does appear to have been the key reason
why the city has been able to accommodate a rate of population growth running
ahead of that in the housing stock. 
4. Evidence of migration impacts on development
Similar regression analyses of local rates of change in the stock of rooms between
2001 and 2011 yield less clear-cut results.  In this case control variables were includ-
ed to reflect variations in supply constraints on developable (or occupiable) space, as
well as the density of room occupancy at the start of the period.   All of these were
demonstrably significant: growth in occupied rooms was faster in localities where less
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How these different population groups contributed to, and were affected by, changes
in overall levels of crowding – or what increases in the stock of rooms their changing
numbers might have induced – cannot be directly seen from Census tabulations.  The
next two sections thus turn to statistical regression analyses of these data, and some
relevant contextual factors, to try to establish the causal impacts of changes in popu-
lation numbers and composition on the incidence of densification and development
between 2001 and 2011.  The basic observations are the roughly 13,000 neighbour-
hoods (LSOAs) of the GSE super-region, supplemented by some aggregated data at
Local Housing Market Area (LHMA) level4.   Detailed results of these analyses are
reported in Gordon (2014).
3. Explaining variations in densification 2001-11
Initial regressions showed proportionate rates of change at LSOA level in average
persons per room to be substantially higher both in areas experiencing faster popula-
tion growth and in those with better accessibility to jobs, though with some tendency
also for convergence (i.e. for densities to grow least where they were already high in
2001).  This suggests that both independent causes of faster population and an
increased concern for job accessibility relative to living space may have played a role
in the denser occupation of available living space within London over this decade.  
When overall population change is split between the 5 population groups we have dis-
tinguished, however, it becomes evident that the dominant element is that of new
migrants (arriving in the UK between 2001 and 2011) from poor countries, who were
accommodated primarily through the denser occupation of existing residential space.
Almost 60% of their numeric growth in residential neighbourhoods seems to translate
into increases in density per room.  Since LSOAs represent only very small parts of
effective housing market areas, this should reflect (individual-level) migrant densifica-
tion rather than (aggregate/ general) market densification.  Another way of expressing
the result is then that the average occupation of a given number of rooms by new
migrants from poor countries was about 2.5 times that of established residents in the
locality5. By contrast, it seems that new arrivals from rich countries did not significant-
ly alter densities of occupation, while additions to the UK-born population had only a
modest one.  
Local changes in numbers of foreign-born residents who had arrived in the UK before
2001 had only an intermediate effect on densities, irrespective of where they had orig-
inally come from.  In the case of those coming from rich countries, this might suggest
that their densities of occupation actually increased with duration of stay.  But we
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a UK housing demand indicator (changes in private completions) as proxy for•
influences on current demands for additional space;
relative dwelling-prices (comparing London with the RGSE; and the GSE as a•
whole with the UK); and
relative unemployment rates (making these two comparisons again).•
The results suggest that for each of the latter two factors it is conditions at the GSE
level which are relevant for both London and the RGSE (not differences between
them), with lower relative unemployment rates and house prices at GSE level having
similar positive effects on both parts of the super-region.  This is consistent with the
idea that the two regions are effectively integrated in housing and labour market
terms, with net outflows from London to the RGSE reflecting a continuing disparity in
space availability.  
Fluctuations in their relative positions derive very largely from the two former factors.
The more important is the general strength of (national) housing demand - reflecting
cyclical and financial influences – which boosts outflows from London (and to a less-
er extent the GSE as a whole) and inflows to the RGSE.  But net international migra-
tion is also important, with evidence of significant displacement effects, after two
years, from both London and the GSE as a whole – though not at all from the RGSE,
consistent with the idea that such displacement stems from the tightness of space-
constraints in a regional housing market.     
For London as a whole, displacement beyond the region seems to account for 40%
of the ‘accommodation’ of the international inflow (with much apparently going beyond
the GSE).  Logically, from the disparities in the role played by densification, it would
be expected that – over the medium term at least - this inter-regional displacement
was particularly linked to rich country migration into London, but this cannot be
demonstrated with existing time series data.  Neither can  the existence of delayed
effects of displacement by poor country migrants as their space expectations con-
verge on those of other groups.
It is clear from this analysis that the main causes of fluctuations in domestic migration
to/from London have very little to do with specific conditions in London, and much more
to do with two sets of external influences – from the macro-economy and international
migration which can cause substantial fluctuations in the balance of such flows away
from any underlying trend that can be counted on continuing over the long run.   
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land was already urbanised or covered by planning constraints, where assessed
brownfield potential was greater, where there had been more vacant dwellings and/or
where existing room densities were higher.  Some (rather weaker) positive relations
were also suggested with the arrival rates of migrants, particularly from rich countries.
But these apparent (migrant) effects were only evident at the local level, within partic-
ular LHMAs, and become completely insignificant at the level of local housing market
areas, where they should actually become salient – and would have to be if there was
to be any effect across London as a whole.  At the London scale then it appears that
additional development induced by demand from migrants made an effectively zero
contribution to their accommodation.      
5. Displacement effects from international migration   
At the neighbourhood (locality) level, the likely significance of displacement effects –
as the third of the means of accommodating migrants – could logically be inferred
from what has been found for densification and development. But many other kinds
of population change involve such local displacement, and what matters more in a
planning context may be how far induced waves of displacement spread as shocks
work their way through inter-linked housing markets. To get an appreciation of the
strategic significance of displacement at a (sub-)regional scale it is necessary to look
at time-series rather than cross-sectional evidence.      
For Greater London as a whole the indications of strong displacement effects have
long been evident from the mirror image patterns of net domestic and net internation-
al migration in time series graphs.  At a more formal statistical level Hatton and Tani
(2005) have confirmed this with panel analyses for the set of southern regions, which
suggested displacement effects of international on domestic flows averaging around
45%. The underlying expectation there was that displacement was likely to be a
labour market phenomenon. In the London/GSE context, however, where most
(cross-border) residential movement is housing rather than employment related, dis-
placement effects and other shocks seem much more likely to be related to the hous-
ing market.  
Accordingly, the regression analyses reported here related net within-UK migrational
flows (for the years 1981-2011) for London and the rest of the GSE (RGSE) to four
sets of influence:
net international migration to each region (separately)•
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A second aspect, highlighted in this research, is that because net gains of population
from overseas don’t induce (nearly) proportionate additions to the housing stock – and
housing availability does substantially affect population levels – these have led to sub-
stantial increases in the scale of net outward migration to the rest of the UK during the
past 20 years or so.  The extent of  such ‘displacement’ to other parts of southern
England is well below 1 for 1, however - more like 1 for 2 – primarily because new
migrants coming from poor countries have accommodated themselves at much high-
er densities, in terms of persons per room.  This reflects the fact that a large propor-
tion of these only initially secure work in low paid jobs, well below the potential indi-
cated by their level of education.  That situation changes, however, and so do the
housing circumstances in which they reasonably expect to live. Over the course of 20
years or so, but with half of the change occurring in the first 7 or 8, their housing space
standards are likely to converge to those of natives (or rich country migrants). If noth-
ing else changes, that will involve a substantial further boost to net domestic outflows
relative to the levels which are currently being projected – up to the point where the
displacement effect (since their time of arrival) reaches 100%, less whatever small
margin might be absorbed by induced additions to the housing stock within London.  
For two reasons, therefore, the mechanical assumption that recent levels of net
migration to other parts of the UK remain constant for the Plan period (like those of
international migration) are likely to involve significant over-estimates of London pop-
ulation growth.  In both cases this is because the realistic aspirations of London resi-
dents for extra housing space – beyond that made available within London – run
beyond those which were realised in this period.  In one case, affecting everyone, this
is essentially because of the interruption of a normal (long run) growth in real incomes.
In the other, affecting just those recently arriving from poor countries (in the global
‘south’ or the European ‘east’), it is because their level of earnings, and housing aspi-
rations, have been temporarily depressed by initial barriers to the degree of econom-
ic and social integration which can be expected in the longer run.
As far as assessments of housing need within London are concerned, these observa-
tions and arguments are double-edged, however.  If (mechanical) population growth
projections are substantially overstated, on this analysis it is because (in these two
sets of recently relevant circumstances) effective housing demands for the average
Londoner have been depressed relative to those which should be expected to prevail
over the Plan period – and so consequently are the numbers moving out to satisfy
these where housing supply is less constrained.  Recognising this bias in the popula-
tion projections for London does not, however, necessarily mean that household pro-
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6. Conclusion
This piece of research has several implications for the analytical basis of the Mayor’s
plans for London, including the latest set of ‘further alterations’ (MoL, 2014) , in rela-
tion to population and household projections and the way in which these are used in
the development of strategic policies for housing provision.
The most general of these implications is that, particularly in the context of London
and the Greater South East, it is inadequate, and potentially quite misleading, to gen-
erate (and rely upon) projections which simply and mechanically presume that popu-
lation trends observed over a recent period of years will continue, without regard to
the causal factors shaping and constraining those trends, and how these are liable to
change.  That is most obviously (and damagingly) true where the base period is one
of unusual macroeconomic conditions (in this case the years of depressed income
levels and housing market activity since the 2007/8 financial crisis) and/or where the
dynamics of change have been radically altered over a slightly longer period (as with
the great surge of inward overseas migration from the late 1990s). There will be
repercussions that will continue to work themselves out during the Plan period, with
changing (rather than constant) implications for patterns of migration and household
growth in and around London.   
These dynamics matter crucially in the London case because shifts in the balance of
migrational flows between the city and other parts of the UK are determined not so
much by any discernible trends in the city’s attractiveness or competitiveness, but by
how current circumstances affect the interaction between Londoners’ housing aspira-
tions and the limits on space available within London.  Population growth within
London is not determined, or predictable, independently of developments on these
two sides of the city’s housing market.
One important aspect of this - which has been demonstrated for earlier (post-war)
periods but is shown again here for the past 30 years – is that the achieved balance
of net outward movement depends substantially on national factors which condition
the current level of effective demand for extra housing space (represented here by
changing levels of private housing completions across the country as a whole).  Lack
of growth in real incomes since 2007 has greatly depressed this and thus the level of
out-flow to the rest of the country has been well below that which is likely in more typ-
ical periods of growth, which are to be expected within the horizons of the London
Plan7.  Projections which ignore this, and rely on the continuation of recent trends are
thus liable to substantially over-estimate future levels of population in London.
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4. Using the lower level of the HMAs defined by Mike Coombes from CURDS at
Newcastle University.
5.Assuming that their arrival does not stimulate any additions to the room stock: if there
had been any substantial development effects the implied size differential would be
greater. 
6. And for those from poor countries initially crowded into the bottom tier of jobs (Gordon
et al., 2007). 
7. This point is also very clearly made in Champion’s (2014) critique of ONS projections
for London.
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Development, displacement and/or densification
jections (or other measures of required additions to the accommodation stock) are
also overstated.  This is because the key argument is that the same factors are likely
to have led to an under-estimate of per capita household headship rates, or other
measures of space requirements (in terms of rooms or areas).
What the evidence does imply, however, is that using this kind of projection method-
ology for other areas within the Greater South East is doubly likely to involve under-
estimates of required levels of housing need (and probably of effective demand too).
This is because of the combination of substantial downward bias in assumptions
about levels of net outward migration from London, and some depression of likely
expectations about the per capita headship rates/space requirements.
Other factors may also play unexpected roles. It is for example at least possible that
the present government’s aspirations to radically cut-back on international inflows
might be realised within the time-frame of the Plan (against demographers’ current
assumptions).  But two more general implications of the current analyses will stand.
One is that intelligently informed planning needs to pay much closer attention to the
causal processes underlying population trends, rather than relying on crude extrapo-
lations of what has been observed in a recent (arbitrarily chosen) run of years.  The
other is that actual population changes for London, and its surrounding regions, reflect
decisions of residents about what they can afford and where (not limited by adminis-
trative boundaries), interacting with those of others (and housing providers) right
across this extended region which need to be the subject of integrated analysis (ide-
ally on a co-operative basis), before strategic plans for any of them are made, ‘altered’
or approved.
Endnotes
1. This use of ‘densification’ in relation to the occupation of a given stock of accommoda-
tion is much narrower than common usage in relation to planning policies or their
impacts, which include additions to the stock within an area – here labelled as ‘develop-
ment’. 
2. Comprising the (former) London, Eastern and South Eastern Government Office
Regions
3. As well as the incidence of deaths and re-emigration.  For this table (only) net disper-
sal effects have been estimated by deducting likely death/emigration rates, on the basis
of national rates of shrinkage between those years in numbers recorded in the Labour
Force Survey for a series of arrival periods and rich/poor country origins, applied to esti-
mates of the relevant local numbers as at 2001. 
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Higher education and immigration
Paresh Shah
London is a global centre for higher education.  The city is home to 41 universities and
higher education (HE) colleges supported by the Higher Education Funding Council
for England (HEFCE), and there are at least 18 ‘campus branches’ of UK universities
based outside London.  In addition, London has approximately 200 private and alter-
native providers; at least four international universities and 24 campus centres for
Study Abroad programmes from universities and colleges in the USA (UK Visas and
Immigration, 2014a).
London has a unique cluster of teaching and research institutions which is highly
attractive to students and academics.  HEFCE supports a range of institutions - from
research-intensive universities, teaching-led universities to specialist performing arts
and design colleges and postgraduate-only research and training centres.  However,
the sector also faces challenges largely because of the higher costs of operating in
the capital and factors such as transport, estates, student housing and staff costs
(Grove, 2014a).
Students from Non-EU countries are a vital element of the London (and UK) HE sec-
tor, in terms of student diversity, economic impact and ‘soft power’.  However, the
Coalition Government considers a reduction in numbers of Non-EU students will help
meet its net migration target within this Parliament.
Section 2. Border controls and the London economy
“Universities in London have expended considerable efforts to adapt to the visa reg-
ulations to maintain their ‘share’ of the international student market”
Image courtesy of Middlesex University
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London’s student population 2008-09 to 2012-13
This section presents data for the five academic years from 2008-09 to 2012-13.
During this period, there have been twice as many undergraduates as postgraduates
(Figure 1).  Numbers of Other EU and Non-EU undergraduates have remained at
about 25,000 for both domicile groups (Figure 2).  Reductions in UK undergraduates
from 2009-10 (Figures 1 and 2) could reflect the national picture where fewer students
are registering for courses in undergraduate subjects other than first degrees (Higher
Education Funding Council for England, 2014).
Total numbers of Non-EU postgraduates have had slight year-on-year decreases from
2009-10 predating recent student immigration reforms (Figure 3), and the reduction in
postgraduate students in 2012-13 is probably due to fewer UK graduates taking up
taught Masters courses, as indicated by our postgraduate survey.
The percentage of Non-EU undergraduates has increased from 10 per cent to 13 per
cent of London’s undergraduate student population in the past five academic years,
while Other EU students have increased slightly from 6 per cent to 7 per cent and UK
undergraduates have decreased from 84 per cent to 80 per cent.
Higher education and immigration
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This chapter provides background on the HE sector in London, summarises Coalition
Government changes to immigration policy with regard to HE, and assesses the
impact of policy changes on the recruitment of international students.  To date,
changes in visa regulations have had hardly any effect on the number of Non-EU stu-
dents studying at HE level, but negative media reporting may well have a detrimental
impact in the future on the reputation of HE in the UK.  One solution would be for
Government to demonstrate some flexibility and remove Non-EU students from its net
migration target, as is the case in several other countries.
Higher education in London
Scale of London’s HE sector
Data on the HE sector in London is based on information from HEFCE-supported uni-
versities and HE colleges which represent the ‘mainstream HE sector’.  There is a lack
of data sources for the other groups of education providers based in London.
Collectively, London’s mainstream HE sector has the following characteristics:
a total of 385,000 students with 69% at undergraduate level *•
34,000 Other EU and 67,000 Non-EU students *•
London hosts 24% of all international students in the UK *•
HE students make up 4.7% of London’s population of 8.2 million estimated in the•
2011 Census *
84,000 academic and non-academic staff *•
generates £17 billion annually in goods and services **•
provides £7.9 billion in GVA to London’s economy **•
contributes £2.5 million in export earnings **•
supports 163,000 jobs at all skill levels **•
* London Higher (2014); ** Universities UK (2014)
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Figure 1 Number of HE students in London
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The percentage of postgraduates in London by domicile for the past five academic
years has varied between 59-61per cent of all postgraduates for students from the
UK, 11-13 per cent for Other EU students, and 28-30 per cent for Non-EU students.
Estimates suggest there were 46,500 HE students in the non-mainstream HE sector
in 2013, with 23,000 at private and alternative providers, 15,000 at campus branches,
5,000 in the Association of American Study Abroad Programme and 3,000 with the
Erasmus exchange programme (London Higher/University of London Housing
Services, unpublished data submitted to the Mayor’s Academic Forum, June 2013).
Another way of measuring the volume of students in London is to consider the income
that HE institutions (HEIs) derive from student tuition fees.  From 2008-09, tuition fees
from Non-EU students in London have comprised 45 per cent of total HE fees (exclud-
ing non-credit bearing courses, FE courses or research training contracts), but
declined by 4 per cent in 2012-13 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 HE tuition fee income in London
Adapted from London Higher Factsheets 2009-2014, based on data collected by the Higher
Education Statistics Agency.
Higher education and immigration
Figure 2 Number of undergraduate students in London by domicile
Figure 3 Number of postgraduate students in London by domicile
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Reforms to Non-EU student visas and accreditation requirements for education
providers were implemented from April 2011 to the end of 2012 (Gower and Hawkins,
2013).  The UK Borders Agency (UKBA) was tasked with overseeing student visa
compliance but made numerous changes affecting sponsors, often at short notice,
with 14 changes in three years (Underwood, 2012). This meant education providers
had to employ or reassign staff to cope with visa workloads and regularly update their
procedures as sponsors of existing and prospective international students.
Undoubtedly the changes caused great stress in HEIs as they adapted both to the
new visa regulations and the rise in tuition fees for UK students.  There was great per-
sonal distress felt by genuine international students who were refused student visas
or even entry to the UK with a valid visa.  Many perceived the UKBA to be acting at
times in a capricious manner, supplying contradictory advice and providing very little
value-for-money (National Audit Office, 2012; Redden, 2012).  Conversely, it could be
argued that the UKBA had little operational experience with HE and was familiarising
itself with the sector and changes in the student visa regulations, with staff experienc-
ing low morale (National Audit Office, 2012, 2014).
Impact on international student numbers in London
Online surveys by London Higher
Given the concerns in the HE sector of the possible impacts of student visa reforms,
London Higher conducted separate surveys on the recruitment experiences by its
members and partners for overseas undergraduate and postgraduate students.  Data
was requested for recruitment to the 2012-13 academic year for Other EU and Non-
EU students to determine if media reports and negative perceptions of HE in the UK
had affected students from both domicile groups.
Undergraduate survey
An online survey of HEIs was conducted between November 2012 to January 2013
about their undergraduate numbers registered for 2012-13 from Other EU and Non-
EU countries, possible reasons for any changes and views on recent differences to
visa regulations.
A total of 29 HEIs responded to the survey, comprising 60 per cent of the 39 univer-
sities and 10 alternative providers who are members and partners, respectively, of
London Higher.
The importance of Non-EU students to London
International students provide diversity to the student body, contribute to HE income
and local and regional economies, benefit the academic community and many will act
as future sources of ‘soft power’ for London and for the UK.
Government policy changes
Net migration targets and implications for higher education
In November 2010, The Home Secretary announced a desire to reduce ‘net migration’
from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands, adding to statements in the
Coalition Agreement of May 2010 (Gower and Hawkins, 2013).  Net migration is the
difference between total numbers of migrants coming to the UK subtracted from those
leaving the UK.
In 2010, the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) argued that since international stu-
dents comprised 60 per cent of Non-EU immigration, and estimated that Non-EU stu-
dent numbers would need to be reduced by 60 per cent, or about 87,600 students,
between 2012 and 2015 to meet the net migration target (Acton, 2011; Migration
Observatory, 2011). 
Policy changes were drawn up by Government with the aims of reducing alleged stu-
dent visa abuse by education providers and reducing net migration (Migration
Observatory, 2013a).  From 2011 educational providers were required to have higher
accreditation levels (Highly Trusted Sponsor status), while prospective international
students faced additional checks for gaining Tier 4 student visas under a Points Based
System.  HE institutions now have legal responsibility for complying with visa regula-
tions to maintain their sponsorship status, and may be prosecuted under criminal law
if they are considered to have failed in their sponsor duties (UK Visas and
Immigration, 2014b).  Students at Further Education (FE) colleges and English lan-
guage schools also faced extra restrictions (Migration Observatory, 2013a).  
The Tier 1 Post-Study Work (PSW) route was changed in April 2012 into a form of Tier
2 visa.  The post-study work visa had previously enabled international graduates to
work in the UK for two years after graduation, but now international graduates have
to seek a position with a minimum salary of £20,000 with certain other conditions
(Gower, 2012).  
Postgraduate survey
This survey was carried out in Summer 2013, to find out information on 2012-13 with
subsections on recruitment by type of postgraduate degree.  Postgraduate (PG) qual-
ifications are currently divided into two types:  Taught PGs PG(T) are generally one
year courses leading to a Masters degree, while PG studies by research, PG(R), lead
to doctorate degrees and are often three to four years in duration. 
A total of 29 (=62 per cent) from 47 London Higher members and partners respond-
ed to the survey on postgraduate recruitment.
Results for taught postgraduate courses
For students from Other EU countries, 15 HEIs (56 per cent of relevant sample) expe-
rienced no changes in numbers compared with the previous year for PG(T), while 10
(57 per cent) had reduced numbers (Table 3), mainly from Germany, France, Italy,
Greece, Cyprus and Portugal due to a fall in applications and increased fees.
There was a mixed picture with Non-EU PG(T) students; eight HEIs (30 per cent) had
no change in recruitment, but 10 HEIs (37 per cent) managed to increase their num-
bers (Table 4) through targeted marketing and a larger volume of applications espe-
cially from south east Asian countries such as China, Singapore and South Korea.
Reductions were noted by nine HEIs (33 per cent) largely from India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, with fewer applications and negative perceptions of the UK for HE study
cited as the main reasons for the fall.
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Type of HEI Increase in  OtherEU PG(T)
Decrease in Other
EU PG(T)
No change in
Other EU PG(T)
HEI + medical school 0 2 0
other multifaculty 0 3 7
creative specialist 2 3 3
other (e.g. health-
care, education) 0 2 5
Subtotal 2 (7%) 10 (37%) 15 (56%)
Table 3 Changes in recruitment for Other EU for taught postgraduate courses
The responding HEIs were classified as either (1) HEI with medical school; (2) other
multifaculty; (3) creative specialist; (4) other (postgraduate, healthcare or education
specialist), or (5) campus partner. For Other EU undergraduates, 46 per cent (13
HEIs) declared there were no changes in student numbers while 36 per cent found
decreases and 18 per cent indicated increases (Table 1).
For Non-EU undergraduates, 46 per cent again (12 HEIs) found no change in num-
bers compared with the previous academic year, 23 per cent experienced a fall and
31 per cent of HEIs had increased their student intake (Table 2). 
Type of HEI Increase in EUUG
Decrease in EU 
UG
No change 
in EU UG
HEI + medical school 2 1 0
other multifaculty 1 6 2
creative specialist 1 3 5
other (e.g. healthcare,
education) 0 0 4
campus partners 1 0 2
Subtotal 5 (18%) 10 (36%) 13 (46%)
Table 1 Changes in recruitment for Other EU undergraduates
Type of HEI Increase in non-EU UG
Decrease in 
non-EU UG
No change in
non-EU UG
HEI + medical school 2 0 0
other multifaculty 3 4 2
creative specialist 1 0 7
other (e.g. healthcare,
education) 1 1 2
campus partners 1 1 1
Subtotal 8 (31%) 6 (23%) 12 (46%)
Table 2: Changes in recruitment for Non-EU undergraduates
4 visa reforms.  That the surveys did not find any consistent effects on international
recruitment may not be surprising given the diversity of universities in London with dif-
ferent institutional strategies, resources, marketing efforts and student expectations.
Slight decreases in numbers of Other EU undergraduates were probably due to eco-
nomic downturns in the countries concerned, while increases in Non-EU undergradu-
ates were thought by survey respondents to be due to increased marketing cam-
paigns in countries such as China, India, Hong Kong, South Korea and Russia.
While the overall numbers for undergraduate and postgraduate Non-EU students
showed little change when aggregated for the mainstream HE sector in London, there
were some noticeable differences between institutions for 2012-13. Several research-
intensive HEIs had increased numbers of Non-EU students while mid-ranking or more
teaching-focused HEIs showed decreases in their international numbers (London
Higher, unpublished data).
Smaller creative specialist institutions may have maintained undergraduate numbers
because of their international reputations, but subjects like engineering experienced
substantial declines due to reduced numbers of students from India and Pakistan,
largely because of the closure of the post-study work visa route.
Many universities substantially increased staffing resources for international student
support services (e.g. UKBA liaison, student helplines) and targeted marketing efforts
allowed them to mitigate against potential reductions in overseas recruitment.  
The USA, Australia, Canada and Germany were regarded as strong competitor coun-
tries for both undergraduate and postgraduate students. Recently, students from India
appear to be more attracted to studying in the USA or Canada.  Australia had placed
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Results for postgraduate studies by research
A total of 18 universities (72 per cent) indicated there were no changes in PG(R)
recruitment for students from Other EU countries but six HEIs (24 per cent) had
reduced intakes (Table 5).  With Non-EU students, 16 HEIs (62 per cent) noted no
changes in numbers, while four HEIs (15 per cent) had reduced numbers (Table 6).
Declines in student numbers by some HEIs were noted from China, India and Nigeria
which were the same countries where other HEIs had increased their market share,
as well as Brazil. 
Conclusions from online surveys
The HE sector in London managed to maintain high levels of international student
recruitment despite the negative media perceptions and initial implementation of Tier
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Type of HEI Increase in Non-EU PG(R)
Decrease in Non-
EU PG(R)
No change in
Non-EU PG(R)
HEI + medical school 1 0 1
other multifaculty 3 2 5
creative 2 1 4
other (e.g. healthcare,
education) 0 1 6
Subtotal 6 (23%) 4 (15%) 16 (62%)
Table 6 Changes in recruitment for Non-EU for postgraduate studies by research
Type of HEI Increase in Non-EU PG(T)
Decrease in Non-
EU PG(T)
No change Non-
EU PG(T)
HEI + medical school 1 1 0
other multifaculty 2 5 3
creative specialist 6 1 1
other (e.g. health-
care, education) 1 2 4
Subtotal 10 (37%) 9 (33%) 8 (30%)
Table 4 Changes in recruitment for Non-EU for taught postgraduate courses
Type of HEI Increase in otherEU PG(R)
Decrease in other
EU PG(R) 
No change other
EU PG(R)
HEI + medical school 0 1 1
other multifaculty 0 1 9
creative specialist 1 1 4
other (e.g. healthcare,
education) 0 3 4
Subtotal 1 (4%) 6 (24%) 18 (72%)
Table 5 Changes in recruitment for Other EU PG(R)
and considered 26 students who had been studying the previous year, between
December and May, and had no leave to remain in the UK.  London Metropolitan’s
license was reinstated in April 2013 by UKBA before a judicial review, initiated by the
university, was due to be heard. (Grove, 2012; Richardson, 2013).
To assist international students at London Metropolitan in 2012, a task force was
formed led by HEFCE involving the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
(BIS), Universities UK and the National Union of Students.  It helped provide options
for existing international students to remain and complete their courses at London
Metropolitan or transfer to other UK universities (Higher Education Funding Council
for England, 2012).
Post-study work visas
The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, through the International
Education Council, conducted online surveys in 2013 which included questions on
how changes in Tier 4 regulations and closure of post-study work visas may have
affected overseas recruitment, but the final recommendations did not address these
issues directly (International Education Council, 2014).
In Autumn 2013, the Mayor of London’s Cultural Strategy Group canvassed universi-
ties and HE colleges in London on the effects of removing post-study visas for grad-
uates on creative arts courses.  This showed a mixed picture, similar to the London
Higher surveys, with just under half of the responding universities stating numbers of
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restrictions on international student visas between 2009 and 2011 but recently imple-
mented several reforms including a post-study work visa option to attract internation-
al students (Clancy, 2014).
Overall the online surveys provided mixed results but were taken shortly after
changes in visa regulations had been introduced.  Nevertheless the recruitment of
Non-EU students indicates increasing uncertainty for HEIs which is likely to manifest
itself in increased costs on marketing efforts and possibly a narrowing of target coun-
tries for international expansion, as HEIs become more conservative in their interna-
tional ambitions.
Effects of visa changes on the wider education sector
One of the aims of the Home Office visa reforms was to reduce potential abuse of visa
provision by educational institutions.  Nationally, approved sponsored visa applica-
tions for study at FE colleges declined from about 110,000 to <40,000 within 12
months from early 2011, while study visas for universities have remained stable at
about 160,000 between late 2010 and early 2014 (Office for National Statistics, 2014). 
In London, a comparison of Tier 4 sponsors licensed to register Non-EU students by
UK Borders Agency (2011) and UK Visas and Immigration (2014a) showed a decline
in the numbers of education institutions by 56 per cent for private providers, 41 per
cent for FE colleges and 40 per cent for English language schools (Table 7).  
Other impacts on the HE sector in London
The changes in student visa regulations had several consequences for mainstream
universities and alternative providers. First, increased resources had to be devoted by
HEIs on interpretation and compliance with visa changes by the UKBA.  Second,
greater effort was required to monitor and assist international students.  Finally, mar-
keting efforts were needed to overcome the negative overseas press coverage of UK
higher education especially in India (e.g. Mishra and Sharma, 2012).
Monitoring of international students
One of the first issues to emerge concerned attendance monitoring and visa compli-
ance by universities. This was exemplified when the UKBA withdrew the Tier 4 spon-
sorship license from London Metropolitan University in August 2012, which became
the second mainstream university to lose its license, after Glasgow Caledonian
University which had had its license suspended temporarily in 2011.  The UKBA’s
decision was mainly based on the examination of the visa status of 101 sample cases,
68
Migration and London’s growth
Sponsor group 2011 2014 Change%
Alternative providers (profit/not-for-profit) 476 210 -56
Schools (incl. independent and international) 105 95 -10
FE Colleges/Sixth Form colleges 58 34 -41
HEIs (HEFCE/non-HEFCE) 48 45 -6
English language schools 45 27 -40
Overseas HEIs (e.g. USA Study Abroad) 35 27 -23
Total 767 438
Table 7 Numbers of Tier 4 sponsors in London in 2011 and 2014
Source: London Higher (unpublished data on Tier 4 sponsors in January 2011 and April 2014). 
it was reported that 290 students at the London School of Business and Finance were
working illegally. 
Little attention has been paid to what the optimal number of alternative providers in
London should be, but in a possible move to regulate privately funded colleges, BIS
announced a consultation in June 2014 which could see the Skills Funding Agency
assume responsibility for these colleges, which largely provide sub-degree courses
for Higher National Diplomas and Higher National Certificates (Gravatt, 2014).  
In what might be seen as a further tightening of sponsor status, from November 2014
universities and other education providers will lose Highly Trusted Sponsor status if 10
per cent of their international student applicants are refused visas; this had previous-
ly been set at a threshold of 20 per cent of applicants (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014).
This latest change applies to all education providers recruiting international students
and could have a disproportionate effect on smaller institutions (Smith, 2014). 
Monitoring quality of provision
Also announced in the June 2014 statement was a review by the Quality Assurance
Agency of universities with campus branches or centres in London (Home Office,
2014a).  This was to ensure the institutional policies and processes for teaching inter-
national students were the same at both the main university location and the London
campus. 
London has 11 campus branches and a further four are scheduled to open in 2014.  It
is a testament to the attractiveness of London that HEIs outside the capital - and out-
side England -  see value in operating in the city.  All of the current campus branches
in London have passed their Quality Assurance Agency reviews, but the Home Office
statement unhelpfully appeared to link these reviews with other education providers
who were under investigation as part of the English Language test enquiry.
Discussion and conclusions
The inclusion of Non-EU, or international students in the calculations of net migration
has been criticised since the majority of international students are only temporarily
resident for UK studies and are not economic migrants (e.g. Migration Observatory,
2013b).  Detailed analysis showed only 1 per cent of international students settled
permanently five years after starting their studies in 2006 and 9 per cent had moved
to a work-based visa category (Home Office, 2013a).  
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graduates had been reduced since the abolition of post-study work visas (Greater
London Authority, 2013).
In June 2014, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration announced an inquiry
into the closure of the post-study work route which is due to report in early 2015 (see
www.appmigration.org.uk).
Access to accommodation and health services
As a counter to the economic and ‘soft power’ benefits of Non-EU students,
Government developed arguments on the burden international students exert on local
services such as housing and healthcare.  
The Immigration Act passed in May 2014 introduced the responsibility for residential
landlords to verify the immigration status of all tenants.  In addition, primary care from
the National Health Service is still free of charge but international students will be
charged for NHS treatment in hospitals from 2015 (UK Council for International
Student Affairs, 2014).  
English language tests and illegal employment
The Home Office issued a statement on 24 June 2014 which appeared to conflate
several visa compliance issues (Home Office, 2014a).  The central problem
addressed by the statement was that one of five approved English language testing
centres, ETS, was found to have issued invalid test certificates in 2012 and 2013.  
As the University of West London, the University of Bedfordshire and Glyndŵr
University in Wales had accepted students with ETS certificates, they were immedi-
ately stopped from sponsoring new international students for entry to the 2014-15
academic year, although existing students were allowed to continue their studies.  The
licenses for 57 private FE colleges were also suspended, of which at least 30 are
based in London (Home Office, 2014b).  
After investigations by UK Visas and Immigration, the University of Bedfordshire and
the University of West London were allowed to resume international recruitment on 5
August and 5 September, respectively, (Grove, 2014b; University of West London,
2014).  A decision is still pending for Glyndŵr University (Glyndŵr University, 2014). 
Another strand in the statement was visa abuse by illegal employment.  International
students attending privately funded FE colleges do not have permission to work, and
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entering directly to the second or third year of an undergraduate course (Higher
Education Funding Council for England, 2014).  The decline in UK students for taught
postgraduate courses may already be leading to an increasing reliance on internation-
al postgraduates to maintain and develop courses.
Despite the changes in visa regulations and associated reforms, in June 2014 the vol-
ume of applications through the UCAS system increased by 5 per cent for Other EU
students and 7 per cent for Non-EU students compared with 2013 (Universities and
Colleges Admissions Service, 2014).
Universities in London, as elsewhere in the UK, have expended considerable efforts
to adapt to the visa regulations to maintain their ‘share’ of the international student
market despite the recent changes, but it remains to be seen if this can continue, as
negative media reporting and competition may well have a detrimental effect on inter-
national recruitment.  
The current situation is a result of the unwillingness of the current Coalition
Government to remove Non-EU students from the net migration target and to formal-
ly regulate, through legislation, the plethora of alternative HE providers which are con-
centrated in London.
Acknowledgements
London Higher wishes to thank the Higher Education Statistics Agency  for permission
to reproduce data on the higher education sector in London.
A map of the main locations of HE providers in London can be viewed at
http://www.londonhigher.ac.uk/members.html.
References
Acton, E. (2011)  The UKBA’s Proposed Restrictions on Tier 4 visas: implications for
University recruitment of overseas students.  Higher Education Policy Institute. Oxford 
Richardson, H.  (2013) London Met wins back foreign student licence. BBC News [Online]
9th April.  Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-22080301 [Accessed 4
August 2014]
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  (2013)  International education - global
growth and prosperity. London: BIS
Cavanagh, M. and Glennie, A. (2012)  International students and net migration in the UK
Institute for Public Policy Research, April.  London: IPPR
Clancy, R. (2014)  International applications to rise following visa changes.  [Online] 21
January.  Available from: http://www.australiaforum.com/information/australia/international-
73
Higher education and immigration
There is no internationally agreed method for measuring international student move-
ments, or flows, but the USA, Australia and Canada report student flows so they do
not contribute to permanent net migration figures (Cavanagh and Glennie, 2012).
Lobbying efforts on migration targets were led by Universities UK with other HE stake-
holders and business organisations, including London First and the London Chamber
of Commerce and Industry.  The chief goal was to remove international students from
net migration calculations and the migration target (e.g. Universities UK, 2012).  Five
Lords and Commons Select Committees recommended changing the inclusion of
international students within the net migration target (Universities UK, 2013a, 2013b).  
In February 2013, Government formally declined to remove international students
from the target but stated that the Office for National Statistics will be improving the
International Passenger Survey (IPS) for more accurate data on international students
leaving the UK after completing their studies (Home Office, 2013b).  
In March 2013, UKBA was abolished following a report on failings by the Agency,
largely outside of the HE sector (Home Affairs Committee, 2013), and UK Visas and
Immigration is now responsible for managing all visa applications with a dedicated
Higher Education Assurance Team.  
The visa policy changes affecting international students exposed conflicting attitudes
in Government with BIS and the Treasury on one side and UKBA and the Home Office
on the other.  Several statements and reports were issued by BIS since 2011 record-
ing the positive economic and ‘soft power’ benefits of international students and the
growth potential of international education exports for the UK economy (e.g. Conlon
et al., 2011; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013;  Mellors-Bourne et.
al., 2013).
It is correct that any abuse of visa regulations by international students or education
providers should be curtailed, but recent Government actions risk deterring genuine
Other EU and Non-EU students from studying in the UK.  There is a danger that treat-
ing all education providers effectively as one group (e.g. Home Office, 2014a) will
have negative consequences for the mainstream HE sector and genuine alternative
providers.  The diversity of the mainstream HE sector partly accounts for the attrac-
tiveness of the London ‘brand’ to international students.  
However, the rise in student numbers from south east Asia, especially China, may
reduce the range of the international student population in London affecting the ‘stu-
dent experience’ for UK and non-UK students.  Substantial numbers appear to be
72
Migration and London’s growth
sheet.  London: Home Office
International Education Council  (2014)  Barriers to growing the UK’s education exports.
Report presented at Council meeting.  [Online] 26 February.  Available from:
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/international-education-council#council-meetings
[Accessed: 2 July 2014]
London Higher (2014)  London Higher Factsheets for 2012-13.  [Online].  Available from:
www.londonhigher.ac.uk/factsheets.html [Accessed 16 June 2014]
Mellors-Bourne, R., Humphrey, C., Kemp, N. and Woodfield, S. (2013)  The wider benefits of
international higher education in the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
Research Paper No. 128.  London: BIS
Migration Observatory  (2011)  International students: A+ or D- for the UK? [Online]  1st April.
Available from: http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/commentary/international-students-or-d-
uk [Accessed: 1 July 2014]
Migration Observatory  (2013a)  4. Migration of non-EU nationals: effects of recent policy
changes on net migration.  In Britain’s ‘70 Million Debate’.  Oxford: Centre on Migration,
Policy and Society
Migration Observatory  (2013b)  Net migration and emigration: An overview in Britain’s ‘70
Million Debate’.  Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society
Mishra, A. and Sharma, Y.  (2012)  UK visa changes driving Indian students away.  University
World News. [Online] 29 July.  Available from:
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120726143750978&query=UK+visa
s [Accessed: 5 August 2014]
National Audit Office  (2012)  Immigration: The Points Based System – Student Route
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.  London: NAO
National Audit Office  (2014)  Reforming the UK border immigration system.  Report by the
Comptroller and Auditor General.  London: NAO
Office for National Statistics  (2014)  Migration Statistics Quarterly Report May 2014.
London: ONS
Prime Minister’s Office  (2014)  New measures to tighten up the immigration system.
[Online] 29 July  Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-measures-to-tight-
en-up-the-immigration-system [Accessed: 29 July 2014]
Redden, E. (2012)  ‘British Higher Ed’s Visa Tensions’  Inside Higher Ed. [Online] 6
September.  Available from: http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/09/06/british-higher-
education-faces-tension-over-foreign-student-immigration#sthash.3q370M2o.dpbs [Accessed:
28 July 2014]
Smith, B. (2014)  UK will drop accepted visa refusal threshold to 10%.  The PIE News.
[Online] 29 July  Available from: http://thepienews.com/news/uk-drops-accepted-visa-refusal-
threshold-10/  [Accessed: 11 August 2014]
75
Higher education and immigration
student-applications-to-rise-following-visa-changes.html [Accessed: 30 June 2014]
Conlon, G., Litchfield, A. and Sadlier, G. (2011)  Estimating the value to the UK of education
exports.  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Research Paper No. 46.  London:
BIS
Glyndŵr University (2014)  Information for Tier 4 sponsored students on UKVI's suspension
of the University's HTS license.  [Online] 26 August.  Available from
http://moodle.glyndwr.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=28&section=16 [Accessed: 11 September
2014]
Gower, M. (2012)  Immigration: Tier 1 (Post-study work) visas, Standard Note SN/HA/5881.
London: House of Commons Library 20 July
Gower, M. and Hawkins, O. (2013)  Immigration and asylum policy: Government plans and
progress made, Standard Note SN/HA/5829.  London: House of Commons Library
Gravatt, J. (2014)  The future of Higher National Diplomas.  [Online] 3rd July.  Available from
http://www.wonkhe.com/2014/07/03/the-past-and-future-of-higher-national-
diplomas/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-past-and-future-of-higher-
national-diplomas [Accessed: 3 July 2014]
Greater London Authority (2013)  GLA Research on Post-Study Work Visas, October.
London: City Hall
Grove, J. (2012)  ‘London Met’s student visa licence suspended’.  Times Higher Education.
20 July 
Grove, J. (2014a)  ‘London is another planet’  Times Higher Education 29 May 
Grove, J. (2014b)  ‘University of Bedfordshire can resume overseas student recruitment’
Times Higher Education 5 August 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (2012)  London Metropolitan University
licence revocation: fifth meeting of the task force, 8 October.  Bristol: HEFCE
Higher Education Funding Council for England  (2014)  Global demand for English higher
education, April.  Bristol: HEFCE
Home Affairs Committee  (2013)  Fourteenth Report: The work of the UK Border Agency
(July-September 2012). London: House of Commons
Home Office (2013a)  The Migrant Journey, Third Report.  Research Report 69, February
London: Home Office
Home Office  (2013b)  Overseas Students and Net Migration:  The Government response to
the fourth report from the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee London: Home Office
Home Office (2014a)  Statement on Student Visas. [Online]  24 June.  Available from:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-abuse-of-student-visas—2
[Accessed: 2 July 2014]
Home Office  (2014b)  Home Office immigration action against education institutions: fact-
74
Migration and London’s growth
Sustaining the City of London’s global labour 
market*: the role of highly-skilled immigration
in banking, financial and professional services
Jonathan V. Beaverstock
Introduction
London’s world city credentials and global financial centre status make it an incredi-
bly appealing location for leading global transnational corporations and small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  These firms have been the catalysts for creating
London’s global labour market demand for, to aptly borrow a phrase from the Prime
Minister, David Cameron, “..the brightest and …. [the] … best” (HM Government
2013). The City of London, and later Canary Wharf, have been at the vanguard of
attracting highly-skilled immigrants from Europe, the Americas, the Middle East and
Asia to work in its banking, financial and professional services economy, going back
to the dawn of the Twentieth Century (see, Michie, 1999).  Or, to put it another way,
“…the City of London – is foreign owned and staffed by a global elite of economic
migrants” (Islam, 2004). London’s highly globalised and innovative banking and finan-
cial system, and closely-supportive professional service sectors (accounting, insur-
ance and legal services for example) have created a global financial centre which is
reliant on a global talent pool of labour to push forward innovation, create Gross
Value Added (GVA) and, importantly, drive competitiveness in a global industry. 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline the role and functioning of the City’s
global talent and immigrant labour pool, but in an over-arching context of the British
Coalition Government’s tight ‘management’ of highly-skilled immigration. The City’s
talent pool is composed of thousands of highly-skilled international immigrants who
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* The term City relates to London’s premier cluster of banking and financial and professional serv-
ices located primarily in the ‘Square Mile’ (the Borough of the City of London) and Canary Wharf,
in Tower Hamlets.  There are also pockets of high-value banking and professional services located
in the West End of London (see, Cook et al, 2007; Corporation of London, 2003).
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was, “…the single most important factor in financial services competitiveness” (Z/Yen,
2007, p.11; also see Cook et al, 2007; Corporation of London, 2011a, 2011b).  In
effect, London’s financial community was experiencing disruption, whether actual or
perceived, in the supply of skilled personnel which resonated entirely with Z/Yen’s
explanation for London losing its crown in the Human Capital sub-sector; “…London’s
reputation has suffered due to … the UK appearing unwelcoming to foreign workers
and visitors”.  Moreover, throughout the GFCI 15 survey, Z/Yen (2014, p.7) had iden-
tified from respondents that one of the main areas of concern about the competitive-
ness of financial centres, including London, was, “…immigration regulation rigidity”.
The City of London’s global labour market
come from ‘all corners of the world’ who work alongside British ‘financial elites’ (see,
Hall, 2009) in the mainly foreign-owned financial and professional services transna-
tional corporations that crowd the skylines of the City, Canary Wharf and West London
(see, Beaverstock, 2010; Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; The Corporation of London,
2011a; Jones, 2010; Z/Yen, 2014).  Since 2010, the British Government’s clampdown
on highly-skilled immigration from non-European Economic Area (EEA) citizens, man-
aged through the Home Office’s Tiered Points Based System (PBS) for visa entry, has
however not been universally welcomed by the City’s globally ‘footloose’ financial
community.  As the Economist (2012) reported, “The City’s status is under threat.
Migration rules are off-putting and the political rhetoric unwelcoming.”  By using the
term, “threat”, The Economist is making a direct link to the City’s competitiveness. If
talent is put off from coming to London, quite simply they will go to places like
Singapore, Paris or New York, and London’s competitiveness will be on the wane. 
Following this introduction, this chapter is divided into four substantive parts.  Part one
examines the role and function of the City’s global talent pool and those highly-skilled
immigrant workers who are essential  to producing the City’s competitiveness within
a network of global financial centres.  Part two analyses publically available immigra-
tion statistics, drawn from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Long-Term
International Migration (LTIM) Series for professional and managerial migration, and
Home Office Tiered PBS visa application data.  This part aims to assess the changes
which have occurred in both EEA and non-EEA immigration from UK and London per-
spectives. Part three focuses directly on London’s labour market for ‘City-type’ jobs1,
and will assess the magnitude of estimated foreign labour in London during the 2000s
and up to the present.  Finally, part four presents a number of conclusions.
The City, its workforce and competitiveness
In March 2014, Z/Yen (2014) published the eagerly awaited, Global Financial Centres
Index (GFCI) 15 on the competitiveness of international financial centres around the
globe2.  In the previous 14 GFCI’s, dating back to 2007 (two indexes are published a
year), London had consistently retained the number one ranking above its nearest
rival, New York.  But, to the consternation of the UK and City financial community, in
the GFCI 15 survey, London had for the first time slipped down the rankings to sec-
ond place, which made eye-catching news in The Financial Times (2014a). It report-
ed, “New York ousts London as top financial centre”.  Looking closely at London’s rel-
ative demise in the GFCI 15, one important factor had emerged which was not pres-
ent in any of the previous surveys. London for the first time had lost ground on New
York with respect to Human Capital (table 1), which the inaugural GFCI 1 had stated
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GFCI1 GFCI 3 GFCI 5 GFCI 7 GFCI 9 GFCI 11 CFCI 13 GFCI 15
London London London London London London London New York
New York New York New York New York New York New York New York London
San
Francisco 
Hong
Kong Singapore
San
Francisco
Hong
Kong
Hong
Kong
Hong
Kong
Hong
Kong
Chicago Singapore HongKong Chicago Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
Hong
Kong Zurich Zurich
Hong
Kong =Shanghai Tokyo Zurich Tokyo
Toronto Frankfurt Frankfurt Toronto =Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Zurich
Singapore Geneva Chicago Singapore Chicago Seoul Boston Boston
Zurich Chicago Geneva Zurich Zurich Shanghai Geneva SanFrancisco
Montreal Tokyo Boston Montreal Geneva Boston Frankfurt Geneva
Boston Sydney SanFrancisco Boston Toronto Zurich Toronto Toronto
Source: Z/Yen (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)
Table 1 Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI) competitiveness ranked by
People/Human Capital, 2007 – 2014
research on the City (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Jones, 2010) identifies the City’s
inherent labour market characteristics as creating the demand for immigrant labour
within the context of the global circulation of talent:
Firms recruit foreign staff from their external labour market to fill job vacancies•
which cannot be plugged from the local (or internal) labour market;
Firms need the most talented labour force possible, irrespective of nationality, to•
remain competitive in the City, on the global stage and in serving a global clien-
tele;
Firms recruit particular foreign nationalities to develop new linkages and relation-•
ships with foreign organizations and institutions that are not in the City;
Firms circulate foreign staff within their global internal labour markets for the pur-•
poses of training, sharing/exchanging knowledge and best practice);
Firms recruit foreign labour in periods of economic boom if local labour market•
conditions are tight.
But, what reinforces the need for the City’s institutions and firms to look outwardly in
the global labour market for immigrant talent is linked fundamentally to the actual
nature of the work being undertaken in the City by its workforce across banking, finan-
cial and professional services occupations.  ‘City-type’ work is inherently transnation-
al or global in scope (Beaverstock, 2007; Cook et al, 2007; Jones, 2010).  It is high-
ly-skilled, highly-specialised, knowledge-rich, complex and, often non-substitutional in
the local, regional, national or even the EU environment (Clark, 2002; Hall, 2009;
McDowell, 1997; Thrift, 1994), but the persons with the appropriate talent may well be
abundant in New York, Chicago, Singapore, Hong Kong, Moscow, Dubai or Shanghai.
‘City type’ work can also be very client-focused in both wholesale banking and across
a range of professional services (accounting, insurance, legal services) which often
trigger named individuals or teams of individuals to move into the City from outside
the UK (originating from within or outside the EEA) to work for a client directly in a sec-
ondment arrangement or represent the interests of the client from the London office
(Beaverstock, 2007; Faulconbridge, 2008).  
Whatever reason foreign nationals come to work in the City, the Corporation of
London (2011a, p.23) reminds us that, “..the main reason why employers recruit from
outside the EU is that they cannot find the desired skillset in … the … EU.”  Not sur-
prisingly, the City and London Mayor, Boris Johnson were very quick off the blocks to
The City of London’s global labour market
Such rigidity is unhelpful in a truly global industry where the City’s competitiveness
disproportionately rests on the knowledge and performativity of its globally function-
ing talent pool, and the ability of its firms and institutions to attract and retain highly-
skilled banking, and financial and professional services workers from across the
globe, irrespective of nationality (Beaverstock, 2010; Beaverstock and Hall, 2012).  
At the crux of the City’s competiveness and race to remain a leading global financial
centres, “…is the functioning of its global labour market, of which immigration is a key
process” (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012, p.272).  Many commentators suggest that the
City’s past, present and future credentials as a global financial centre are closely
aligned to the quality and depth of its global talent pool, in situ (Beaverstock and
Smith, 1996; Corporation of London, 2011a, 2011b, Deloitte, 2014, Jones, 2010;
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010; Thrift, 1994), and its magnetic attraction for nurturing
and nourishing this labour pool with a continuous through-flow of talented people from
around the globe (Wigley, 2008).  As far back as the late 1980s, The Economist’s
(1988, p.34) Survey of the City of London, put “…the pull of people” at the heart of the
City’s competitive credentials, noting that, “London’s greatest asset is its pool of tal-
ented financiers … [working] …alongside the locals is a pool of international finan-
ciers.”  The City is a unique place to work given that its industrial structure is dominat-
ed by hundreds of the global leading multinational accounting, banking (wholesale,
retail, commercial, private), consulting, insurance, legal, real estate and auxiliary
financial services corporations, and a constellation of ‘boutiques’, SMEs3, whose inter-
nal labour markets are composed of thousands of employees drawn from across the
globe (Augar, 2001; Beaverstock, 2010; Clarke, 2002; Cook et al, 2007; Corporation
of London, 2014).  As I and others have noted elsewhere (Beaverstock, 1996;
Beaverstock and Smith, 1996; Beaverstock, 2010; Jones, 2010) since the late 1980s
and  the ‘Big Bang’, the City, like many other leading financial centres, operates as
part of a global labour market, which is highly mobile and flexible, and if there are any
disruptions in the migratory corridors between London-New York, London and other
European centres, or London and Asia (particularly Singapore, Hong Kong and
Tokyo), the City can quickly experience a dearth of talent as the highly-skilled go else-
where, for example to New York or Singapore (Faulconbridge et.al, 2009a).
The global functioning and practice of the City’s local labour market, comprising the
internal labour markets of transnational firms and SMEs, facilitate the conditions and
need for immigration and emigration (both long and short-term) from within and out-
side of the EEA.  Research from a number of commentators, including the
Corporation of London’s (2011a) Access to Global Talent report and academic
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lobby the UK Coalition Government over its management of long-term and short-term
international migration and application of the PBS for non-EEA immigrants in 2011
(Mayor of London, 2010).
They particularly targeted Tier 2 PBS entry for highly-skilled workers for the purpose
of work (with a sponsor, including ICTs).  As Angela Knight, the CEO of the British
Bankers Association reported in the London Evening Standard (2010), “[W]e are cer-
tainly in favour of a flexible cap as it applies to financial services, and banking in par-
ticular” (emphasis added).
Professional and managerial immigration to the UK – some key trends
At the aggregate level, migration statistics for British and non-British professional and
managerial occupations entering and leaving the UK for more than one year are
included in the LTIM Series (Long-Term International Migration)  series published by
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (ONS, 2012).  Data showing the immigration
(inflow), emigration (outflow) and net migration (difference between inflow and out-
flow) for total LTIM in professional and managerial occupations, by citizenship,
between 2007 and 2012, shown in table 2, are the latest figures publically available.
Since 2008, there has been a reduction of 34% in the inflow of professional and man-
agerial immigrants from 187,000 to 124,000, which is not surprising given the onset
and effects of the global recession, and more locally the UK recession and Eurozone
crisis (Dobson and Salt, 2009; Salt and Dobson, 2013).  But of particular interest in
these data are the changes since 2010, at the onset of the British Coalition
Government’s tightening of immigration to the UK for non-EEA citizens  (COMPAS,
2014; Migration Advisory Committee, 2012).  Between 2010 and 2012, the number of
professional and managerial immigrants entering the UK for more than one year has
fallen by 28,000 (-18%) from 152,000 to 124,000, and the net migration rate has
reduced from 40,000 to 13,000 (table 2).  
Looking more closely at these data, the major decline in total immigration flows to the
UK for these professional and managerial citizens can be mainly accounted for by
reductions in the inflow of non-British persons from the Commonwealth and Other
Foreign countries, i.e. those nationalities who are outside of the EEA and subject to
the UK’s Tiered PBS for allocating visa applications (for work, study or family/depen-
dents).  Between 2010 and 2012, net immigration inflow for professional and mana-
gerial citizens from the Commonwealth and Other Foreign Countries has reduced by
16,000 or 31% (from 52,000 to 36,000) and 10,000 or 33% (from 31,000 to 21,000),
respectively. In the same period, the net inflow of professional and managerial citizens
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All British Non-British EU EU15 EUA8 All Com
Other
Foreign1
2012 Inflow 124 38 87 30 23 5 36 21
Outflow 112 63 49 20 17 2 19 10
Net +13 -25 +38 +9 +6 +3 +18 +11
2011 Inflow 142 33 110 35 24 9 47 27
Outflow 125 67 58 27 22 3 20 11
Net +17 -35 +52 +8 +1 +6 +27 +16
2010 Inflow 152 39 114 30 21 8 52 31
Outflow 113 60 53 24 20 4 21 8
Net +40 -21 +60 +6 +1 +4 +32 +23
2009 Inflow 152 36 115 33 24 6 49 34
Outflow 128 54 74 34 25 8 28 28
Net +23 -18 +41 -2 -1 -3 +20 +22
2008 Inflow 187 40 147 46 29 13 61 40
Outflow 147 79 68 33 21 11 25 10
Net +40 -39 +79 +12 +8 +2 +36 +30
2007 Inflow 168 30 138 43 25 17 61 33
Outflow 112 67 45 16 13 3 22 8
Net +55 -37 +92 +27 +12 +14 +39 +26
2006 Inflow 154 24 130 27 20 7 74 29
Outflow 125 80 45 12 10 1 23 11
Net +29 -56 +85 +15 +10 +6 +52 +18
2005 Inflow 168 37 131 29 16 12 66 36
Outflow 137 82 55 16 14 2 26 13
Net +31 -45 +76 +13 +2 +10 +40 +23
2004 Inflow 175 35 140 28 21 7 69 +43
Outflow 114 74 40 11 11 - 20 9
Net +61 -39 +100 +17 +10 +7 +49 +35
2003 Inflow 146 44 102 12 12 - 52 38
Outflow 108 64 44 15 15 - 21 8
Net +38 -20 +58 -3 -3 - +32 +29
2002 Inflow 139 39 100 17 17 - 46 37
Outflow 123 77 46 17 17 - 20 10
Net +16 -38 +54 +1 +1 - +26 +28
1 From 2004, Other Foreign excludes the EUA8 countries that joined the EU. From 2007, excludes Bulgaria
and Romania who joined the EU in 2007.
Source: ONS LTIM, annual data 2000-2012 (by citizenship prior to migration). Series MN Table 3.13 
Table 2 Long-term international professional and managerial migration trends by
citizenship (000s) 2002-2012
strongly the propensity of highly-skilled professional and managerial migrants in these
skillsets to enter the UK from within the firm’s global internal labour markets, their
international office network or subsidiaries (UK Home Office Border Agency data, as
reported in Salt, 2009). 
The introduction of the PBS by the UK Home Office for controlling the entry of non-
EEA citizens to the UK for purposes of work, study or family reasons (mainly as
dependents) has been fine-tuned by the Coalition Government to reduce pro-actively
net migration, particularly from the non-EEA (Salt and Dobson, 2013; The Financial
Times, 2013).  The current PBS for work purposes is divided into three main tiers: Tier
1 – highly-skilled migrants (including entrepreneurs, exceptional talent, investors);
Tier 2 – highly-skilled migrants who have a job offer (from a named sponsor, includ-
ing ICTs); and, Tier 3 – temporary workers.  Tier 2 replaced the Work Permit system
in the Highly-Skilled Migration Programme and, with Tier 1, has come under close
scrutiny from the Coalition Government to cap visa entry. But, significantly, the
Coalition Government has made an exception for ICTs in Tier 2 who remain outside
the visa ‘quota’ (see Migratory Advisory Committee, 2012; Salt and Dobson, 2013).
ICTs, although under tighter eligibility rules, do retain a relatively unrestrictive pipeline
for banking, financial and professional services firms to transfer their highly-skilled
non-EEA immigrants to London.
In 2012, a total of 37,600 PBS Tier 2 persons were allowed entry to the UK for work,
of which 21,800 (58%) were ICTs, and for that same period, a total of 29,516 Tier 2
(sponsored with a job)  including 8,656 ICTs (29%) were granted extensions of stay
(Home Office, 2014).  Interestingly, permission for first entry and extension of stay for
total Tier 2 persons had actually increased quite markedly from the previous year, a
12% increase from 33,700 to 37,600), and a 62% increase from 18,195 to 29,516
respectively.  ICTs had remained relatively constant for first entry (21,900), but had
increased by 2,319, a 37% increase for extension of stay (Home Office, 2014).  In
2013, Tier 2 applications for visas for work using sponsor certificates for the category
‘financial and insurance activities’ numbered 5,875, which was 73 more applications
than in 2010 (Home Office, 2014). Data for 2011 and for the first six months of 2012
show that there were 7,199 (12.7% of the total number of certificates of sponsorship)
and 3,761 (11.8%) certificates of sponsorship designated for ‘financial and insurance
activities’, respectively. (For more information on sponsorship certificates granted by
industry and occupation, see Salt, 2012.)  In summary, from 2010-2012, there is little
evidence to suggest that the Tier 2 PBS route of entry for non-EEA citizens in ‘finan-
cial and insurance activities’ has been significantly affected by the tightening of the
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from the EU has remained constant at about 30,000, but  it actually rose to 35,000 in
2011.  From this basic analysis of the LTIM statistics for non-EEA professional and
managerial citizens to the UK, one could argue very strongly that the Coalition’s tar-
geted immigration policy, the Tiered PBS to allow entry for work, study or visit family
is having the desired political outcome to reduce net migration, including profession-
al and managerial migrants, into the UK  
Moreover, Oxford University’s Migration Observatory (COMPAS, 2014) report Highly-
Skilled Migration to the UK 2007-2013, has reaffirmed the general trends in the ONS’
findings (2013).  Based on an analysis of the UK Labour Force Survey, COMPAS
(2014, p.13) has highlighted a 39% fall in the number of non-EEA  highly skilled (and
educated) migrant workers entering the UK, from 154,000 in 2011 to 94,000 in 2013,
noting, “…there has been a negative trend in this number since 2011, when policies
to reduce net migration to the UK presumably began to have the bulk of their effects.”
In contrast, COMPAS (2014, p.15) suggests that between 2010 and 2013, there has
been a 136% increase in the number of highly skilled and educated migrant workers
coming to the UK from the (old) EU - from 33,000 to 78,000 - which they termed the
‘Balloon effect’.  
The publication of COMPAS’ report (2014) received headline news in The Financial
Times (2014b, p.1) focusing on the possibility of businesses losing out on highly-
skilled workers as they faced ever tighter restrictions to work in the UK; “Visa curbs
on highly-skilled migrants hit UK talent pool”.  But, to make a more fine grained
assessment of non-EEA highly-skilled professional and managerial migration to the
UK, it is important to look at recent trends in Home Office visa application (and ICTs)
data, particularly for those involved in financial, real estate and insurance activities.
Immigration in ‘City-type’ jobs: financial, real estate and insurance activities
Before the introduction of the PBS for regulating the entry of non-EEA citizens to the
UK, the processing of regulating visa applications for main applicants, dependents
and extensions was through a Work Permit system in the Highly-Skilled Migration
Programme (Dobson and Salt, 2009).  Between 1995 and 2008 before the introduc-
tion of the PBS, the combined number of first and extension work permits for financial
services, law related services and real estate and property services increased by
161% -  from 3,457  to 8,995 and financial services accounted for 3,194 or 92% of the
increase.  Financial services accounted for 7,852, or 87% of the total (Salt, 2009;
2011).  In 2008, the latest data available on Work Permit entry to the UK (first and
extension permissions), 51% (4,024) were issued as ICTs, which indicates very
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and professional services may have reached 326,000 in 2013 but these may have
been employed in both wholesale and retail financial services activities. Applying the
‘25%’ foreign worker ratio, 81,500 could have been foreign workers.
There are no accurate mechanisms to verify either Aldrick’s (2009) suggested ‘25%’
ratio of foreign workers to the total number of ‘City-jobs’ or Beaverstock and Hall’s
(2012) estimations of the number of foreign workers in ‘City-jobs’ between 2000-2014.
But, as noted earlier, London’s position as a pre-eminent global financial centre (see,
Augur, 2001; Cook et al, 2007; French et al, 2009; Z/Yen, 2014) and global city (see,
Deloitte, 2014; Massey, 2007; Sassen, 2013), created the conditions which generat-
ed the demand for global talent of all nationalities in large quantities - particularly
through ICTs. The banking, financial and professional services are dominated by lead-
ing global transnational corporations (TheCityUK’s surveys on: accounting (2011);
fund management (2013); and legal services (2014)).  Back in 1990, I termed these
global labour market demand conditions as the onset of, “a new international labour
market” for professional and managerial labour (Beaverstock, 1990, p.1). For exam-
ple, in 2012 the number of foreign owned financial services firms in the UK, which are
highly concentrated in London, were: 488 from the USA; 42 Swiss; 38 Japanese; 37
German; and, 30 French (Corporation of London, undated).  More significantly,
London at the last count has: over 250 foreign banks with representation from almost
all the global US, European and Asian wholesale (investment) banks; a highly com-
petitive insurance, private wealth management and professional services sector pro-
vided by the leading global firms in all sectors; and many global firms which have
located their global or European headquarters in London (especially in accounting
and law) (TheCityUK, 2014).  All of these transnational firms, and ‘boutique’ SMEs,
ensure that the labour market for ‘City-type’ jobs is functioning on a purely global
scale, irrespective of whether they are located in a fixed position in the City, Canary
Wharf or the West End of London.  These firms not only drive the conditions for immi-
gration to the UK for long and short periods, but also drive the global and flexible
movement of ‘City-type’ work in portfolios of mobility, particularly involving internation-
al business travel and short-term rotations (Faulconbridge et al, 2009; Salt, 2009; Salt
and Wood, 2012).
Discussion and conclusion
The City is in a “critical battle for talent” (Deloitte, 2014, p.1).  The City needs a con-
stant through-flow of talent to remain at the top of the leader board of financial cen-
tres.  The city isn’t unique in attracting non-EEA immigrants.  All financial centres have
cadres of highly-skilled foreign workers, who are intrinsically highly-mobile, and regu-
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Coalition’s immigration policy, partly because ICTs remain unaffected by the restric-
tive quotas on non-EEA visa permissions and extensions.
Focusing back on London’s financial district and the demand for immigrant labour, of
all nationalities, Beaverstock and Hall’s (2012) analysis of ‘City-type’ jobs and esti-
mates of foreign workers employed in these sectors are useful guides to set along-
side official migration data sources.  Beaverstock and Hall (2012, p.278-279) have
applied Aldrick’s (2009) estimation that at least a quarter of City-related jobs are filled
by foreign workers (primarily in the City of London and Canary Wharf) to time-series
employment data in ‘City-type’ jobs from 2000 to 2014, drawing on labour market data
provided by the Corporation of London (various) and the Centre for Economic
Business Research (CEBR, 2011). Beaverstock and Hall (2012) estimate that at the
peak of the boom in 2008, there could have been 100,000 foreign workers of different
nationalities, both EEA and non-EEA, out of a total of approximately 400,000 ‘City-
type’ jobs.  By 2012, following the financial crisis, the CEBR (2012) had calculated that
there were 250,000 ‘City-type’ jobs in London. Applying Aldrick’s (2009) ratio, there
could have been an estimated 62,500 foreign workers in these occupations (table 3).
Focusing specifically on the City of London and Canary Wharf, TheCityUK’s (2014)
London Employment Survey has estimated that the total number of jobs in financial
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Year City Type of jobs Estimated number of foreign workers
2007 354,000 88,500
2008 324,000 81,000
2009 305,000 76,250
2010 315,000 78,750
2011 288,000 72,000
2012 250,000 72,000
2013 237,000 59,250
2014 236,000 59,000
1 Estimate of City-type jobs provided by the cebr (2012).  The definition of ‘City-type’ jobs is
explained in endnote 1. 
Based on the ‘25%’ ratio of total ‘City-type’ jobs as noted by The Corporation of London who esti-
mated that there were 75,000 foreign workers in the total of 300,000 City related jobs in 2009
(source: Aldrick, 2009)
Table 3 Estimation of highly-skilled immigrants in ‘City-type’ jobs in London
In May 2015, the UK elects a new national Government.  Immigration policy will be
one of the political cornerstones in the forthcoming election campaign for all the major
political parties, seeking to ‘manage’ or ‘control’ non-EEA immigration into the UK.  If
the new Government, pulls the current status quo for particularly Tiered 2 PBS (includ-
ing ICTs) towards further reductions in quota and, or adds, more ‘red tape’, this may
result in an actual and/or perceived choking-off of the supply of labour into the City.
The Government will be walking a fine tight-rope. It could have quite a significant fall-
out for the City as other centres in Europe and Asia benefit from London’s loss of tal-
ent.  Equally, if the future Government relaxes further or streamlines Tiered 2 PBS
visa applications and ICTs, the City will once more be able to advertise its welcoming
and receptive credentials for labour of all nationalities, which will not only enhance its
competiveness as a global financial centre, but will sustain London’s status as a cos-
mopolitan world city.
Endnotes
1 Most definitions of ‘City-type’ jobs include employment which is in the wholesale finan-
cial services sector in the London economy, which also includes closely aligned jobs in
accounting, insurance and legal services for example, which are mostly geographically
concentrated in the City of London and Canary Wharf and therefore, by definition
exclude non-wholesale activities like parts of retail banking (CEBR, 2012).  Also see:
http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-
information/statistics/Pages/Research%20FAQs.aspx (accessed 04/08/2104).  City-type
jobs are closely aligned to SIC Codes 65 (financial intermediation), 66 (insurance & pen-
sion funds), 67 (other financial intermediation activities), 7411 (legal), 7412 (accountan-
cy) and business consultancy (7414).
2 There are five main areas of competitiveness, termed instrument factors, which are
used to calculate the indexes for the GFCI: business environment factors (e.g. political
stability, regulatory environment; tax and cost competitiveness); financial sector develop-
ment (e.g. volume of trading, availability of capital, depth of clusters); infrastructure fac-
tors (e.g. quality of building and office, transport and ICT); human capital (e.g. availabili-
ty of skilled personnel, labour market flexibility): and reputational and general factors
(e.g. cultural attractiveness, city brand and appeal) (Z/Yen, 2014).
3 The ONS (2013) reports that the Borough of the City of London has an industrial struc-
ture composed of 14,385 enterprises, of which approximately 240 employ between 50
and 249 staff, and 215 employ 250+ staff. See: http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/busi-
ness/economic-research-and-information/
statistics/Pages/Research%20FAQs.aspx (accessed 5th August 2014)
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larly move between different centres within and between the internal labour markets
of transnational firms (Beaverstock, 2005).  As the economies of the ‘west’ pull them-
selves out of the recession, steered in part by growth in the service sector and partic-
ularly in ‘City-type’ industries across financial centres, the ‘war for talent’ (McKinsey,
1997) will again dominate the competitiveness of places like the City of London.
The UK’s PBS for managing highly-skilled immigration has, on the whole, been
favourable to the City’s appetite for knowledge-rich immigrant labour from outside of
the EEA, but recent data from the LTIM statistics for professional and managerial
migration would question this claim at the UK scale. The Home Office has initially
excluded ICTs from the Tiered PBS, and from official data sources and there is little
evidence to suggest that actual flows in financial and related occupations are being
significantly choked-off by a reduction in Tier 2 applications.  The analysis from COM-
PAS (2014) referring  to the EU ‘balloon effect’ is of interest and relevance, but from
almost thirty years researching the City’s international labour market it is clear that the
leading global transnational banks and related financial and professional services
seek to recruit the best qualified labour for the vacancy, irrespective of national domi-
cile and country of last residence.  In many respects, unlike other sectors of the econ-
omy, the Home Office’s management of non-EEA immigration for the City-type occu-
pations has ensured that the City (and London’s wider world city status) has not been
undermined by a lack of talent.  But, this observation is not without two important
caveats to note.  
Firstly, if there is an all encompassing perception from the City’s financial community
and lobby groups that the Coalition Government’s tightening of visa application pro-
cedures (also involving ICTs) is making the outward facing image of the City “unwel-
coming” for foreign talent, as noted by The Economist (2012), this perception may
actually become concretised as ‘fact’ for those individual immigrants and sponsoring
firms, and it could deter initial applications, and thus contribute to the tightening of the
City’s global labour supply.  Secondly, firms based in the City and Canary Wharf are
financially ‘footloose’ and do have the ability to switch capital and labour between their
other international offices in Europe, North America and Asia.  A tightening of the
City’s labour pool may not see the wholesale closure and relocation of firms to other
centres, but particular labour shortages and the inability to attract and retain particu-
lar highly-skilled foreign workers, may lead to firms contracting certain parts of the
business in London and expanding them in more ‘welcoming’ centres for foreign work-
ers, like for example Singapore or Hong Kong.  
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Swiss immigration policy - at a crossroads
Aymo Brunetti
Introduction
Immigration is a key factor explaining the development of Switzerland from a poor,
rural economy to one of the richest countries in the world. Immigrants were crucial in
overcoming the scarcity of labour during the economic booms of the last century.
Despite the undeniable positive effects on the economy, the heavy reliance on immi-
gration has always been a touchy political issue. The very high percentage of foreign-
ers in Switzerland has occasionally led to strong, populist resistance. A recent refer-
endum now endangers the country’s economically beneficial agreement with the EU
on the free movement of labour. To find a viable alternative which combines restric-
tions on immigration as proposed by this vote and the agreement with the EU will
probably be the most challenging political and economic issue Switzerland faces in
the next few years. This could well be an interesting case study for a British audience
given the extent of public support there for leaving the EU.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 gives figures to illustrate the increas-
ing importance of immigration for the Swiss economy. Section 2 then explains the his-
torical development of immigration policy  in Switzerland. Section 3 gives some indi-
cations on the economic effects of the current arrangement – free movement of labour
with the EU. Section 4 explains how the recent vote on restricting immigration endan-
gers free movement of labour and section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
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unease with this process and to a great extent the public vote against unrestricted
immigration in February 2014 which is discussed in section 4.
2. Swiss immigration policy - a historical perspective
Immigration policies have fluctuated in recent Swiss history. After a period of relative-
ly free movement of labour up until the First World War, immigration policies then
became very restrictive for the following 30 years leading to the sharp reduction in the
proportion of foreigners. After the Second World War, Switzerland again opened up
for immigration. This led to a second wave of at least temporary immigration, domi-
nated by seasonal workers in the 1950s and 1960s. Increasing political resistance cul-
minated in a popular initiative against ‘foreign infiltration’ in 1970. This initiative sought
to restrict foreigners to 10% of the population. It was not approved but 46% of voters
supported it. In reaction to this mounting resistance, Switzerland tightened its immi-
gration policies and introduced quotas for specific groups of immigrants. 
The quota regime from 1970-2002
After 1970 the allocation of quotas to different economic sectors led to an increasing-
ly political struggle for the scarce permits. Research by Dhima (1991) shows that the
way permits were allocated had a huge effect on the economy. The allocation process
for permits was prone to successful lobbying by powerful groups wanting to get
access to foreign workers.  Mainly low productivity sectors such as agriculture and
construction have the most effective political organizations in long established democ-
racies like Switzerland (see Olson 1982) and were most successful in lobbying for
immigrants.  These sectors mainly require low-skilled workers and so this had a
marked effect on the composition of new immigrants. Consequently, the majority of
immigrants were low-skilled with below average productivity. Some years after getting
the first work permits, these immigrants were free to seek work in other sectors. As
the medium to high productivity sectors Switzerland were expanding, these workers
eventually found jobs there. However, this process created considerable economic
inefficiency. Many relatively high-productivity firms could not recruit the immigrants
with the necessary skills directly but had to hire and retrain low-skilled workers from
those low-productivity sectors. Figure 2 illustrates this inefficient system that was one
of the main reasons why economic growth in Switzerland was mainly driven by an
increase in labour supply (i.e. hours worked) and much less by productivity growth.
This also accounts for the very subdued per capita growth rates Switzerland experi-
enced during this period.
Swiss immigration policy
1. Immigration in Switzerland
Figure 1 shows the percentage of  Switzerland’s population born outside the country
over the last century. In the first half of the 20th century the proportion of foreigners
fell considerably from about 15% in 1910 to 5% at the end of the Second World War.
Since the 1940s there have been two waves of significant immigration. The first wave
lasted until the deep recession at the beginning of the 1970s and the second started
in the 1980s and continues to this day. The proportion of foreigners reached almost
25% of the total Swiss population in 2012 which compares to around 13% in the US
and about 12% in the UK. And immigration has further intensified in recent years.
Average immigration in the period 1982-2002 was around 90,000 people per year.
From 2002-2012 this average rose to 120,000 people a year. This is the equivalent of
the population of the Swiss capital city of Bern coming into the country each year. The
remarkable recent increase can also be seen in the net numbers. The net increase in
the population as a result of migration, that is immigration minus emigration, was
25,000 people a year until 2002 when it rose to 60,000 a year. 
These figures show that Switzerland is indeed a country of immigrants and the recent
past has brought an intensification of this process. This statistic already goes a long
way to explain the role of immigration in the Swiss economy, the increasing political
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Figure 1 Percentage of foreigners in the Swiss population
Source: Statistik des jährlichen Bevölkerungsstandes (ESPOP)
rather than lobbying by influential groups. Higher-productivity firms no longer had to
hire and retrain low-skilled immigrants who had entered Switzerland via the low-pro-
ductivity sector. Under FML, they could recruit directly from the EU labour market.
As described in the next section, this fundamentally changed the skill-composition of
immigrants and had a profound effect on the efficiency of the Swiss economy.
3. Economic effects of free movement of labour
Economic growth
To evaluate the effects of FML on economic growth it is important to distinguish
between the two fundamental sources of GDP growth,  the increase in hours worked
and the increase in average productivity. 
Concerning the total hours worked it is natural to expect that the sharp increase in
immigration would have a positive effect on the Swiss economy. However, immigrants
only contribute positively to hours worked if they indeed have jobs and they do not
replace Swiss workers one for one. Figure 3 illustrates the sharp increase in the total
hours worked in Switzerland since the introduction of FML in 2002.
Swiss immigration policy
Free movement of labour with the EU from 2002-2014
The inefficiencies of the quota regime were not easy to reform as the well-organized
interests which profited from the system opposed any changes. However – as is quite
common in Swiss policy making – foreign political pressure brought change. In the
late 1990s, the Swiss government negotiated bilateral treaties with the European
Union to secure access for its companies to the increasingly integrated Union. Both
parties agreed to the mutual improvement of market access. In the negotiation
process, free movement of labour (FML) was regarded as a ‘concession’ by
Switzerland.  The EU had made it clear that FML was integral to the improved access
to the internal market.
As the EU is by far Switzerland’s most important trading partner, the introduction of
the free movement of labour markedly changed Switzerland’s policy on immigration.
The quota system then only applied to non-EU migrants. Combined with the
favourable economic situation, this led to the sharp increase in the net migration,
mentioned earlier. Switzerland proved very attractive to EU citizens with the Swiss
labour market providing jobs for these immigrants. Having a job was more or less the
only precondition for an EU citizen to move to Switzerland.
An important effect of the new regime was that it removed the economic inefficiencies
of the quota system. Immigration was directly governed by demand from Swiss firms
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Figure 3 Total hours worked
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Figure 2 The regime before 2002
and/or to R&D-activity. These effects are hard to measure especially as long-run data
is needed to control for the distorting effects of business cycles on productivity. The
best – admittedly indirect - indication of the likely effect is probably the skill composi-
tion of immigrants. The larger the percentage of immigrants with higher education
qualifications, the more likely they will have a positive effect on average productivity.
Figure 5 clearly shows a strong shift in the skill levels of immigrants since the intro-
duction of FML. Immigrants with tertiary (i.e. university-level) education qualifications
were in a clear minority under the pre-2002 quota regime. There were less than
200,000 foreign workers with the equivalent of a university degree compared to
350,000 who did not go beyond secondary education. After 2002 immigration by high-
ly skilled sharply increased. In 2013 almost 400,000 foreign employees had a tertiary
education qualification; about the same number as people with secondary education.
This remarkable development illustrates the differing effects of immigration controls
identified in section 2. FML allows higher-productivity firms to recruit directly from
abroad. This market-driven approach clearly favours higher skilled immigration.
Swiss immigration policy
From 1990 to 2002 – a period of very low economic growth in Switzerland – the total
hours worked were more or less constant. This changed after the start of FML. Hours
worked increased sharply from about 6,500 million hours in 2002 to almost 7,400 mil-
lion hours in 2012. Given that having a job was a precondition for immigration, the
immigration directly impacted on the labour market. Figure 4 shows that indeed
migrants did not replace Swiss workers.
While, the total hours worked by Swiss citizens increased during the period 2002-
2012, figure 4 confirms that the lion’s part of the boom in hours worked indeed came
from immigrants.
The case is much less clear for average productivity - the second source of econom-
ic growth. Whether immigration increases overall productivity mainly depends on
whether the average immigrant has a higher productivity than the average Swiss
worker; additional effects can also come from productivity spillovers to other workers
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Figure 5 Foreign employees by educational background (000s)
Source: Siegenthaler et al. (2014) or BfM
100
Figure 4 Change in hours worked by foreigners and Swiss nationals since 1991 -
Immigrants did not replace Swiss workers
Source: Siegenthaler et al. (2014)
Kaiser (2010) show that FML had a positive effect on the wages of medium and low
skilled workers and no significant effect on the wages of the highly skilled. Overall
wage distribution has therefore equalized. This result is in line with the evidence
shown above. After the introduction of FML, the immigrants were mainly highly skilled
workers, while migration by less qualified workers was more or less unaffected by
FML. Competition for jobs that could potentially drive down wages, therefore, mainly
increased for domestic highly skilled workers.
Other effects
Other economic effects of increased immigration have been at least as important in
the political discussions. There have been concerns that immigrants are placing addi-
tional demands on scarce public resources affecting the domestic population’s access
to those services and housing. There is no available evidence that FML is having this
effect to any significant extent. Nevertheless such anxieties are important in explain-
ing the shift in the popular perception that led to the policy change discussed in the
next section.
4. And now back to square 1?
In Switzerland, important political decisions are often brought to a referendum. Since
its introduction in 2002, FML, not surprisingly, has been the subject of popular votes.
FML was supported by the Swiss population in three votes before 2014.
This changed however in February 2014 as the Swiss people narrowly (50.3%) voted
in a referendum in favour of a popular initiative that endangers a considerable part of
the bilateral treaties with the EU, including FML. The ‘Popular initiative against mass
immigration’ had the following aims: 
Switzerland should regulate its migration independently, •
There should be a significant decrease in net migration and •
There should be a yearly limit on the number of immigrants. •
It is interesting to note that the proportion of votes in favour was higher in rural areas,
which is somewhat peculiar as the vast majority of the immigrant population lives in
cities.
The initiative did not explicitly seek to terminate the agreement with the EU on FML.
In effect, however, its strict enforcement would clash with the treaty with the EU estab-
lishing the principle of the free movement of workers. The constitutional change has
Swiss immigration policy
Combining the direct evidence on hours worked and the indirect evidence on produc-
tivity from the skills composition of immigrants it is possible to conclude that FML had
a positive effect on Switzerland’s economic growth. It is one of the key factors explain-
ing why – after two decades of low economic growth – Switzerland has had a higher
growth rate than most of its European neighbours since 2002. It is also one of the rea-
sons why Switzerland was less affected by the financial crisis than most other OECD
countries. Strong net immigration even during the crisis strengthened domestic
demand and helped to compensate for the sharp fall in the demand for exports. Due
to the demand for housing and retail consumption by immigrants, Switzerland was
one of the very few countries that did not face a drop in domestic demand in 2009 and
2010. 
Unemployment and wages
Before the introduction of FML, concerns about the effects of immigration on the
labour market were widespread. Specifically, people feared that the competition from
labour from abroad could lead to an increase in unemployment and/or a fall in wages.
In terms of unemployment the increase in hours worked, as discussed above, sug-
gests that most immigrants added to the labour force rather than replaced Swiss
workers.  After all, the total hours worked by the domestic population has increased
as well. Studies on the labour market effects have shown that unemployment has not
increased due to FML. According to Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (2014) average
unemployment has barely changed since 2002. Depending on the statistical source
there has been a slight decrease (official Swiss data) or a slight increase (harmonized
survey data). In both cases the measured effect was insignificant. Research by
Siegenthaler et al. (2014) finds that there has been a small reduction in unemploy-
ment due to FML, whereas an earlier study by Stalder (2008) hints to the possibility
that since the introduction of the current regime, cyclical unemployment has tended to
fall less quickly in an economic upturn. Summarizing the research it can be stated that
Swiss unemployment stayed at extremely low levels after the introduction of FML.
Concerning real wages a similar observation can be made. There are few indications
that the introduction of FML has had a significant effect. Real wages have increased
at a greater rate since 2002 than in the previous decade. However, this may also be
due to the overall improvement of the macroeconomic situation and it is virtually
impossible to isolate the effect of FML. An empirical analysis by Basten and
Siegenthaler (2013), found no significant effects of FML on wages. More relevant to
the political discussion is probably the effect on the wage distribution. Gerfin and
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to be put into law within three years. Currently there is a lively debate on how to
enforce it without endangering the entire relationship with the EU, the so called “bilat-
eral way”. The first bilateral treaties with the EU are formally linked which means that
discontinuing FML would potentially terminate all these treaties. 
If the result of the referendum was strictly enforced, the pre-2002 system of permits
would have to be reintroduced. If this road has to be taken it will be crucial to find ways
to avoid the highly inefficient and politicized system that was in place before 2002. It
is important to learn from the experience with quota systems. From an economic per-
spective, a system as close as possible to the demand driven migration system in
place under FML is favourable. However, potentially efficient systems, for example
with tradable permits, are not popular. 
While the initiators of the vote favour a return to the pre-2002 system, most other par-
ties are talking about a future referendum on the entire relationship with the EU,
including the FML arrangement. They presumably hope to avoid the strict enforce-
ment of the February 2014 initiative agreed through the referendum. The Swiss gov-
ernment is currently evaluating the options for enforcing the newly introduced consti-
tutional articles while respecting the FML treaty. This will not be easy, as the EU has
already stated that it is not willing to accept quotas under FML. Hence, a possible
future referendum on the Swiss relationship with the EU seems increasingly likely to
be not only about institutional agreements between Switzerland and the EU but also
about Swiss immigration policies. This vote’s importance for Switzerland’s economy
cannot be underestimated. It may well be compared to a possible UK referendum on
its membership of the EU.
5. Conclusions
Swiss immigration policies are clearly at an important crossroads. Since its introduc-
tion in 2002, FML with the EU has proved economically to be a very efficient immigra-
tion policy. Strictly enforced, the recent referendum result demanding a reintroduction
of quotas for immigration is likely to re-instate the permit-system. This system proved
highly inefficient for Switzerland in the years before 2002. EU countries that consider
pulling out of the European internal market should be aware of Switzerland’s
unfavourable economic experience with a politicized immigration system based on
quotas compared to the one based on FML with the EU.
I would like to thank Fabio Canetg for his support in the preparation of my talk at the
conference which is the basis of this chapter.
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Migration and the case for a higher National
Minimum Wage in London: an emerging 
discussion
Ian Gordon
1. Introduction
Last winter, after 15 years of a (uniform) National Minimum Wage (NMW) something
of a ‘Routecluster’1 of reports appeared – from the London Assembly’s Economic
Committee, the Resolution Foundation and the Centre for London - advocating (or at
least contemplating) the idea of a separate, higher statutory minimum wage level for
London (Ussher, 2013; LAEC, 2014 and Plunkett et al., 2014). None of these referred
to immigration as a relevant factor2, but their publication coincided with that of an LSE
research paper claiming that increased migration from the late 1990s had substantial-
ly depressed wages at the bottom end of the London labour market, where the NMW
did not offer real protection (Gordon and Kaplanis, 2014).   
As part of the LSE HEIF initiative on London migration issues, a seminar brought
together authors of three of these publications, a representative of the Living Wage
Foundation, and a pair of researchers from Queen Mary University of London.  Work
by the QMUL group with migrants in low paid London jobs had contributed to the
Mayor’s adoption in 2005, of a Living Wage (LW) standard for London, significantly
above both the NMW and LW norms for the rest of the country (Wills, 2013). A list of
the contributors and titles of presentations is appended. This chapter reviews and
develops key points from that discussion3, in relation to the question about whether
the strong representation of migrant workers in London makes a difference to the
case for a statutory higher London Minimum Wage (LMW).
Beyond the fact that Minimum Wages are statutory and extensively (if not perfectly)
enforced, while the Living Wage is a normative standard voluntarily adopted by only
a minority of (mainly London) employers4, there are differences of concept between
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ment – not least because many small firms could not afford the LW - and wanted
efforts to be focused on persuading firms that the LW made good business sense.    
Despite this difference in their recommendations, there was substantial agreement
between the two London reports on the existence and character of a London low pay
problem. This started from the fact that workers receiving the NMW in London were sub-
stantially worse off in real terms than those in other areas – while many Londoners with
earnings in excess of the NMW would also be worse off than those in receipt of the
NMW elsewhere. A reasonable inference is that, in those terms, the poorest among the
legally employed/paid workers in the country would be found in its richest city-region.  
Beyond this, both reports note that the problem is concentrated in certain low-paying
activities, notably caring, cleaning, and catering. An implication (picked up by the
LAEC) is that the impact of a national minimum wage  with lower purchasing power in
London would also tend to be heavily concentrated among particular (more vulnera-
ble) population groups, for whom it would be a major source of poverty. Not spelled
out, these groups would be expected to include many of those arriving in London
recently from poorer countries, from both the global ‘south’ and the European ‘east’.     
The rest of this chapter focuses on a pair of issues which are key to the question of
what should be done.  One involves the connection between low pay in London and
the role of these migrant groups (section 2); and the other about how far economic
affordability should be a constraint on setting a wages floor in the London economy
(section 3).  A short conclusion then suggests directions for taking this forward
towards firmer action  (section 4). 
2. The migrant connection 
The salience - and indeed urgency - of the London ‘low pay’ issue now partly reflects
developments since the financial crises, combining the employment downturn, contin-
ued increases in housing costs and the curtailment/restructuring of in-work benefits,
notably housing allowances. But it also reflects the transforming impact on the London
labour market, over a longer time frame (stretching back into the 1990s), of unprece-
dented levels of international migration.    
The arrival of large numbers of migrants from poorer countries (in particular) is rele-
vant for two reasons.  One is that on arrival many of the migrants can only find
employment in low paying activities, where they are particularly vulnerable to exploita-
tion.  But also, their crowding into this segment of the labour market means that pay
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them which affect both how they are justified and the way in which rates are set. In
the UK and other Anglo-American countries the notion of an LW relates to a Poverty
Line, set in terms of the cost (for households of various kinds) of maintaining a mini-
mum decent standard of living, to which all in the society should be entitled, whether
able to work or not.  On the premise that fully employed people and their families
should certainly not fall below this line, the LW is meant to represent the required min-
imum wage for workers with a family to support. The MW on the other hand is set in
relation to labour market implications, rather than either personal circumstances
(except age) or living standards.  In the UK case (as operationalised by the Low Pay
Commission) it came to reflect the highest figure that research evidence showed as
safe from untoward economic repercussions.
The Resolution Foundation (RF) report argued for adopting a more far-sighted and
assertive approach to the NMW, with an explicit target to first recover ground lost dur-
ing the downturn and then bring the share of workers earning under two thirds of the
median wage down to 17%. Additionally, however, it advocated active efforts to estab-
lish, through public debate, sectors and places where a rather higher rate could be
afforded.  Primarily this was conceived in terms of sectors, but it also said that “a sim-
ilar case could be made for London” – via specification of a non-mandatory London
weighting, to go on top of the NMW.  
In her report for the Centre for London, Kitty Ussher is substantially more assertive
about the London case, offering evidence that London employers could initially actu-
ally bear a (mandatory) LMW of at least 7% above the NMW, rising to 20% above in
the long run. Power to set the actual rate should in her view be devolved to the GLA,
acting on the basis of recommendations of the Low Pay Commission.  
Coming at the issue, from the other end – reviewing the London LW, as an existing
locally-defined but non-mandatory standard – the London Assembly’s Economic
Committee (LAEC) focuses on ways of increasing its coverage, to meet the Mayor’s
declared aim that it should become the (effective) norm among London employers by
2020.  The committee’s judgement was that without a major new effort this will not be
achieved; and it makes a series of recommendations in terms of the necessary effort,
though distinct doubts are evident as to whether they would be adequate. If progress
towards the Mayor’s goal proved too slow, there was a division of opinion on party
lines in terms of the measures proposed.  The majority, who saw such failure as like-
ly, would then want the Mayor to push for the MW in London to be progressively raised
to the LW level.  The Conservative group, however, opposed any statutory involve-
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The downward pressure on pay levels in these bottom tier jobs should be a one-off
effect of increased inflows from poor countries, since most migrants do seem to escape
from this tier after a bit (half of them within 7-8 years)6. But the statistical evidence is
that it was a very powerful one in depressing bottom quintile wages in London, in the
wake of the migrant boom of the late 1990s (Gordon and Kaplanis, 2014).  Previously,
London wages in this segment of the jobs market had been significantly above those
in any other region. But the gap in relation to other southern regions very largely closed
by 2000. This was partly because introduction of the NMW had very much less impact
in London than elsewhere. Primarily, however, it was because of the greatly enlarged
inflow of migrants from poor countries, which at its most intense seems to have low-
ered London wages for such jobs by some 15 per cent. That the effect of migration was
so strong in London does, however, reflect the fact that the NMW was set so low in
relation to London wages and prices. A higher minimum wage in London at that time
would have provided a much more robust cushion against the depressing impact of an
enlarged intake of migrants from poor countries. 
3. Affordability and potential economic impacts of a higher Minimum Wage in
London
As noted earlier, the practical difference between notions of a (normative) Living
Wage and of a statutory Minimum Wage is that the latter is tempered by some notion
of ‘what the market will bear’, in relation to potential negative impacts on levels of out-
put, employment or worklessness.  At UK level, a cautiously experimental approach
by the Low Pay Commission led to the NMW being set at a level which is generally
agreed to have avoided any significant deleterious effects even on employment lev-
els. The absence of any evident trade-off between wage and employment levels in
bottom tier jobs seems to be due not just to the elimination of some crude exploita-
tion, but also because employers found value-adding ways of using their lower-paid
workers (Metcalf, 2008).  
The London Mayor’s ambition – to make the LLW the ‘norm’ across London, securing
its application to the great majority of low paid jobs – seems to rest on the idea that
employers can be persuaded that such benefits will actually cover the additional cost
for them.  That was certainly the basis on which the Conservative group on the LAEC
supported the Mayoral aim. But it seems quite unrealistic for a couple of reasons.
One is that the gap between the Living Wage and current market rates for lower tier
jobs in London is much wider than was (successfully) faced with the NMW, in relation
to such market rates elsewhere. The other is that net gains which may be achievable
(e.g. through staff development) across a whole sector when all employers are
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levels there are liable to be depressed – exacerbating exposure to poverty among all
those who can only access these kinds of work.
The migrant division of labour and migrants’ work experience   
Intensive research on migrant workers’ experience of low paid work, alongside other
London office cleaners, during the boom years showed the migrants to be occupying
very specific roles, within a division of labour shaped by the combined effects of de-
regulation/out-sourcing, on the one hand, and tightening up of entry controls and wel-
fare availability, on the other (Wills et al., 2010). 
Since the downturn, migrants from poor countries have continued to arrive, finding a
resilient demand for their labour.  But, as Datta and McIlwaine reported, the conditions
they faced had clearly worsened. Their interviews with migrants in London suggested
that they continued to come – and to stay here, because economic opportunities were
still better than at home and/or because migrants were moving on from other EU des-
tinations (e.g. Spain) that had been hit by worse economic downturns. Post-crisis
flows were more likely to involve secondary and/or irregular moves, adding to the vul-
nerability of migrants in the workplace. Reductions in pay rates and available/paid
hours were reported, together with downgrading from more skilled jobs, and height-
ened fears about job security.  Tensions between groups of workers within the low pay
sector had also increased – e.g. between legals/illegals and migrants/British-born –
and stresses had spilled over into personal lives and relationships. Despite the UK
recession, exploitable migrant labour still appeared crucial to the functioning of the
low-paid servicing element in London’s global city economy. 
Impacts of migration on pay and work incentives in lower tier jobs
At an aggregate level, the insertion of a large number of new migrants from poor coun-
tries into the bottom tier of the London jobs, can be seen to have had a depressing
effect on pay levels right across this segment of the labour market. The lowering of
pay has not been confined to (recent) migrants, though some others may have with-
drawn from work rather than accept them. Such effects come about both because
even quite well qualified migrants can find it very had to access work opportunities
above the bottom 20 per cent or so of jobs during their first few years in the UK, and
because there is no effective ‘floor’ to the wage most will accept – other than the
NMW. Even where this is enforced – which is not universal in this context5 - it repre-
sents a very low floor in relation to either living costs or previous pay rates in London.  
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On this point, it is significant that Ussher’s two benchmark estimates of a safe London
increment to the NMW, of 20 per cent and 7 per cent relate to the situations in 1997
and 2013 respectively. Oddly enough (and maybe perversely) this change seems to
arise because over this period people in low paid occupations in London had general-
ly become less well paid, relative to their counterparts elsewhere in the country. One
simple indicator quoted by Ussher  (2013 p.75) is that while in 1997 the lowest 10 per
cent in London earned 25 per cent more than those in the lowest 10 per cent national-
ly, by 2012 this gap had shrunk to 13 per cent). Ussher ascribes this to the weak impact
of NMW in London, but growing migration from poor countries has also clearly played
a role (the dominant one according to Gordon and Kaplanis, 2014). Neither, however,
would be good reasons for setting a lower London increment on the NMW – except
maybe as a staging point. 
Paying more direct attention to how migration has affected pay rates at the bottom
end of the London labour market does seem important anyhow, because in this case
there is some evidence of knock-on impacts from lower pay on both employment and
worklessness in London. These impacts are not symmetric, however, as far as num-
bers of jobs are concerned. The evidence indicates that a reduction in wage costs for
London’s lower tier servicing jobs did actually have a positive effect during the early
2000s – by switching demand from neighbouring regions (Gordon and Kaplanis,
2014). Imposing a higher LMW would presumably reverse this change. Whether that
would actually be a bad thing seems to depend on whether it led to significantly high-
er levels of worklessness (among disadvantaged groups in particular) offsetting the
poverty reducing effect of improved wages for those in work.  
However, looking at outcomes at the bottom end of the London labour market in the
years of lowered pay levels after 2000, there is no evidence that an increase in the
number of (lower tier) jobs then was accompanied by any reduction in worklessness.
Indeed there actually seems to have been a reverse effect among those within the
London population whose work prospects are effectively limited to such jobs.
Amongst this group specifically the proportion reporting that they were not even inter-
ested in seeking work grew by about 3 per cent in the years after the downturn in
London pay for jobs in the bottom quintile. This development seems to have been
unique to London, and to have had similar effects on both the UK-born and migrants
who had been in the country for at least 5 years (Gordon, forthcoming). Apart from the
most recently arrived waves of migrants, it appears then that low pay (in terms of pur-
chasing power) represents an important disincentive to labour market engagement for
a significant proportion of those in economically weak positions. The prospect of
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required to pay an NMW, may not be available for a single firm opting into the LLW.
This is  especially the case with high turnover labour markets (e.g. catering or clean-
ing in London) where firms pursue a low pay strategy effectively recruiting from a
shared labour pool. On both counts it is hard to see the Mayor’s target being achieved
with the proposal by the Conservative group on the LAEC, that firms should be invit-
ed to sign up  voluntarily. It also seems very unlikely however that the majority group’s
proposal for the LLW to be made mandatory – once voluntary efforts prove inadequate
- could credibly be shown to be free of negative effects on London employment in
those low paying activities.  
The relevant question is rather whether, within the economically realistic frame of ref-
erence of the NMW, a persuasive case can be made that a separate higher London
rate, reflecting the cost of living differences, would be not only socially just but also
economically safe. Both the Resolution Foundation and Centre for Cities reports give
weight to the issue of what the London economy could bear, though neither is explic-
it about what this might mean in practice.  Ussher (2013) essentially – and very care-
fully – seeks to mirror for London the attributes of the Low Pay Commission’s judge-
ment of what was nationally feasible (at the points when NMW was first and last set),
in terms e.g. of where it fitted into the wage distribution for relevant groups and activ-
ities.  Plunkett et al. (2014) acknowledge this work, suggesting that ‘it would be sen-
sible’ for the Low Pay Commission to carry out similar analysis, with commissioned
research to secure its legitimacy, but rely on their ‘instinct’ to suggest that any rate
judged to be bearable without adverse effects on London employment should still only
be a non-mandatory reference point – unless employers turned out to disregard it!
Until that point, the danger is, as Ben Rogers has pointed out7, that a second non-
mandatory wage standard for London (inevitably set at a lower level) would simply
‘muddy the waters’ in relation to the Mayor’s LW. 
The Ussher analysis at least shows that there is no particular need to be nervous
about setting a higher minimum wage in London, since its low wage sector is propor-
tionately smaller than elsewhere, includes very little in the way of exporting activities,
and largely services the needs of the city’s high value-added businesses and their rel-
atively affluent workforces.  But, in determining an appropriate level for an LMW, there
would need to be far more discussion of the appropriate criterion of economic safety
– e.g. avoidance of adverse impacts on London employment (as the Resolution
Foundation report proposes), or on ‘the economy of the UK as a whole and on com-
petitiveness’ (as in current national legislation8).  Recognising the openness of the
London labour market, and the crucial role of migration in this segment of it needs to
be part of these discussions.  
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Endnotes
1 i.e. the appearance close together of  three (or more) London-oriented reports on a
recently neglected topic – each offering an open platform for a waiting public to jump on    
2 A parallel report from the Centre for London, addressing weaknesses in enforcement of
the NMW, did however, discuss significant problems stemming from the powerless posi-
tion of some migrant workers, with  London examples  (Hull, 2013)
3 It also draws on material from an unpublished LSE London consultancy report for a pub-
lic agency in London considering adopting a Living Wage standard (Gordon et al., 2011)
4 with a coverage (excluding Olympic staff)  running at something under 5% of low paid
workers in London
5 As Hull (2013) shows and the LAEC (2014) recognise, there are substantial compli-
ance problems with small firms in such low level trades/services.  The MAC (2014) have
recently commented both on weak enforcement of protective legislation and the particu-
lar vulnerability of migrants to exploitation.  The irregular status of a significant propor-
tion of London migrants (Gordon et al., 2009) is a particular has also been an issue:
indeed the official position is that the NMW simply does not apply to illegal workers.   
6 Though wage levels would only actually recover when rate of inward movement was
reduced. 
7 Ben Rogers ‘London’s Minimum Wage’, Centre for London blog, March 13th 2014:
http://centreforlondon.org/londons-minimum-wage/
8 The 1998 Minimum Wage Act, quoted by Ussher (2013), p.18
9 As with the support for skills progression advocated  by the LAEC
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receiving the current (uniform) NMW when they gain work did (and does) not provide
a sufficient incentive to keep many marginal workers in London attached to the labour
market – and out of continuing poverty.
Conclusions
Despite the very welcome cluster of recent reports opening up the issue of low pay in
London, and the inadequacy of the NMW as a means of securing basic living stan-
dards in this high cost city, the debate as to what exactly should be done about this
still has some way to go.  Since their roles are complementary there seems a good
case for both ratcheting up the Living Wage campaigns and establishing a London
weighting for the statutory Minimum Wage to reflect both the housing cost premium
and employers' ability to pay. 
Beyond this, there is a need to look more closely at the links between low pay, and
processes which crowd too many workers into a bottom tier of poorly-paid service
jobs, when many ought to be able to do better in this dynamic economy.
Understanding what the barriers are to their progression, and following this through
with more vigorous application of equal opportunity and relevant HR policies, could
help substantially both in easing the low pay problem and making more productive
use of the potential of London's working age population .
The beneficiaries of such action would include recent migrants (particularly from poor
countries) who are among those most at risk of exploitation by low-paying service
employers.  But it is important also to recognise that the arrival of particularly large
waves of such migrants plays an important short-medium term role in overcrowding
such jobs - with knock-effects on both pay and work motivation among others whose
immediate job prospects are also restricted to such jobs. 
Not everyone in London gains equally from the flexible and diverse labour supply
which the larger migrant flows have provided. And those who most directly compete
with the new arrivals are very likely to have lost out economically in the process, with
significant real wage cuts for many, and others apparently retreating from the labour
market. This can be a quite reasonable source of social grievance, running against
the general tendency in London for residents to be supportive of migration. But it is
one that is particularly likely to arise here, not simply because of the higher rate of
arrivals in this city, but also because the current uniform NMW provides very much
less protection against working poverty in London than anywhere else in the country.  
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Immigration and the UK economy: interaction
between policy and economic research since
the mid-1990s
Jonathan Portes
Introduction
The first part of this chapter offers a personal overview of what happened to UK 
policy since the mid-1990s that led to the huge expansion in migration to this country;
what economic research has contributed to that; and what research has learned from
it. It then turns to some of the broader questions about the dynamic effects on the
economy, which economists expect to be substantially more important, but to which
we don’t yet have answers. 
Economic analyses and migration policy shifts after 1997
Migration wasn’t really a big issue in this country politically from about the late 1970s
to about 1997, as it had been in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, it was
not framed as an economic issue but it was primarily about race and the social issues
that result from that. As a consequence, there were relatively few economists in this
country working in this field, and very little quantitative analysis. When I came to this
subject as a civil servant in about 1999, there were maybe one or two papers that
actually did quantitative analysis of the impacts of migration on the UK economy and
labour market. We knew very little indeed. 
When we in government tried to set out to fill that gap (Glover et al., 2001), we didn’t
fill it through quantitative analysis but rather we tried to describe what was going on,
highlighting the fact that something was really happening in the UK (especially in
London) in the late 1990s. There was some sort of regime shift in relation both to actu-
al migration flows and in terms of how the policy framework facilitated them. In his
IPPR post-mortem on migration policy in  the first 10 years of the Labour Government,
Will Somerville (2007) said that in the late 1990s/early 2000s there was really a com-
prehensive shift in policy towards migration, and in particular economic migration.  A
previous policy model — benign or malign depending on your perspective — was
set of factors which really say quite a lot about the tradeoffs and challenges that
migration policymakers face. 
First – and this is often forgotten – was geo-political and foreign policy. The A8 coun-
tries were allowed to join the EU in large part because the UK government wanted
them to, and expended a great deal of diplomatic capital enabling them to sign up.
That was particularly the case with Poland. Tony Blair had a close relationship with
Polish politicians. He wanted them in the EU — and the British foreign policy estab-
lishment in general felt that this was a big win for the UK and that they would be an
important ally in various debates within the EU. That’s largely proved to be true. The
downside of forgetting that, was apparent very recently with the reported critical
remarks about the UK from the Polish Foreign Minister. He really ought to be one of
the UK’s closest allies in Europe across a whole range of debates about liberalisation
of the single market, about foreign policy etc. Yet, we’ve managed to comprehensive-
ly alienate him because of a perfectly reasonable complaint about things like child
benefit going to Poland, which is really not a big issue in the wider foreign policy
debate. Immigration policy debates really cannot be separated out from some of the
wider geo-political discussions. 
The second which is even more frequently forgotten is an administrative and practical
issue, but again is relevant to current debates.  We did not have the option of saying
to Polish people:  “oh, you can’t come here on May 1, 2004”. They came as citizens
of the EU as free movement meant they were entitled to come here without any bor-
der controls. The question was whether we were going to let them work here legally.
The strong view of most people within government was that in a relatively flexible, rel-
atively lightly regulated labour market, where there aren’t great corps of labour inspec-
tors going around, that Poles and others would come, and they would work. The ques-
tion then was whether they would work legally or illegally. This is often forgotten in
such debates. 
And then finally, there was the more economistic view that the labour market impacts
would largely be benign. 
As it turned out, the in-flows were considerably bigger than anticipated, as can be
seen in figures 1 and 1a, for the UK as a whole.  For London, in particular the upturn
was even bigger – about 3 times larger in proportionate terms.  What do we know
about the impacts of this migration?
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replaced with a framework that was much more proactively identifying how migration
could have positive impacts on the UK economy. This then led to a period of really
rapid policy development that was very much informed by, and developed in conjunc-
tion with economists inside and outside government. 
The really big policy changes that took place in the early 2000s included: 
The work permit system was modernized, reformed, streamlined, made much•
more business-friendly, much more based on the presumption that businesses
ought to hire workers from outside of the EU if they wanted.  
The highly skilled migrant programme was introduced which, for pretty much the•
first time, allowed people with some qualifications to come here without having a
job to go to. 
The framework for international students was not only liberalised, but universities•
were very much encouraged to recruit international students, not only because it
was seen as a way to alleviate the pressures on university and public finances,
but also because it was perceived to have wider positive economic spin-offs. That
in turn led to an expansion of the post-study work route under which students were
allowed to stay on and work after graduation. 
The biggest single policy change or policy development of all was the decision to•
give unrestricted labour market access to nationals of Poland, the Balkans, and
the Baltic states in particular when they joined the European Union in 2004. 
Now, there were lots of little rule changes that went into this huge expansion of the
work permit system. It’s quite difficult to separate out which precisely drove what, but
there’s no doubt that the overall impact was huge. We had about 30-40,000 people a
year coming here on work permits a year between 1995-1997.  By  2002-2004, how-
ever — pre-EU enlargement—the Government was giving well over 100,000 work
permits to people outside of the EU every single year. That’s a pretty big shift. Then
came labour market access for the A8. 
I want however to dispel at least one particular myth, that the decision to grant access
was driven by the forecast from academics at University College London, that the
numbers would be very small (Dustmann et all, 2003). It goes much wider than that.
It does need to be seen not in the context of one particular set of economists produc-
ing a gravity model which spat out a number and ministers just saying ‘oh, okay that’s
alright then. We’ll just liberalise immigration policy on that basis.’ It was driven by a
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There has been a huge upsurge of research on labour market impacts (e.g.
Wadsworth, 2010; Lucchino et al., 2012; MAC, 2012). Most of the papers (including
my own) show that looking at labour market impacts in a standard way, plotting on a
graph some indicator of labour market outcomes such as unemployment or employ-
ment against the immigrant inflows, gross or net, you come up with a bunch of dots
that suggest basically there is no relationship at all. You draw a line through it and it
comes out flat. Even If you then fiddle around with some fancy econometrics, the
results are still that there isn’t much of a big impact if you look at immigrants as a
homogenous group, and the impacts in terms of those sort of headline indicators. 
So where does that leave us? There’s a general consensus that there is little or no
impact on unemployment, in other words immigrants create about as many jobs as
they take. Some probably make a relatively small negative impact on wages at the
bottom end of the wage distribution, and in London it might be bigger because there
are more and because the impact on the structure of labour markets is greater. 
Impact on public services is however pretty significant. Benefit tourism is largely myth-
ical, but there clearly is a big impact on public services, in particular schools and hos-
pitals in London. Again, it’s on both the supply and the demand side. It affects tax rev-
enues and public expenditures. The balance is quite difficult to assess and perhaps -
despite a lot of discussion about this—it’s probably not actually the most interesting
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Labour market impacts
The one field in which we know a great deal is that of labour market impacts, where
quite a bit of econometric analysis has been done - including some of my own work.
We haven’t found significant negative labour market impacts, and that there aren’t big
negative impacts has become pretty much conventional wisdom among economists.
Sadly, there hasn’t been the sort of detailed  evaluation of the specific policy changes
that allowed particular categories of immigrants to move in, which would answer some
of the very sensible questions about the heterogeneity of effects. Thus we can look at
the overall impact of immigrants on the labour market, or even of some very big slices.
However, we cannot, unfortunately, look at,  for example the impact of people who
come through the highly skilled migrant programme, who are a very interesting group.
It is possible to have wildly different views on whether they’re likely to have had a large
positive impact, a small positive impact, or even a negative impact on various indica-
tors. Yet that hasn’t been done, and there isn’t the data to do it -  and that is a shame. 
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Figure 1a Percentage of immigrants in the UK’s working age population 1975-2013
Figure 1 The rise of work permit issues and net migration in the UK 1995-2004
to our car industry and the Italian, French, and German ones over the last 20 years,
we have all become considerably more efficient. And there is plenty of economic liter-
ature, which illustrates that. Is that true of immigration as well? 
Well, there are certainly ways in which that might be the case. There are spillovers
and complementarities in the operation of human capital. It’s not just that we have
more skilled workers, but it is also about the possible interaction between workers with
different characteristics and different skills. A lot has been written about transnational
networks, mostly on the positive side, although there are obviously some potentially
negative impacts of transnational networks. There are effects around the segmenta-
tion of labour markets, particularly at the bottom end of the labour market. We under-
stand very little about this. Why is it, for example that most parking attendants at least
in my part of north London seem to be West African? Why is this happening? Is it a
good thing? In some cases, individuals who appear  relatively well educated are prob-
ably doing jobs that they aren’t terribly happy doing and are overqualified for. What’s
going on there? What are the wider impacts of that? And there are other labour mar-
kets in London with similar features. There are plenty of interesting research ques-
tions here, which some of this aggregate econometric analysis doesn’t really answer. 
So, what evidence do we have? There are a range of papers now which seek to
address some of those questions both in the UK and abroad, about these broader, not
direct labour market questions. There are a number of studies by Jennifer Hunt and
others in the US about immigration and innovation and patenting. They look at inno-
vation as measured by the numbers of patents and consider whether that’s associat-
ed with immigration, particularly high-skilled immigration or particular immigrations.
Max Nathan (at LSE and NIESR) has done some similar work on the impact of ethnic
diversity within management and company founders on patenting. And this again finds
some positive evidence, though leaving aside the questions about, for example,
whether patents are really a good measure of innovation. There are the beginnings of
some suggestive evidence there, but none of this is entirely convincing yet.  
At a more macro level, what do we know about immigration and productivity? Some
recent papers, notably one by Giovanni Peri at University of California Davis, and his
co-authors suggest positive impacts (Ortega & Peri 2013). This, again, is quite simi-
lar to the trade literature, and I am not a great believer in cross-country regressions
myself. But again, as a sort of stylized fact, the association of — at least in some
countries— of high levels of immigration and high levels of GDP growth per capita is
notable.  And certainly in the UK, London’s outstanding performance is clearly related
to its reliance on immigration. 
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question. There has recently been some estimates of the long term fiscal impacts
(OBR, 2013, Lisenkova et al, 2013), which suggest that there are, in the grand
scheme of things some dramatic numbers — tens of billions of pounds, several per-
centages of GDP over very long periods. The numbers look quite dramatic, but are
still fairly modest impacts compared to other issues affecting the economy over 30 or
40 years. 
Research on longer run dynamic effects
A reasonable summary verdict on the evidence from this body of research was that: 
immigration has very small impacts on GDP per capita, whether these impacts
are positive or negative. This conclusion is in line with findings of studies of the
economic impacts of immigration in other countries including the US
(House of Lords, 2008).
This led many in the policy community to the view that migration was a political not
economic issue. But this was, in my view, profoundly wrong –especially in relation to
London.   
Leaving aside the analysis of labour market impacts, there are other more interesting
questions about the wider impact of immigration on economic structures, on innova-
tion, on productivity – for example how does immigration or particular types of immi-
grants actually change the structures of production? And there are several different
routes by which immigration might impact on other, more complex economic out-
comes. These include:
Increased competition•
Human capital spillovers•
Transnational networks•
Complementarities (O-ring effects)•
Segmented labour markets (may be negative..)•
Impact on innovation, patents, start-ups etc•
Some of these relate very clearly to the analysis in the economic literature about the
wider impacts of trade. So for example, the benefits of trade with the EU do not come
mostly because of comparative advantage. It is not clear that we have an inherent
comparative advantage over the French or the Italian in making cars or vice versa.
However, we think that because of the increased competitive pressures applied both
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Cinzia Rienzo at NIESR has also looked at the association between levels of immi-
gration or numbers of immigrants within industry sectors and productivity changes
within those industries. Again, this shows some suggestive evidence of a positive
association. Though we’ve got some firm level data on immigrant shares, we don’t
really have any evidence on a longitudinal basis yet; so it’s quite difficult to conclude
anything about causality. Obviously, anecdotally, we know there are many high
growth, high productivity sectors in London. Many of those sectors employ large num-
bers of immigrants. Many of the companies in those sectors will tell you that they are
very much dependent on immigrants and regard the diversity of the backgrounds of
their staff as an important asset. Is it possible to show that quantitatively? Can we
describe how policy change influences that either positively or negatively? It’s tough
to answer those questions. For a recent review of this literature see Nathan (2014).
Finally in relation to education in the UK, there is some evidence of significant posi-
tive effects on London schools.  The remarkable success at least as measured by
quantitative outcomes (test scores etc) of London schools is really one of the most
interesting social policy developments in the UK in the last 15 years. I understand that
London is now the only capital city in the developed world where students significant-
ly outperform the rest of the country, and that is particularly true for disadvantaged stu-
dents. Success has many fathers. London local authorities,  such as Tower Hamlets
which is a particularly notable example of this transformation, can reasonably claim
some of the credit.  It clearly has something to do with immigration and also with many
other developments in the policy environment in education over this period.  There
has been research by Charlotte Geay and Sandra McNally, (2012),  and the Institute
of Fiscal Studies has  recently written on this (Greaves et al, 2014). There isn’t a defin-
itive answer.  It’s difficult however to think that immigration and diversity haven’t con-
tributed somehow, interacting with some of these other policy developments. 
Conclusion
This leaves us with a huge research agenda, but it has certainly advanced compared
to a few years ago. We’re however only scratching the surface of some of these more
complex aspects of the impact. These matter especially in the London situation. You
can think of the impact of immigration on Berkshire, or on Devon, where it’s only a
small fraction of the population. But London is immigration and immigration in this
country is London; the two are inseparable. We still have to try to frame some of these
connections.  It’s a fascinating topic with plenty of scope for future research – on
issues going far beyond those of numbers, jobs and fiscal effects on which the earli-
er debate and analyses largely focused.
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Faces of migration: migrants and the 
transformation of Amsterdam 
Robert C. Kloosterman
Multicultural markets: the street and the financial species
The daily Dappermarkt street market is clearly a meeting place for people from almost
everywhere in the world with its sights and sounds and smells of all kinds of food
being sold. The market, in the eastern part of Amsterdam, built in the 19th/early 20th
century, is an urban renewal area with a highly diverse resident population in terms of
their place of birth, length of stay, family status, education, socio-cultural orientation
and life prospects. There are members of what used to be the ‘traditional’ (white)
working class, migrants from less-developed countries who came as guest workers
and their descendants, migrants from the former colonies and their descendants,
political refugees and asylum seekers and young urbanites, mostly students or recent
graduates from the Netherlands and increasingly from abroad. 
Only a few kilometres to the south, there is a quite different type of street life. In the
Zuidas business district with its gleaming office towers, there are people who work in
advanced business services sitting outside posh cafés. Their more or less uniform
dress style and conversation often in English, the lingua franca of their trade, belies
their diverse national backgrounds from the Netherlands, the US, the UK, Germany,
France, Japan, China and many other countries.  
Both city snapshots are images which reflect the presence of migrants in Amsterdam.
Not just Amsterdam, but many other cities in the world are also displaying ever more
diverse faces of migration spanning low-paid cleaners to high-flying CEOs of multina-
tionals (Vertovec, 2007). In addtion, ethnic diversity associated with migration tends
to overlap with socio-economic fault lines resulting in segmented urban societies. To
put the Amsterdam experience in perspective, I briefly sketch the relationship between
the emerging production system and social stratification. After that, I set out very
briefly recent migration trends in Amsterdam. I then explore how this diverse migrant
population has fared in socio-economic terms using quantitative data from  the local
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“Not just Amsterdam, but many other cities in the world are also displaying ever more
diverse faces of migration spanning low-paid cleaners to high-flying CEOs of multi-
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employment in 2013, (O+S, Jaarboek 2013) and creative and cultural industries which
provided 10.5 per cent of total employment in 2012 (O+S, Jaarboek 2013;
http://www.rotterdam.nl/sectorenenclusters). 
While the competitiveness of the evolving urban production system hinges on the
leading sectors, these activities do not exist in a vacuum, but “are almost directly cou-
pled with an adjunct penumbra comprising a flexible low-wage employment segment
… focused on jobs like housekeeping, child care, health care, food preparation and
serving, janitorial work, taxi driving, and home repair” (Scott, 2012: p. 43). Their labour
market position is not just characterised by low pay but also tends to be more inse-
cure, and, moreover, are dead-end jobs in terms of opportunities for upward social
mobility. Given the often precarious situation these workers find themselves in, they
belong to a new vulnerable group, the ‘precariat’  (Scott, 2012: p.101). Migrants from
non-western countries are typically overrepresented in this class of servile workers.
Accordingly, with this new phase of urbanisation, a central fault line is emerging
between those who work in cognitive-cultural activities and those in supporting activ-
ities (Sassen, 1991/2001; Scott, 2008 & 2012). Both poles of the labour market are,
in principle, able to attract migrants, especially in global cities with already firmly
established linkages with various parts of the world. However, given the diverging
requirements for the jobs in both segments, multifaceted sorting processes in the
urban labour market create a complex mosaic along lines of human capital, social and
cultural capital, and, often ethnicity. This mosaic is also spatially articulated as the
position in the labour market is strongly related to the status in the housing market
resulting in neighbourhoods with very different ethnic compositions. Migration, hence,
is not just about those who live close to the Dappermarkt, but also about those who
live in the expensive parts of the Canal District in the historical centre of the city. 
This is, of course, a highly schematic rendering of what is happening in advanced
urban economies. It does, however, provide a few key reference points for position-
ing a city and its migration experience. Before locating Amsterdam in this broader
scheme of contemporary processes of urbanisation, we first consider the migration
trends and some key indicators of the socio-economic position of the migrants.  
Migration trends 
In 1959, Amsterdam’s population peaked at about 872,000 inhabitants and the nadir
was in 1985 at just under 676,000. Without the arrival of migrants from abroad this
decrease could have been much larger, as the birth rate had declined and, moreover,
many people, especially middle-class families with children, left the city in droves for
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Amsterdam office (O+S) Dutch and the national statistical office (CBS). I conclude by
trying to draw out more general lessons. 
A new wave of urbanisation
Cities are always changing but I want to distinguish between the different phases of
urbanisation under industrial capitalism and to focus on the more enduring generic
characteristics, specifically those concerned with the production system: the dominant
technology, the leading industrial sectors, the key products, the prevailing labour prac-
tices and managerial strategies, the locational patterns, and the main cleavages in the
social division of labour. The current phase, labelled cognitive-cultural capitalism by
Allen Scott (2008 & 2012), is first and foremost characterised by a production system
in which ‘highly qualified human capital’ constitutes the crucial input and more cus-
tomised products are an increasingly important output (Scott, 2012: p.x). Within the
leading sectors, then, the key input consists either of highly formalised knowledge -
as in advanced producer services and high-tech industries - or of a less-formalised
form of aesthetic, cultural or craft knowledge as in creative industries such as fashion
design or music making. Both forms of human capital may enable firms to compete
more on quality than on price. Thus they are able to find or create a particular niche
and focus on a limited range of products, and escape, at least temporarily, cut-throat
competition from other firms. 
These leading activities tend to thrive when, on the one hand, firms are able to reap
agglomeration economies by being concentrated in local clusters, and, on the other,
when they are able to tap easily into global networks to maintain contacts with suppli-
ers, customers and others. Those cities or city-regions with the right conditions have
benefited and seen employment and population growth. They have a certain critical
mass and diversity, an orientation towards advanced producer services, high-tech
industries and/or creative and cultural industries, and a tradition of openness and
global linkages and a supportive infrastructure.  In general “… capitals demonstrated
a striking ability to recover, aided by their dominance of national and international
business and transport networks. The upturn in world banking and finance since the
1980s consolidated their primacy.” (Clark, 2009: p.242) Global cities such as New
York (not a political but certainly a financial capital) and London evidently belong to
this category, but on a more modest level, smaller cities like Amsterdam have dis-
played similar dynamics achieving an urban renaissance with strong growth of cogni-
tive-cultural activities, a resurgence of their inner-cities and widespread gentrification
(Engelen, 2007; Fernandez, 2012; Kloosterman, 2013). Amsterdam’s economy is cur-
rently dominated by producer services which provided 39 per cent of the city’s total
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and early 1980 that Amsterdam would be stuck with a lower educated labour force,
did not materialise. Instead, in 2007, Amsterdam ranked second, only behind much
smaller Utrecht, in terms of the proportion of higher educated workers in the city’s
labour force with slightly more than 50 per cent (Marlet, 2009: p. 121). Indeed, a new
phase of urbanisation had set in, driven by an unfolding production system strongly
oriented towards cognitive-cultural activities. Amsterdam benefited greatly from the
combination of a production system dependent on proximity because of agglomera-
tion economies and connectivity because of global linkages with the shift in the resi-
dential preferences of high-skilled workers towards urban living. 
These changes are reflected in the demographic trends of the Dutch capital. In 1985,
after almost three decades of continuous decline, the Amsterdam population started
growing again. After 1985, the birth rate in Amsterdam exceeded the death rate and
has remained positive ever since so contributing to the population growth. Even more
important at least until the late 1990s was the decline in net domestic outmigration,
while the net international migration surplus remained until 1993 when outward migra-
tion temporarily exceeded inward (see Table 1; O+S, 2014). After 2008, all compo-
nents contributed to population growth and at the beginning of 2014 (Latten and
Deerenberg, 2013), the Amsterdam population went over the 800,000 mark again for
the first time since 1971 (O+S, 2014a) (see figure 1).
International migrants from roughly 1965 until 1985 were mainly relatively low-skilled
non-western guest workers and their family members or they came from Surinam.
From 1990 onwards they were far more diverse (Obdeijn and Schrover, 2008; Latten
and Deerenberg, 2013). There were political refugees, asylum seekers from the for-
mer Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Ghana, Afghanistan, Somalia and other countries. They
tended to be generally better educated than their predecessors. Moreover, with the
liberalisation and extension of the European Union, citizens of other EU member
states have acquired the right, in principle, to settle in the Netherlands. The mgrants
from notably Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Belgium, France, Italy come mainly for
work, study or to join a family member and are typically relatively highly educated
(Obdeijn and Schrover, 2008 p.339). Amsterdam, with its expanding economy, its cos-
mopolitan atmosphere, its two universities and other higher education institutions, and
its already sizeable population of western migrants, unsurprisingly, has the largest
number of non-Dutch citizens of all Dutch cities (O+S, 2014). Whilst Dutch citizens
make up about 695,000 of the city’s 799,500 population, figure two shows that the
remainder come from a wide range of countries. Non-Dutch citizens in Amsterdam
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the green promise of suburbia (Kloosterman, 1994). Migrants from Turkey and
Morocco came as guest workers to fill low-skilled jobs and later as part of family
reunion schemes. There were also migrants from Surinam who left when the former
Dutch colony became independent in 1975. These migrants partly replaced those
leaving for Purmerend, Hoorn, Almere, and other smaller cities in the vicinity of
Amsterdam (Mak, 1995: p. 328). The socio-economic effects of this relatively rapid
change in Amsterdam’s population became painfully evident in the 1980s when a
deep recession hit the Netherlands and Amsterdam in particular. Deindustrialisation
rapidly pushed up unemployment, especially among migrant workers. When employ-
ment started growing again with an expansion of the service sector in the second half
of the 1980s, the local labour force in Amsterdam turned out to be less well qualified
for the new jobs. It was not just that the educational qualifications of many members
of the labour force were deemed inadequate, employers preferred workers from out-
side Amsterdam who they saw as better educated and more eager (Kloosterman,
1994). As a result, a significant part of the Amsterdam labour force found itself at the
end of the hiring queue and, consequently, the overall rate of unemployment in
Amsterdam went up to about 25 per cent – one of the highest in the  country - with
even higher rates among migrants. Amsterdam in the 1980s, with its riots, squatters,
and highly visible population of junkies close to the Central Station seemed on its way
to becoming an intractable urban mess (Bosscher, 2007a,b and c).
In retrospect, however, we can now observe that, although unemployment remained
very high throughout the 1980s, the signs of an urban renaissance were already
there. A period of economic and demographic decline, of sharp political, social and
cultural turmoil ended more or less in 1985. 
Geert Mak (1995: p.326), in his history of Amsterdam, has dubbed this period from
1965 to1985 the ‘Twenty Years Urban War’. It was not just that after two decades of
deindustrialisation, the urban economy picked up again in the mid-1980s with the
expansion of the services sector and growth of employment, but city life itself had
become more popular among large numbers of higher educated young people who,
instead of leaving the city soon after graduation, stayed in the more central parts of
the city even when they had children (Boterman, 2012), and widespread processes of
gentrification started to alter the outlook of the city. The Jordaan, a rather dilapidated
and deserted neighbourhood in the 1970s, became a prominent playground for the
new urbanites. Teachers, academics, and increasingly people working in the produc-
er services had become the successors to the indigenous working-class Amsterdam
residents who had left the city (Mak, 1995; p. 326). The fear expressed in the 1970s
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Amsterdam in the 21st century has again become a city of migrants just like it was in
its Golden Age, the 17th century, when people from Germany, Belgium, Spain,
Portugal, among them many Huguenots and Jews, flocked to a booming and tolerant,
or to put it more cynically, indifferent city. Many migrants encountered difficulties in
finding their way and historical studies have shown that substantial numbers of
migrants were part of a pre-industrial underclass living separate lives from the rest of
the Amsterdam population (Obdeijn and Schrovers, 2008 p.59-63). Other migrants,
though, were crucial in boosting the competitiveness of the Amsterdam economy by
bringing knowledge of products and production processes (e.g. Huguenots and
woollen cloth, Prak, 2002: p.158-159) and trade networks (e.g. Sephardi Jews, Israel,
1987 p.73). What can we say about their contemporary counterparts? 
Migrants and the new wave of urbanisation
A comprehensive overview of the role of migrants in the Amsterdam economy is
beyond the scope of this contribution. Instead, the focus is on the labour market posi-
tion of migrants in Amsterdam. I will look at the unemployment trends among specif-
ic groups of migrants and especially among the youth, the differences between men
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(from all EU member states, the rest of Europe and the Americas), total about 60,500
persons, which is about 7.5 per cent of the overall population (see Figure 2).
Figure 2, however, grossly underestimates the diversity of the city’s population as
many people of Turkish, Moroccan or Surinam descent and other countries (and
especially their offspring) have  Dutch nationality. Table 1 shows a more nuanced pic-
ture of the share of migrants and their offspring in the population of Amsterdam. This
table reveals that Amsterdam has become a majority/minority city in that people of
Dutch origin have become a minority. Migrants from non-western countries have the
largest share, with about a third of the total Amsterdam population. Migrants from
western countries constitute about 16 per cent of the total Amsterdam population. The
second generation (those born in the Netherlands of parents born elsewhere) count
for little less than half of the population of non-Dutch origin Amsterdam. 
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Figure 1:  Net international migration to Amsterdam, 1990-2013
Source: O+S (2014a), http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/feiten-en-cijfers/#
Figure 2 Amsterdam’s non-dutch population by nationality, January 1, 2013
Source: O+S (2014), Jaarboek 2014
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unemployment rates are consistently higher and, in some cases, much higher than
the overall rate. These rates also appear to be more erratic, but this might be due, at
least partly, to problems with data collection. Whatever the quality of the data, it
seems beyond doubt that unemployment rates among 1st and 2nd generation
migrants  are much higher than those of indigenous Dutch (and western migrants).
The data also suggests that these migrants from non-western countries are among
the first to lose their job and the last to be hired. 
If we focus on the labour market situation of young people up to the age of 26, these
differences become even more salient. Recently, the municipality of Amsterdam pub-
lished a Factsheet which gives a detailed picture of the labour market situation of
young people in Amsterdam in 2014 (Monitor jeugdwerkloosheid Amsterdam 2014,
2014). This report shows that unemployment rates among young people of respec-
tively Moroccan descent (48 per cent), Surinam and the Dutch Antilles (38 per cent)
and Turkey (33 per cent) are considerably higher than the overall rate for young peo-
ple in Amsterdam (24 per cent). These differences can only be partly explained by dif-
ferences in educational qualifications as even highly educated young people from
non-western countries are twice as likely to be unemployed as their counterparts of
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and women in groups of migrants and the nature of their work contracts and consid-
er whether a ‘precariat’ is emerging along ethnic lines. 
The recovery of the Amsterdam economy after 1985 first benefited highly educated
young workers who to a large extent came from outside the city and largely bypassed
the local pool of lesser educated unemployed (Kloosterman, 1994). As a result, the
overall rate of unemployment in Amsterdam remained relatively high for quite some
time (Kloosterman, 2013). Only after 1997 did the rate drop below 10 per cent and
reached friction level in 2001 (see Figure 3). After that, the rate of unemployment
remained relatively modest and even the credit crisis in 2008 did not affect the rate
very much – at least until 2011. The picture for migrants and their descendants from
Surinam, the Dutch Antilles, Turkey and Morocco, however, is rather different. Their
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Actual figures %
Country of
origin
1st 
generation
2nd 
generation Netherlands Total
1st 
generation 
2nd 
generation 
% of total
Amsterdam
population
Surinam 37393 30097 67490 55.4 44.6 8.3
Dutch
Antilles 6877 5211 12088 56.9 43.1 1.5
Turkey 21921 20290 42211 51.9 48.1 5.2
Morocco 34115 39196 73311 46.5 53.5 9.0
Other non-
western
countries
57047 29920 86967 65.6 34.4 10.7
Total non-
western
countries
157353 124714 282067 55.8 44.2 34.8
Western
countries 73531 55494 129025 57.0 43.0 15.9
Netherlands 400093 400093 49.3
Total 230884 180208 400093 811185 28.5 22.2 100.0
Table 1 The Amsterdam population  by country of origin and generation
Source: O+S (2014), Jaarboek 2014: 218. Figures at January 1 2014
Figure 3 Unemployment rates in Amsterdam by country of origin, 1994-2011 (%)
Source: O+S, Jaarboek 2013 
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London: “Employment rates are especially low for women born in South Asia (37 per
cent) and the Middle East and North Africa (39 per cent)”. The high unemployment
rate for women of Turkish and Moroccan descent in Amsterdam partly explains the
very low rates of net participation, but they also reflect the fact that a much smaller
number enter the formal labour market in the first place. The figures for workers of
Dutch descent and those from other western countries, both men and women, are
comparable but contrast sharply with that of migrants from non-western countries.
Labour market position is not just about rates of unemployment but also the quality of
the jobs. The pay, security, how dangerous and/or dirty they are and whether they
offer possibilities for upward social mobility are also key issues. There is no data on
most of these characteristics, but there is a breakdown according to job security for
different groups of workers for 2013 (see Table 3). This gives only a very limited
insight into the nature of the jobs, but still marked differences are revealed between
the various groups. It indeed seems the case that migrants from non-western coun-
tries are more likely to have flexible contracts, which is one of the defining character-
istics of the ‘precariat’. The proportion of migrants on flexible contracts from Morocco
and Surinam and the Dutch Antilles at 40 per cent and 30 per cent respectively stands
out. Interestingly, we do find a gap here between workers of Dutch descent and those
Migrants and the transformation of Amsterdam 
Dutch descent (19 per cent compared to 8 percent; Monitor jeugdwerkloosheid
Amsterdam 2014, 2014 p.2). 
The same pattern is evident across all the working population. Table 2 shows the
unemployment rates and the net labour market participation rates among different
ethnic groups. Again, there are much higher rates of unemployment among migrants
from non-western countries and, accordingly, much lower rates of net labour partici-
pation than among those from western countries and the Netherlands itself. Even
more striking are the differences between women of the different groups.
Unemployment among women from Surinam and Dutch Antilles (24 per cent), Turkey
(27 per cent) and Morocco (a staggering 36 per cent) are much higher than among
women from western countries and those of Dutch descent (both 5 per cent). These
figures are very much in line with those mentioned by Vertovec (2007:1040) for
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Men Women Men and women
Labour 
participation 
net rate (%)
Unemployment
rate (%)
Labour 
participation 
net rate (%)
Unemployment
rate (%)
Labour 
participation 
net rate (%)
Unemployment
rate (%)
Surinam &
Dutch
Antilles
54 20 51 24 52 22
Turkey 57 18 24 27 41 21
Morocco 51 26 29 36 40 30
Other 
non
western 
countries
54 22 42 23 48 22
Western
countries 76 7 72 5 74 6
Netherlands 77 7 69 5 73 6
Total 69 12 59 11 64 11
Table 2 Labour market participation and unemployment in Amsterdam by country
of origin and gender, 2013.
Source: O+S (2014), Jaarboek 2014: 214
Tenured
(%)
Flexible 
contract
(%)
Self-employed
(%)
Combination of
self-employed
and job (%)
Surinam and Dutch
Antilles 62 30 6 3
Turkey 50 24 26 1
Morocco 56 40 2 3
Other non-western
countries 45 31 21 4
Western 
countries 48 31 18 3
Netherlands 55 21 18 6
Total 53 26 17 5
Table 3  Labour market position of the active Amsterdam labour force broken
down by country of origin as a percentage of the total group, 2013
Source: O+S (2013), Jaarboek 2013, 4213
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Amsterdam, a second or third-tier global city, but nonetheless a global player in par-
ticular producer services, creative and cultural industries, and tourism (recently
ranked, together with the rest of the Dutch Randstad as the 16th most influential city
in the world (Kotkin, J. 2014), basically fits this pattern. The city can be labelled as a
highly developed cognitive-cultural urban economy with a very diverse population. 
A closer look at the relationship between migration and the processes of urban trans-
formation suggests that there are no simple, clear-cut answers to the questions
regarding this relationship. The more generic structural economic changes intersect
with existing more specific local socio-cultural and institutional contexts. The labour
market statistics revealed a city with very evident ethnic fault lines especially between,
on the one hand, migrants from non-western countries and, on the other, those from
western countries and the Netherlands itself. Surinamese, Turks and especially
Moroccans, although the majority were born or have lived most of their lives in
Amsterdam, still find themselves at the end of the hiring queue. This is also true if they
have higher educational qualifications. The deeply rooted division between insiders
and perceived outsiders, a dominant trait of Dutch corporatist society for much of the
post-war period, apparently still holds sway (Kloosterman, 1994). Moreover, it is very
hard not to suspect discriminatory practices on the part of employers towards these
groups. Even at the height of the economic boom, unemployment rates among these
categories were still significantly higher than among native Dutch and migrants from
western countries who do not seem to suffer from negative stereotyping. The danger
then exists that some may become less attached to the labour market and develop
subcultures, which are even less conducive to getting a job. The process might then
feed off itself and create an ever greater distance between these detached subcul-
tures and more mainstream ones. A self-reinforcing process is initiated which is in
many ways similar to what William Julius Wilson (2011) has described regarding
unemployed Afro-Americans in American cities, but in this case (a specific interpreta-
tion of) religion (Islam) rather more as a defining characteristics than race as such. 
Within the highly diverse migrant population, then, a continuum can be found compris-
ing the top-end of highly paid bankers, consultants, lawyers, managers mainly from
other western countries and a bottom end with long-term unemployed migrants origi-
nating from non-western countries - the Zuidas and the Dappermarkt. What is in
between, is less clear; there are some indications of the emergence of a precariat
along ethnic lines but the jury is still out, as flexible, low-paid jobs are not confined to
ethnic minorities and time may tell who is getting stuck in which jobs. 
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from other western countries. The proportion of workers from the latter group on flex-
ible contracts is 10 percentage points higher than for those of Dutch descent.
Among workers from non-western countries, there are marked differences regarding
self-employment with a very high rate of self-employment among those from Turkey
with one in four being self-employed. This contrasts sharply with the self-employment
rates among Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans and a significant proportion of
Moroccans are on flexible contracts. From the data, it is impossible to tell to what
extent this self-employment is out of necessity - pushed towards self-employment
because of obstacles in the labour market - or out of choice (pulled) for reasons of
higher remuneration or self-esteem (Kloosterman, 2010a). It is also unclear to what
extent self-employment fits the description of the ‘precariat’ and thus could be
described as a highly uncertain and low-paid activity. However, research seems to
indicate that the recent rise of self-employment is intimately related to the increasing
flexibilisation of the economy and that part of the self-employed can be characterised
as a kind of buffer, or even a contemporary version of Karl Marx’s Reserve Armee of
workers who can easily be called upon when demand is high.
The demographers Jan Latten and Ingeborg Deerenberg (2013) have shown that
Amsterdam, as an international centre of producer services and creative and cultural
industries, attracts most of the workers from western countries within the Netherlands.
These workers are, on average, relatively well paid (e.g. expats working with multina-
tionals) thereby significantly contributing to the local economy.  
Conclusions 
Amsterdam has shown a similar development pattern to many other (capital) cities.
The population decline which started in the 1960s as manufacturing shed jobs and
middle-class people left the city was partly countered by the arrival of lesser educat-
ed migrants from non-western countries seeking work and a better life in the west.
With the transformation of the production system after 1985 and a shift towards cog-
nitive-cultural activities requiring highly skilled workers, the city changed significantly.
Central urban locations became attractive again for both firms and residents thereby
altering the face of many urban neighbourhoods. The emerging production system
also fostered contacts and ever more flows of highly skilled workers between different
advanced urban economies. Migration before 1990 was confined to people from less-
developed countries, but after that increasing flows of mainly highly skilled workers
(and students) came from other advanced economies between global nodes.
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It is clear, though, that migration and migrants are here to stay. Amsterdam as a
minority/majority city is testimony to that. Insertion processes of migrants are obvious-
ly dependent on the trajectory of the urban economy which is partly a function of a
city’s place and role in the global urban hierarchy. They are also determined by the
national regulatory framework regarding migration as well as labour and welfare. In
addition, the specific history of a city as embodied in the minds of people, its local tra-
ditions and its built environment also impacts on processes of insertion (Kloosterman,
2010b). These factors determine the variations on a common theme of migration and
transformation and the more idiosyncratic characteristics of the Amsterdam case can
contribute to them. 
The analysis above has shown that the pocket-size global city of Amsterdam is
increasingly benefiting from migration especially from other western countries. Some
groups are however tending to be left behind. Migrants and their descendants from
non-western countries who came in the 1960s, 70s and 80s have alarmingly high
unemployment rates which point to the existence of an unemployed, ethnic outsider
population, which may be even worse than the emergence of a precariat. The costs
and benefits of migration are, then, quite unequally distributed. There are clear win-
ners, those working in high-paid jobs, but there are also losers: migrants barely able
to get a decent job, but also established citizens who feel they face unfair competition
from newcomers or who feel alienated by the rapid demographic changes in their
neighbourhoods. It would be hard for a compact and open city like Amsterdam to
afford sharp socio-spatial divisions. 
The former mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, talked about “keeping the city togeth-
er”. This in a nutshell captures the huge task faced not just by the current mayor of
Amsterdam, but probably by also by mayors of other cities. It obviously requires cre-
ating the conditions for a thriving urban economy, but it also needs to go beyond see-
ing it in purely economic terms. Cities should be seen as more than just localised
machines of commodification and accumulation. Cities also have, according to
Aristotle, a telos or goal beyond the economic realm and should provide a home and
a haven to its citizens (Sandel, 2010). This requires at the very least some sense of
a shared destiny as well as considerable collective action to balance the different
claims and to pursue policies of integration. Given the increasing fragmentation of
urban (and national) societies along various lines (not just ethnic) and the retreat of
the state in the domain of social policies (Streeck, 2014), urban policymakers in
Amsterdam and elsewhere face an uphill struggle.
Migration and London’s growth
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The impact of migration on London’s housing 
Christine Whitehead
Introduction: tensions in the housing market
Housing is one of the most important factors generating tension between migrants
and local populations because migrants are seen as taking away one of the scarcest
resources from those with prior rights. Regular media stories suggest migrants are
given priority in social housing allocations and that they are pushing up house prices.
They point to international buyers being given first refusal on new developments,
especially in London so local households cannot compete.  Some of these stories are
myths but, because of long term issues of undersupply and the impact of the financial
crisis on new build, there are very real issues of in-balance between demand and sup-
ply which inherently impact most directly on newly arriving households. 
London’s housing affordability crisis arises from, on the demand side, massive
increases in population but also from re-emerging economic growth and other factors
such as currency rates, the quality of higher education and even London’s role as a
safe haven. On the supply side, decades of low levels of housing investment and
completions mean that the demands can only be met by increased densities of occu-
pation and higher prices. Many of the specific issues - such as priority access to social
housing, the effect of non-EU working migrants and their dependents and the impact
of overseas investors are overstated. However they are symptoms of increasing con-
cern which is now putting housing at the top of the political agenda. I start by looking
at the reasons for the worsening housing situation since the turn of the century and
then set out some of the evidence on these three specific issues before drawing some
conclusions about the future.
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not require additional homes for a couple of decades. The issue is more that older
people are living longer and not vacating their homes as quickly as in the past.
Second, there has been a substantial net inflow of international migrants into London
over the last two decades. They added an average of 93,000 a year to London’s pop-
ulation between 2001 and 2011- rather higher in the later part of the decade, although
now starting to fall a little. 
Together natural change and international migration drove the population up by over
160,000 per year (far above expectations). However an average net outflow of 72,000
a year to the rest of the country, brought population growth down to 88,000 per
annum.  Importantly the net outflow to the rest of the UK, which until this century, had
often more than offset international in-migration has been much lower since the finan-
cial crisis and the following recession. This put massive additional pressures not only
on housing but also on education and other social services. Whether this reduction
will be reversed as the economy improves is not yet clear – although there was some
increase in outmigration in the last year. 
Housing supply
Housing conditions have worsened in London at least since 2001 because not
enough homes have been built for the growing population.  House building has fallen
far below expected household growth during the last decade, resulting in higher den-
sities, more sharing, larger households, higher house prices which have meant that
people cannot afford to set up home separately and more overcrowding.  
This situation is not set to improve. The latest official projections suggest that London
requires an average of 53,000 additional homes a year over the next ten years – but
these are based on past trends which incorporate the lower standards of the last
decade. To avoid any groups being worse off than in 2011, it is estimated that at least
63,000 extra homes are needed per year.
The problem, as illustrated in figure 2, is that we will almost certainly not build 53,000,
let alone 63,000 annually. The Mayor’s housing strategy has a target of 42,000 –
although new estimates of land availability suggest that 49,000 could be built in the
early years, albeit at higher densities (Mayor of London, 2014). The household 
projections also assume that over the 20 years to 2031, 15 boroughs will be able to
accommodate more than a third more households, including Tower Hamlets where
the number of households is expected to grow by more than 50%. 
The impact of migration on London’s housing 
Housing demand in London
First, what is making London grow so fast?  The basic reasons are: natural change,
ie births versus deaths and increases in net international immigration and particularly
reductions in outmigration to the rest of the country have all added to London’s pop-
ulation. Figure 1 gives the annual averages for the decade 2001–2011 emphasising
the importance of outmigration to the rest of the country.
London has a young population compared with the rest of the country which means
that there are many more births than deaths. This ‘natural change’ added 68,000 to
London’s population each year between 2001 and 2011. Past migration has some
impact on this figure because migrants are generally young - and often unattached
when they arrive, but if they settle they have children like households of a similar age.
So children of migrants make up a significant proportion of this net increase – but do
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Figure 1 London: average components of change 2001-2011
Source: ONS
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The housing impact of non-EU working immigrants 
One of the government’s reasons for seeking to limit immigration to less than 100,000
by constraining non-EU immigration has been the impact additional migrant house-
holds have on access to housing for existing residents. Indeed some reports regard
this as the most important negative effect when estimating the net benefits of migra-
tion (House of Lords, 2008; Dustmann and Frattini, 2013). An important question is
therefore whether non-EU employment based migration does have a significant
impact on housing markets. Work by LSE London suggests that there is an impact –
but it is limited, concentrated in specific areas, notably London, and becomes greater
the longer the migrant remains in the country (Whitehead et al, 2012).  
Non-EU migrants with Tier 1 and Tier 2 status are the most important groups who
come in specifically for work purposes. Their numbers are small in comparison to
overall migration flows – and the quotas have not been filled, which implies that the
impact of controls is mainly indirect – companies may not sponsor potential employ-
ees because of the hassle and uncertainties involved. If the current visa regime
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Yet London only added an average of 27,000 extra homes to its stock each year over
the period 2001-11 and current output levels are well below that figure.  Indeed
London has only built on the scale needed for a short time in the 1930s.  The likeli-
hood is that around 30,000 will be built each year if the economy remains buoyant –
perhaps half of what is needed.   
An issue particularly affecting migrants is who is in need of the additional housing.
Figure 3 shows that the largest group of new entrants into the market is those aged
between 25 and 34  –   the most usual age for immigration.  Over the decade from
2001 – 2011 over half a million additional younger people entered the London hous-
ing market – and many of them were unable to find the homes they wanted.  The
result was far fewer single person households and far more multi-adult households –
including large proportions of migrants.
London’s housing situation is getting worse and this will almost certainly continue
unless the economy goes back into recession and London loses its competitiveness.
Migrants by definition are new entrants to the housing market so face higher costs and
also have fewer choices than average. 
Migration and London’s growth
Sources: DCLG; GLA; own calculations; McDonald and Whitehead, (forthcoming)
Figure 2 Housing requirements to meet projected household growth 
Source: McDonald and Whitehead, (forthcoming)
Figure 3 Cohort change in London: 2001-2011
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owner-occupation. So a particularly important question when estimating the impact on
the housing market, is what proportion and which type of migrants stay in the country
into the longer term. Statistical evidence is extremely poor, but the material which
exists suggests that those from richer countries make up a large proportion of the
inflow of migrants but stay relatively short periods. Those that remain become more
like the overall average. Those from poorer countries, and especially those from coun-
tries from which many asylum seekers come, make up smaller proportions of new
entrants but on average stay much longer. This applies as much to EU as it does to
non-EU migrants (Gordon et al, 2007 and 2009). 
Initially migrants form fewer households consume less housing than their indigenous
counterparts but come to resemble the general population over time. Non-EU work-
ers coming in under the quota schemes are admitted only because there are jobs
available which cannot readily be filled by established residents. The issues with
respect to EU migrants are different not so much because of their housing decisions
but because they are not always taking job vacancies that cannot be filled locally. 
The allocation of social housing
A second major area of concern is that migrants are often thought to get priority over
the indigenous population in the allocation of social housing. In this context most of
the evidence quoted is around race and ethnicity rather than migrants – but that does
not detract from the concerns. The evidence that exists contradicts this interpretation.
First, with respect to eligibility, the only non-EU migrants immediately eligible for assis-
tance are refugees who now go through entirely separate procedures and are accom-
modated outside the capital usually in temporary or private rented housing.
Secondly social housing providers will only accept households who are eligible for
Housing Benefit even though the household is able to pay the rent themselves. Those
ineligible include any non EU migrant who has neither UK citizenship nor permanent
right to remain in the country. In practice, on the basis of Labour Force survey evi-
dence, only about 8 per cent of migrant households, defined as anyone born outside
the country, including British citizens and those who came decades ago as well as
those who have only just arrived, are formally excluded. These are basically house-
holds from outside the EU  with no British family member who have been in the coun-
try less than 5 years. On the other hand there is no formal entitlement to social hous-
ing for anyone, and migrants who meet the eligibility rules are treated like any other
UK resident in line with the local authority’s allocation criteria. On 25 March 2013 the
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remains in place, LSE London estimated, when intra company transfers were taken
into account, that in 2011 about 30,000 new entrants per annum could be expected to
enter the UK on Tiers 1 and 2 visas and to remain for more than one year.  Including
dependants, the total number of migrants in these categories would be about 45,000
because the average number of dependants per main migrant is only 0.5.  
These migrants are not spread uniformly across the country.  Almost a half is likely to
work in London while there are also concentrations in other parts of the South East –
notably Reading, Milton Keynes, Ipswich, Aberdeen and Edinburgh. Even in those
local housing markets where they are concentrated, such migrants are likely to
account for only a small percentage of local demand for housing. The highest percent-
age is in London, where they might account for about 3.5 per cent.  In the rest of
England the figure is likely to be below 1 per cent in any local market.  
Migrant households are overwhelmingly likely to rent housing when they first arrive,
although the longer they stay in the UK the more likely they are to purchase a home.
Those migrants who arrive without dependants (the majority) usually either live alone
or share with other adults, but over time more live separately, form larger households
and require more space (Holmans, 2013).  Their immediate effects are undoubtedly
strongest on the private rented markets in those areas where migrants cluster—and
indeed, estate agents confirm that migrants are often competing for private rented
housing not with UK tenants but with other migrants.  Even so, over time there will be
increasing demand for owner-occupied housing, which may affect the market in cer-
tain areas of high migrant concentration. Equally, over time some households move
into the wider housing market reducing concentrations and pressures.  Finally, many
will leave – including almost all those who come, particularly from India, on intra com-
pany transfers which are time limited.  
The demand from Tier 1 and 2 households is clearly only one part of the story with far
more EU migrants entering the housing market. Even so, because migrants in gener-
al have lower propensities to form households and there is a much greater likelihood
that they will live in the private rented sector where densities are higher, their impact
on demand is initially disproportionately low. If more workers are required, migrants
are a relatively good way of limiting the impact on the housing market.  
Extending the lessons to EU migrants 
Over time however those who remain, from whatever source – EU, non-EU (or indeed
illegal) -  will increase their demands ultimately in line with indigenous households with
similar attributes. They will form households, consume housing and may move into
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Economic Area (EEA) country accounted for 1 per cent of new lettings. Finally 4 per
cent of new lettings went to a household with an HRP from a non EU country.  As
many of these households will have other UK members – eg a wife or partner -   these
figures hardly suggest that migrants are given priority.
Foreign buyers  
A further issue is the perceived increase in the number of foreign buyers purchasing
housing in London.  In other spheres, international investment in the UK economy is
highly prized but their investment in residential property is at best regarded with sus-
picion and at worst seen as a disaster.
The majority of statistics on the role of international investors in the residential prop-
erty market come from large estate agents and concentrate mainly on prime central
London locations. One important issue in understanding these statistics is that the
definition of prime changes over time so longer term comparisons are problematic.
So, when the agents say the proportion of overseas buyers in prime locations was
around 38 per cent in 2013 and it is exactly the same as in 1990 and perhaps lower
than the 1980s, they are not comparing like with like.  It is true that the proportion rose
rapidly after the financial crisis – in part this is because the total number of sales
dropped dramatically, as UK buyers withdrew from the market.
The proportion of new-build in central London sold to international buyers is far larg-
er than for existing homes. Savills suggest that re-sales account for nearly 80 per cent
of the overall prime market and that over 60 per cent of these buyers are from the UK.
In the new-build market however they assess the proportion of international buyers at
over 70 per cent - some other estimates are lower.  Within this group the majority are
purchased to let; nearly 30 per cent for main residences and 16 per cent as second
homes (Savills, 2014).
Other figures suggest that perhaps 40 per cent of new-build in central London was
purchased by Asian buyers who are generally looking for a rental return. As important-
ly a clear majority of international buyers are resident in the UK and large numbers
who are non-resident have strong economic and social ties. This and other evidence
suggests that the ‘lights out in London’ issue is mainly confined to a relatively small
part of the highest end areas of central London – where indeed there are clear signs
of changing patterns of ownership and declining demand for local services.
Outside central London the proportion of international buyers even of new build prop-
erty is very much lower – at perhaps 20 per cent for inner London and well under 10
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Prime Minister announced plans to “introduce an expectation” on local authorities to
use local residence tests. He stated: “The Government will introduce an expectation
on councils to introduce a local residency test in determining who should qualify for
social housing. This would mean someone would have to live in an area for say 2 or
5 years before they could even go on the waiting list” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
Econometric analysis by the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE using
Labour Force Survey 2007–2013 data found that EU migrants were much less likely
to be in social housing than natives and that, controlling for household structure and
economic circumstances, those from outside the EU were similarly less likely to be in
social housing (Battiston et al, 2014).  However, after ten years those from outside the
EU are somewhat more likely than average to be in social housing.  This is in line with
earlier findings that in London those from poorer countries, who had been here for
sometime, were more likely to be in social housing than the average Londoner
(Gordon et al, 2007).
The relevant issue for many is not who is already living in the social housing stock but
who gains access to new lettings. Administrative data on this topic are not particular-
ly detailed but DCLG data show that in 2012/13, 92 per cent of new social housing let-
tings in England went to households with an household head (technically known as
an HRP) who was a UK national (figure 4). 3 per cent were let to households with an
HRP from an A10 country, while households with an HRP from another European
Migration and London’s growth
Source: DCLG
Note: The European Economic Area (EEA) includes EU countries and Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway
Figure 4 Allocation of social housing 2012/13 by origin of head of household
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increases. Again it is clearly true that much of the early interest came from institu-
tions based in countries with experience of this type of renting – but few large
scale private rented developments are yet on the ground.
International money is looking for good management of the buildings and the envi-•
ronment and will help professionalise management of both private renting and
leasehold developments. The pressures for this are undoubtedly there but the real
impact cannot be judged in the short term. 
Conclusions 
Housing is clearly an important issue both for migrants and for local populations
(Migration Observatory, 2014). Many of the concerns about migrants and indeed inter-
national investors crowding out established British households are clearly overstated.
But in all cases there is some cause for concern particularly in areas where new
migrants tend to concentrate. The scale of the impact that new non-EU working
migrants and their dependents have on house prices, rents and availability is quite
limited overall but while investment levels remain so low there will be some observ-
able effect.  From the point of view of the economy as a whole there are also  bene-
fits because this group is offsetting labour shortages. The costs to some households
in a small number of localities are however  real. Over the last few years EU immigra-
tion has had a more significant but still small impact. Similarly with respect to social
housing very few non-refugee households are able to enter social housing soon after
they come to Britain, let alone in London.  Over time they do become eligible if they
are in recognised housing need, They then put additional pressure on waiting lists and
the allocation of scarce housing – even though they still generally have a lower
chance than average of entering social housing.  And again with respect to interna-
tional investors only if their interest in new house building adds more to supply than
to demand – eg by unlocking stalled sites – is there no negative impact.
So the first fundamental lesson is simply that additional households, wherever they
come from, add to the demand for housing - although migrants add less than the
indigenous population. If supply responsiveness is inadequate then house prices and
rents are affected. The second fundamental lesson is therefore that we must improve
supply responsiveness as rapidly as possible. 
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London’s churning
David Goodhart
London is currently winning many plaudits, whether it is as top ‘city of opportunity’
(PwC, 2014) or global city where most global professionals want to work (Boston
Consulting Group, 2014). The idea of London as the most popular and successful city
in the world is, naturally, a message relentlessly promoted by the London Mayor and
the main London media outlets. But for the majority of people who actually live in the
city it is at best a half-truth.
London is certainly a phenomenon. It is a city that has partially outgrown its country
and sometimes feels more attached to the rest of the world than to its own national
hinterland. It is the apotheosis of the transactional, market society—a wonderful place
to have as a bolt-hole if you are a rich foreigner, a good place to come and live and
work for a few years if you are an ambitious young incomer from provincial Britain or
from another country. Yet it is also the most economically, politically and ethnically
polarised part of a Britain that has come to regard it as ‘the great wen’ of Willam
Cobbett’s famous denunciation1.
Its population is now standing at 8.2m according to the 2011 Census having grown at
a bit less than 1m over the last decade, partly as a result of immigration and is now
more than three times larger than the next largest city in Britain. This is a ratio more
commonly found in the developing world than in Europe or North America. Moreover,
of the eight next largest cities in Britain only one (Bristol) has a per capita GDP high-
er than the national average. That makes for a very capital-centric country.
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1 The Great Wen is a disparaging nickname for London. The term was coined in the 1820s by William
Cobbett, the radical pamphleteer and champion of rural England. Cobbett saw the rapidly growing
city as a pathological swelling on the face of the nation.
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of outflow remained flat and even rose somewhat in the 2000s — at a time when new-
comers were pouring in to transform the city.
There are a few places in outer London like Barking and Dagenham where speed of
change suggests a strong element of ‘white flight’ but in general the reasons for white
exit are many and complex, to do with wanting fresh air and greater space to bring up
children as much as discomfort with the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods. (See
Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris’s (2014) brilliant Demos pamphlet on this issue,
Changing Places). But if ethnic change plays no role at all in the flows, why is it that
white British people are significantly more likely to leave London than ethnic minority
citizens and are also more likely to move to whiter areas - as Kaufmann and Harris
show? And, more generally, if London is such a wonderful place to live, why do so
many native Londoners, white and non-white, want to get out?
One reason for wanting to leave is the scale of churn itself which makes stable com-
munities increasingly rare. According to the UCL publication London 2062 London’s
‘revolving door’ saw total inflows/outflows of 6.8m in the period 2002-2011  (Bell &
Paskins, 2013). In around one third of the 33 London boroughs, the equivalent of half
their populations move in or out every five years. There is churn in all big cities, but
not normally on this scale (at least in the developed world). There are many factors
behind the churn – a large number of students, changes to family structure, the cost
of living in London and, of course, the highest level of immigration the city has ever
experienced.
Infrastructure provision
Infrastructure development – transport, schools, health, housing etc – cannot, in the
main, keep pace with the inflows. Liberal societies with rights and legal protections
and due process are not designed for the sort of rapid infrastructure development that
London requires. The very thing that attracts so many people to London (and Britain
as a whole) – the stability, the rule of law, democratic due process – are the very
things that make it so hard to accommodate them! It is true that transport capacity in
London is expected to expand by almost 50 per cent between 2001 and 2021 but
housing is a much less encouraging story. It is widely agreed that the city needs
between 40,000 and 50,000 new homes a year to keep up with population growth, yet
in 2012/13 only 21,000 homes were completed and in most years the completion rate
is similarly below half of what is needed.
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Last year around 45 per cent of all advertised graduate jobs in the country were
London-based. And despite more public debate about ‘rebalancing Britain’ since the
crash of 2008 the gap is getting wider. As Tim Hames, director general of the British
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, has pointed out: “As far as the profes-
sional middle class is concerned, London has become a form of gigantic black hole
dragging everything into it. In England at least it is often London or bust” (Hames,
2013). As Hames implies this is not a positive state of affairs for Britain or even for
most people in the capital itself:
It makes London an incredibly expensive city in which to live and work, with the
property market distorted by its status as an international enclave… Moreover, it
can make the rest of the country feel inconsequential. This despite the fact that
cities like Aberdeen, Bristol, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester,
Newcastle and Oxford are world leaders in certain fields” (ibid).
London has a high proportion of Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ – highly educated,
mobile people for whom rootedness is not a high priority. And it has a relatively small
proportion of the middle income/middle status people, who form the core of any coun-
try. Some of those people – especially those on modest incomes from the white British
majority – have in recent years felt themselves squeezed out both financially and cul-
turally between affluent professionals and the growing ethnic minority presence. This
is one reason for the rapidity of white population decline in London.
White British desert the city
As recently as 1971 the white British made up 86 per cent of the London population.
In 2011 it had fallen to 45 per cent, down from 58 per cent in 2001; that means 17 per
cent of London’s white British residents left the city in the decade after 2001. Nobody,
including the academic experts, expected London to become a ‘majority-minority’ city
by the 2011 census. Politicians were also caught unawares. Ken Livingstone, the for-
mer London mayor, told me in an interview with Prospect magazine in 2007 that
London would not become a majority-minority city in my lifetime. It had probably
already become one as he was speaking (Parker, 2007).
White British net migration from London (around 500,000 a decade) has actually been
pretty constant since the 1970s. Yet there was no white British ‘return’ when the city
began to thrive once more in the 1980s after a long period of decline. Just when we
would have expected the city to start attracting white British residents again, the rates
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– again the lowest figure in the country and one third the level in Scotland and Wales
(Wind-Cowie, undated).
Of course the story is not as bleak as such a list implies — and some of those issues
apply to any big first world city. London has enormous attractions too, not just eco-
nomic. It has a rich public realm and much of it is free: museums, parks, the South
Bank at a weekend. Its schools are the most improved in the country, especially for
poorer pupils. Its cultural life is wide and impressive. And it is, of course, a city of
opportunity albeit overwhelmingly for the affluent and the young. Indeed, it is increas-
ingly a mono-generational city designed for people to work in for a few years and then
move on, not a place to lay roots. As the UCL London 2062 report points out, London
sucks in large numbers of people in their twenties and thirties from the rest of Britain
and the world and tends to expel everyone else. London loses population in all age
groups except those aged 20-29 . As London 2062 puts it: “London acts primarily as
a city for work and play where all other aspects of the life-cycle are hard to sustain”
(Bell & Paskins, 2013).
London is still living off the social capital of the past but another generation of churn
on today’s scale and, on current trends, it can only become an even more unpleasant
place to live except for the affluent. Let me now consider the trends in two areas:
London’s economic life and ethnic integration.
Inequality
London is, of course, one of the most economically dynamic regions in the entire
developed world. It is home to many of the country’s and world’s, leading companies,
financial markets and universities. But it also exhibits the drawbacks of a laissez-faire,
transactional form of capitalism: economically unequal, a polarised labour market and
little investment in training especially at the bottom end. London has both the richest
and poorest communities in the country – of the 20 places in Britain with the highest
levels of non-employment/unemployment half are in London. Two of its boroughs,
Hackney and Tower Hamlets, are among the ten most deprived in England. According
to the Centre for London, 28 per cent of Londoners are classified as poor which
comes down to 16 per cent if housing costs are excluded (Theseira, 2014).
There is also greater ethnic inequality in London than elsewhere in Britain: in London
40.5 per cent of white British adults are professionals but just 25.5 per cent of minori-
ties are. In the rest of England and Wales the gap is only eight percentage points. Part
of the reason is that the average white Briton in London is more affluent than whites
elsewhere in the country (Kaufmann & Harris).
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The result of this undersupply of new infrastructure is, of course, greater congestion
and rising costs. In a less trumpeted recent report Savills, the estate agent, declared
London the world’s most costly city partly thanks to rising rents (Sharman & Noble,
2014). In housing,  the newest immigrants often live in conditions more associated
with sprawling third world favelas. As Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris (2014) said in
Changing Places: “Incomers are willing to trade room size and amenities for proximi-
ty to co-ethnic networks and employment.” Ian Gordon of the LSE calculates that 40
per cent of London immigrants from poor countries in the 2000s have been accom-
modated through an increase in persons per room.
Rapid immigration has also impacted social housing, which still makes up about one
quarter of London’s housing stock. This is, in general, no longer available to ordinary
Londoners on modest incomes but rather to the poor/unemployed or those with spe-
cial needs of some kind. About one in six of the social housing stock is occupied by
foreign nationals, which suggests a much higher proportion of new lets is going to
newcomers  (DCLG, 2013).
Meanwhile, a Financial Times investigation discovered that, as a result of rapidly ris-
ing house prices in the capital, members of the professional middle class – architects,
engineers and academics – could no longer contemplate buying a house in whole
sections of London: the City of London, Kensington, Westminster, Wandsworth,
Islington, Camden and Hammersmith. In fact in only three London boroughs is home
ownership affordable to people on  median incomes.
There are, of course, many reasons for the London housing crunch apart from the
immigration-driven increase in demand in recent decades. One big reason, according
to Matt Leach, head of the housing think tank HACT, is poor land planning which has
restricted growth and turned London into an international store of wealth.
So, contrary to the ‘greatest city in the world’ boast, for the middling classes of all eth-
nic backgrounds London does not offer a good quality of life. Indeed it is one of the
least good places to live in Britain on most counts. According to the ONS, London has
the highest anxiety levels and lowest life satisfaction levels of any region in the coun-
try (ONS, 2013). In the latest ONS report published in September, London’s mood
improved but it stayed bottom of the league. It also has the highest crime levels in the
country (though declining) and the worst air pollution in western Europe (ibid).
According to an Ipsos MORI poll, 85 per cent of Londoners think that England is over-
crowded, higher than any other region. And according to a poll commissioned by the
Yorkshire Building Society in 2013 only 13 per cent of Londoners trust their neighbour
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This is not just about coffee shops. According to Peter Carter of the Royal College of
Nursing nearly one third of new London nurses have been recruited from abroad in
the past year, mainly from Africa and Eastern Europe. Yet over the same period NHS
London axed nearly one quarter of its training places (Howie, 2012).
A dynamic city needs immigration, especially at the top end of the labour market
where some people from abroad really do have unique skills that are vital to a com-
pany or cultural institution. But you can have too much of a good thing, especially for
the middling and poorer people of London, many from ethnic minorities, who have
experienced greater pressure on public services and housing, longer commuting
times, downward pressure on wages, greater competition in the job market as well as
large increases in core living costs.
The integration of newcomers
Any decent community needs time to absorb newcomers, time to establish the con-
nections of familiarity and continuity that make for solid communities that together
make for a great city, not just a place to make a quick buck. But despite the melting
pot rhetoric the sheer scale and speed of the recent inflows into London means that
it has become a more ethnically segregated city than is often realised. I detailed some
of the figures on white British decline earlier, and this has left five boroughs where less
than one third of the population are white British – Tower Hamlets, Newham, Harrow,
Ealing and Brent. Across Britain nearly half of the ethnic minority population live in
wards where the white British are less than half of the population, and this proportion
has risen sharply since 2001. There is no reason to believe London has bucked this
trend, indeed the speed and scale of demographic change in the capital may have
made it even worse.
A major recent survey by the Social Integration Commission asked people about their
friendships and contacts across ethnic boundaries and found that relative to its ethnic
minority population London is actually the least integrated region in the United
Kingdom. It also found London to be the least integrated by age and class. It is often
pointed out that public housing and expensive private housing nestle next door to
each other in many parts of the capital, but that does not mean that the people in the
different forms of housing have significant social contact (CSI, 2014).
London is a relatively tolerant city – with about 90 per cent of people saying people
from different backgrounds get on with one another. That does not mean there is
much common life being forged across ethnic boundaries. Walking around the centre
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London remains, of course, the central hub of Britain’s hub economy as well as the
political, administrative, cultural and media capital of the country. Yet more than any
other region it pays little heed to national social contracts; London employers have no
special loyalty to Londoners let alone British citizens. According to the Centre for
Research on Socio-Cultural Change, more British-born citizens leave London every
year than enter it from the rest of the country; the population increase is driven almost
entirely from abroad. And London’s universities now generally admit more people from
abroad than from the rest of Britain outside London.
London has the lowest apprenticeship figures of any region in the country; only 3 per
cent of employers recruit direct from schools, and youth unemployment is the highest
in the country at 25 per cent - and higher for many ethnic minority youths. The Living
Wage Campaign is a valuable counter to London’s often ruthless market economy but
despite much noise about it from the London Left and the Mayor, the living wage is
only paid by 400 companies in the capital.
Many of these factors have been exacerbated in the past 20 years by exceptionally
high levels of immigration, both at the top and bottom of the labour market. At the top
end a global ‘war for talent’ ideology takes for granted that London’s top institutions
must be free to attract whomever in the world they want. Of course London needs to
be relatively open, and many of the people it attracts help to generate economic activ-
ity and create new jobs. But when one third of all graduate jobs in London are taken
by people born abroad there is also bound to be some displacement of British citizens,
either in London itself or people who would have come to the capital from other parts
of the country.
Displacement
At the bottom end, the displacement story is even clearer, and that is without even
considering illegal immigration in the capital. Around 20 per cent of low-skill jobs are
taken by people born abroad and, according to Ian Gordon of the LSE, wages in the
bottom 20 per cent may have been depressed by as much as 15 per cent in periods
of peak inflow. Until the big immigration surge started in the late 1990s there were
fewer people in London employed at the very bottom end of the labour market than
elsewhere in the country, and they were better paid. Mass immigration has expanded
the numbers at the bottom and reduced the pay gap. Why would you employ a local
school leaver for a low skill service sector job when you can hire a better motivated
graduate with modest wage expectations from eastern or southern Europe?
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How then does London get away with perpetuating such a powerful myth about itself
while telling the rest of the country how dependent it is on the urban superpower? One
could argue that there is a sort of ‘contract with the capital’ in which the rest of the
country pays to raise children who then as graduates move to London where they are
more productive and then pay higher taxes to repay the rest of the country. London
does generate proportionally more tax income than any other region because it has
so many high earners and successful companies, but it also sucks up a disproportion-
ate amount of public spending. And the idea that London does not need the rest of the
country did not survive the financial crisis: the capital could not have supported the
London based banks without the national tax base to draw upon.
The London media, above all the Evening Standard, is understandably wedded to
London ‘boosterism’ as, of course, is the mayor’s office and to a lesser extent the
Labour-dominated London Assembly. And the ‘greatest city in the world’ story does
partly reflect the experience of affluent professionals living in pleasant parts of the
capital, networking with interesting colleagues from all over the world, and with the
financial cushion to buy themselves out of some of the congestion and pressure
described earlier.
The voices of those in the bottom half of the income spectrum do not get heard much
in the London media and many of them are in any case recent immigrants who, fresh
from poorer and more chaotic places, happily endorse a London story that is partly
about celebrating their arrival.
Although London is essentially a left-wing city the ‘old left’ issues of pay, jobs, public
services, community and public housing get drowned out by ‘new left’ issues of diver-
sity and minority rights – Doreen Lawrence rather than the late Bob Crow. This makes
it hard to mount a case from the left for more social and employment protection –
more fellow citizen favouritism – for London’s school leavers and young unemployed.
There is a bigger reason too why London gets away with telling itself and the rest of
the country (and the world) such half-truths. It is true that the London ideology large-
ly overlaps with, and indeed contributes to, the wider liberal ideology that dominates
the country as a whole – the ideology of much of the upper professional class, both
centre left and centre right. It is an ideology for the successful but caring, favouring
individual autonomy, geographic and social mobility, openness, diversity and equality
in most things apart from income.
London’s liberal ideology does not like immigration caps or favouritism towards long-
established Londoners. It has little understanding for popular hostility to needy new-
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of London or travelling on public transport one has the impression of a mixed up,
colour-blind city, at ease with its ethnic diversity. And that is true of some neighbour-
hoods, but there is also a reality of ‘sundown segregation’ with many Londoners
returning home to live in parallel, monocultural communities. In 13 per cent of London
households no one has English as their main language, and 40 per cent of pupils in
London schools speak a language at home other than English (ibid).
Schools everywhere tend to be more segregated than the neighbourhoods that they
serve and that is as true in London as anywhere else. Around 60 per cent of South
Asians live in majority white areas but only about one third of South Asian primary
school children are in white majority schools. Chris Hamnett of King’s College and the
author of a report on ethnic minorities in London schools concluded: “There are very
high levels of ethnic minority segregation in London schools” (Bentham, 2011).
A polarised city
Finally, the belief that Londoners are more progressive and liberal than the ‘backward
shires’, as David Aaronovitch puts it, is only partly true (Aaronovitch, 2013). In fact
London is more politically polarised than any other part of the country. There is less
hostility to immigration, reflecting the fact that more than half of the population are
immigrants themselves or the children or grandchildren of immigrants – though not
much less hostility, 60 per cent of Londoners think that immigration has been too high
or much too high. There is also a tilt to the Labour party in the capital thanks to the
Labour voting bias of ethnic minority Britons.
But the last Euro-election results in London also revealed an electorate sharply divid-
ed along ethno-cultural lines. Two out of three visible minority voters voted Labour,
while two out of three white voters backed the Tories or UKIP. In fact UKIP, which won
17 per cent of the vote in London, outpolled Labour by almost two to one among white
voters in the capital (Phillips & Webber, 2014).
So, in part thanks to the immigration of the past 20 years, London has become more
economically and politically divided, and for ordinary families it is probably the least
good place to live in Britain: it has the highest crime, pollution, congestion and anxi-
ety levels and lowest levels of trust and neighbourliness. And it is only for the rich that
these drawbacks are compensated for by greater wealth – according to Danny Dorling
the median Londoner is not much better off than the average citizen of the country as
a whole (Dorling, 2014).
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comers jumping queues in social housing or the NHS. Similarly, it cannot comprehend
white ambivalence about the ethnic transformation because it involves sentiments of
group identity and affinity and a desire for familiarity in neighbourhoods that are not
generally felt by more mobile elites, and are therefore too often dismissed as xeno-
phobic. Londoners born and bred in the city, of whatever ethnic background, are
thought to have no special claim on the place.  As Peter Whittle of the New Culture
Forum has pointed out “claiming Londoner status now is rather like claiming citizen-
ship of the World” (Whittle, 2014).
And the London ideology simply ignores what does not fit its worldview. It was strik-
ing how little coverage the news of London becoming a ‘majority-minority’ city
received when it was first announced by the ONS at the end of 2012. The Evening
Standard did not even put the news on its front page, tucking it away on page 10. And
the BBC London television news had it as its seventh item. Boris Johnson’s usually
ubiquitous blond bob was nowhere to be seen.
According to the Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh, demographic and social
trends are remaking Britain in the freewheeling image of its capital city. He argued in
a recent FT column that Britain is becoming more urban, more diverse, more atom-
ized, and altogether more like London. And he concluded: “If the future points to a
rootless, postmodern society in which nothing is sacred, then London got there long
ago” (Ganesh, 2014). Ganesh evidently approves of the London-isation of Britain. But
a rootless, postmodern society “in which nothing is sacred” is not, given a choice,
where most people want to live (ibid).
Yet for many of its inhabitants, both old and new, London has indeed become an inse-
cure, congested, transit camp. The biggest single reason for this has been the unman-
aged mass immigration of the past two decades. The challenge to London politicians
is to somehow reduce those inflows and make it a more decent place for the middling
majority – less ‘rootless and post modern’ – without losing the economic dynamism
and cultural vigour that mass immigration has contributed to.
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London as a migration city in the context of
UK politics
Shamit Saggar
Introduction
The emerging image of London as a crossroads capital encapsulating a cross-section
of the globe is unmistakable. The story of London as a capital city is intertwined with
the story of migration. Within living memory two waves of migration (postwar, post-
colonial and following the accession of the eastern European nations to the EU) have
transformed the nature of the capital. The impacts are ubiquitous – in commerce,
fashion, street culture, education, social relationships and beyond. 
Forty years ago, migrants were too few in number, struggled to enter the mainstream
and were marginal to political leadership. Much of that has changed dramatically.
Liberal markets and social trends have driven an intake of additional numbers on a
large scale. Demographic twists have occurred with the  younger migrant age struc-
tures being concentrated in the optimal years for child bearing and rearing. Settled
migrant communities have started to navigate – some more successfully than others
– opportunity structures in education, housing and employment. Significant gains for
some have resulted, but with patterns of disadvantage for others. But the scale of pop-
ulation growth and churn has overwhelmed parts of the city and with it the capacity for
public bodies to cope. Long-standing, white Londoners (and some black and brown
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Section 4. Migration and urban politics
“Key sectors such as culture, fashion, media and cuisine directly thrive on a fulsome
supply of newcomers and outsider influences, and this has some purchase in shap-
ing the growth of new jobs in parts of the city.”
more like us?”; and “Can we live together?” In other words, the national migration
focus has been on the likely social and cultural fit between migrants and settled
natives.
If migrants and natives are notably unalike, this can give rise to difficulties for long-
term integration as well. But the characteristics of the migrants (in age, education,
employment, skills and residential locale, etc.) will themselves be subject to change
after arrival and initial settlement. In any case, these characteristics can and do vary
considerably within different migrant groups – as they do among natives. But the larg-
er point is that some of these characteristics are more amenable to change and influ-
ence through government policies than others. Certainly characteristics to do with
faith and the social mores of particular groups are more embedded and rather harder
to impact on, than outcomes in school attainment and vocational skills.
These are essentially challenges and dilemmas that stem from migrant integration,
and they all involve a careful balancing of rights and responsibilities. In the UK’s case,
it was recognized early on that the odds of successful interaction, exchange and inte-
gration would be harmed if discrimination and prejudice remained unchecked. These
discriminatory drivers and practices were initially quantified empirically through pio-
neering social research carried out by Social and Community Planning Research that
informed Colour in Britain published in 1970. Subsequent surveys have pursued a
similar purpose, and have provided a key impetus to the creation and extension of
anti-discrimination legal frameworks in 1965, 1968, 1976, 2000, 2006, and 2010
(Spencer, 2011; Hansen, 2000).
Migration, meanwhile, has mostly remained contentious for somewhat distinct rea-
sons over this long period. Public anxiety grew dramatically in the 1970s – providing
a major plank to the appeal of a radical Conservative administration alongside issues
of social welfare and trade union rights (Crewe and Sarlvik, 1983) – and then abated
until the mid 1990s. From then onwards, the end of the Cold War in Europe affected
UK immigration. Flows began to shift to become more European in nature particular-
ly with the 2004 accession of a number of eastern European nations to the EU. 
There are five key fault-lines that span the two main waves, first from the New
Commonwealth and then from the EU over this long period.
Scale/quantum
Put bluntly, this refers to the heat generated from complaints that there are too many
immigrants at any one time. In its purest terms, it refers to the absolute numbers and
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ones too) have left the capital in disproportionate numbers, in part fuelled by fears
about the pace of change (Kaufmann, 2014).
London has built a new spirit of cosmopolitanism that increasingly flavours, if not
defines, its identity domestically and internationally. Almost all ethnic groups sit in a
minority bracket and are unable to dominate either at borough (save for Tower
Hamlets) or pan-London levels. The city’s cosmopolitan identity is founded on it being
a place for global exchange both between and across distinctive groups but also fea-
tures new, dynamic multi-dimensional identities. And civic boosters in some quarters
see this as a form of competitive and comparative advantage, commercially and
socially, branding London as the de facto ‘capital of the world’.
Yet London’s migration narrative is not that of the country at large. Admittedly, impor-
tant echoes of the capital’s migration dynamic are increasingly heard in major region-
al cities such as Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham and Bristol. UK politics have been
heavily shaped by migration politics in the postwar epoch and this creates a possibil-
ity of an important de-alignment between city and nation. Assessing the extent of that
alignment of drivers and interests is therefore a key rationale for this chapter. 
The chapter is in four parts. It begins by looking at the historic and political context;
second, consideration is given to aspects of geography and demography that drive
the key tensions that have arisen; third, the electoral dynamics of migration and eth-
nic identity are discussed; fourth, the implications for national public policy are
reviewed. The chapter closes with some brief remarks that address London’s migra-
tion identity in relation to the future trajectory of UK politics.
Historic and political context
The 1949 Royal Commission on Population initially mooted post-war mass immigra-
tion to the UK as a potential response to labour shortages during economic recovery.
While non-European immigration remained rare and unusual at this time, the Royal
Commissioners naturally remained cautious about the welcome that could be expect-
ed. They noted that, to succeed as an option, the migrants would need to be:
...of good human stock and not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying
with the host population and becoming merged in it.         (Royal Commission, 1949).
Almost all subsequent official reports and academic surveys (Scarman, 1981; Swann,
1985; Runnymede Trust, 2000) have returned to three central questions that have
dominated national political debates: “Are they like us?”; “Could they be made to be
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trast, have pointed to using state authority and influence to underpin tiny, though vital,
aspects of social cohesion. Neither of these viewpoints has thus far managed to gain
sufficient credibility in the case of responding to the risks of Islamist-inspired extrem-
ism and pressure for separate development. 
There is, perhaps, one further dimension to these fault-lines that arises in considering
the politics of migration. This is the problem of sensitivities over matters of culture, dif-
ference, choice and relationships. These are each embedded in migration. Yet gov-
ernments face difficult judgments about how far to extend themselves and for what
purpose. In the mid 1970s, nervous politicians and public servants devised a pro-
gramme to test the matrimonial claims of migrants’ spouses. To do this they shaped
a quasi-medical scheme to assess individual’s sexual virginity at airport immigration
interviewing facilities. It led to a public outcry when later revealed by an inquisitive
press. 
It was Pierre Trudeau, the former Canadian Prime Minister, who warned that miscal-
culation over policy ends could all too easily result in policy means that defied legiti-
mate public sentiment about the reach of the state. He once declared: “The state has
no business in the bedrooms of the nation.” The Trudeau dictum is important because
it is a reminder of the need in liberal democratic societies to maintain scale, privacy
and proportionality – and this is readily apparent in current policy interventions that
increasingly subsume universities, landlords, employers and GPs to detect and mon-
itor the presence of illegal migrants. Illegality of status remains a major aspect of polit-
ical debate, but it also highlights a balance that needs to be struck in the design of
policy interventions.
Geography and demography
Post-imperial immigration gained momentum from the mid 1950s and peaked during
the late 1960s and early 1970s. This long period saw the settlement of substantial
numbers of primary and secondary migrants from the New Commonwealth, creating
the initial drivers of much longer run demographic growth. Recent estimates have pro-
jected that the black and minority ethnic population is likely to grow dramatically from
14 per cent as shown in the 2011 Census (ONS, 2012). By mid century, this may
touch 30 per cent across England and Wales (Policy Exchange, 2014).
Much of the UK in other words will continue to change its ethnic character and iden-
tity on a significant scale. Growing diversity of this kind is principally associated with
the country’s major urban areas and not just London. It also involves higher growth
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is cast in intangible, nationwide terms. But in practice, it is about a quantum divided
by time – i.e. the rate of flow of newcomers – and given a local twist – i.e. the rate of
settlement in particular places.
Composition
Immigration gives rise to concerns as a result of the selection characteristics of those
arriving and how these compare with those of natives and settled communities. In the
past selectivity may have meant colour or ethnic identity as a key marker, such as
Australia’s overt immigration policies until the early 1970s. A more legitimate basis for
selection involves the human capital characteristics of migrants, in order to ensure a
good complementarity with the skills and capabilities of the existing population.
London as a generally prosperous city has significant demand for relatively low skilled
migrants to take up jobs that its natives are unwilling to perform.
Congestion
These are in part related to the concerns about scale and rate noted above. In partic-
ular, this enables a focus on isolating important bottlenecks in public services (com-
pulsory education places, access to primary health care appointments, etc.), as well
as in areas such as infrastructure (overloaded local transportation, inadequate hous-
ing supply, etc.).
Managerial capacity
The previous fault-lines relate to familiar axis of immigration politics and are thus
almost essentialised into the debate. But immigration also sits alongside other issues
and concerns, many of which display evidence suggesting growing public doubts
about governments’ overall ability to deliver on pre-stated goals. There is heavy dis-
counting in public attitudes on a range of fronts that relate to competence. Political
choice is increasingly presented as a managerial set of tasks that place emphasis on
performance alone. In this respect, immigration is one of a set of matters found in the
performance basket on which voters pass judgment (Clarke et. al., 2009).
Identity and cohesion
Finally, immigration as a political issue goes to the heart of concerns about differences
and how these sit alongside sameness. As ethnic and cultural diversity has grown
apace, it has become harder to articulate a defined narrative around homogeneity and
solidarity. In some quarters mainstream political leaders have implied that a gradual
Balkanised, fracturing of UK national identity can barely be contained. Others, by con-
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dedicated, sub-national educational and urban regeneration funding streams. Both
used ethnicity as a marker for general deprivation and additional social need. Two
generations later that approach looks dated and anachronistic at best.
Black and brown immigration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean is now a residual
chapter in UK migration. It is eclipsed by Eastern European immigration that gathered
significant pace following the Accession in 2004 of 8 former Soviet satellite states to
the European Union. The decade that followed witnessed one of the largest peace-
time movements of people across national frontiers in modern Europe. Estimates sug-
gest that around 1.5 million migrants from A8 countries migrated to the UK in the five
years following Accession (Sumption and Somerville, 2010). “In the case of the UK,
the Polish migration is the largest slice of recent European migration. The Poles have
thus rapidly entered the country’s popular cultural lexicon” (Saggar, 2014b).
These new white European migrants represent many points of contrast with earlier
waves. First, their colour and common European ancestry have led to predictions that
their arrival would lead to less public hostility than earlier non-white migrants. In real-
ity, the levels of public and political rancor have been higher than anticipated although
the explanation may lie in the rapid and concentrated movements of people and the
flux in local communities that this has created. Second, the new migration differed in
that the settlers chose to settle not only in major cities such as London but also spread
beyond in regions that had traditionally experienced very little immigration. Some of
this was linked with accessing manual work in labour intensive agriculture (East
Anglia, the South West), but also in terms of the attractiveness of regions with lower
housing and living costs. The new migrants in other words have been much more
evenly spread than in earlier waves. Third, the characteristics of the new migrants are
rather more heterogeneous: there are many women alongside men; they are driven
by a variety of motives beyond economic betterment alone; there are large numbers
engaged in some kind of temporary or circular migration; and cheap travel and com-
munications means that migrating to the UK feels as if it is not a one-way voyage to
a far and distant place.
Put together, the frictions of earlier migrations are now different and possibly more
muted. But when it comes to integrating into British society, the new migrants display
some of the traits of older, settled migrants. For instance, their characteristics and
behaviours have a bearing on feelings of attachment and belonging. Circular and tem-
porary Polish migrants have a diminished subjective orientation to Britain; they also
perceive British natives to be more hostile to them; and objectively, they are likely to
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rates among particular minority groups than others. Pakistani and Bangladeshi house-
holds in particular remain linked with higher fertility rates. Elsewhere large parts of
less densely populated areas have thus far seen only very modest changes in their
ethnic composition. Parts of the North East, East Anglia and South West stand out.
The minority ethnic communities that past immigration phases have delivered are far
from a homogeneous bloc. The political lexicon of the UK has developed the term
‘ethnic minority’ as shorthand for these communities. However, the term today
appears less than coherent. The principal reason for this is the contrasting objective
social and economic profile of many of the groups.
For instance, some sub-groups such as Indians and Chinese have made significant
gains in educational attainment, housing patterns, employment rates and returns, and
asset gathering. Strands within each of these groups appear to have massively over-
achieved as against the group average, and this has led to patterns of residential
mobility and clustering in belts in outer north west London and the home counties to
the north west and south west of the capital. Demographers such as Ceri Peach have
talked of them as the new Jews, following recognizable paths away from ethnic
strongholds in inner cities. The high attainment of these groups has meant that perti-
nent questions confront policymakers who in the past have equated ethnicity with dis-
advantage (Saggar, 2014a).
In human capital terms these groups have developed strength from a previously mod-
est base. Indians and Chinese are twice as likely as all other groups to gain a degree
according to the 2011 Census (Lymperopoulou and Parameshwaran 2014).
But there are groups that have fared much less well. Pakistani and black Caribbean
groups have been cited in this regard with their much poorer (though modestly
improving) educational attainment patterns and rates of entry into higher occupation-
al categories. Indeed, there is a near continuous arc of poor achievements that under-
score both of these groups in the compulsory education system, in access to higher
education, in employment returns, in progression into higher white collar professions,
and in self employment and entrepreneurial outcomes.
The result is that, in terms of the traditional ethnic minority groups originating from
Britain’s era of decolonization, it is no longer possible to treat their average experi-
ences as being representative. Some of these five groups massively over-achieve,
and others significantly under-achieve. Public policy prescriptions that target ethnicity
therefore can lead to unintended blunders. In 1966 and 1969 Harold Wilson’s Labour
Government responded to the influx of New Commonwealth immigrants by creating
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have argued strongly in favour of engaging with middle class ethnic minorities who
hold aspirational, bourgeois values. Indian groups are singled out to demonstrate the
value of a fresh strategy given that this group is substantial in size, more likely to have
drifted into marginal seats in the sights of Tory electoral strategists, and crucially,
already exhibit the strongest levels of support for the Conservatives. 24 per cent of
Indians versus just 16 per cent of all ethnic minorities cast a vote in favour of the
Conservatives at the 2010 General Election (Heath et. al., 2013). These points of
attraction for the party are further underscored by analysis that ethnic minority voters
in general are emerging as disproportionately large components of the new first time
voting cohort. This is mainly due to a demographic quirk as minorities are generally
younger than their white counterparts, and so over-represented in the child bearing
and rearing age cohorts. The result is large numbers born two decades or so ago are
spilling over into the new voter cohort for the 2015 general election. One calculation
shows they amount to more than half of all new voters in several of the party’s 40 tar-
get constituencies along with its 25 existing marginal seats. Harrow West, Hendon,
Hampstead and Kilburn are prime examples in the capital where minority first time
voters are projected to account for more than one in two of all new voters (Warren,
2014).
The counter argument in Conservative circles retains a strong logic and a following of
its own. This accepts that demographic drivers are altering the look and feel of the
electorate at large, rather more rapidly than envisaged. But there is recognition that
the Tories are starting from a low base statistically and in terms of reputation. Large
groups of minority voters remain distant to the Tories. Voting support for the
Conservatives in 2010 was very low among Pakistanis (13 per cent), black
Caribbeans (9 per cent) and black Africans (6 per cent). In terms of reputation, the
party suffers from a sense of being indifferent or too distant from ethnic minorities as
well as from everyday working class interests. The final hurdle seems most insur-
mountable, namely the long-standing bond that has grown between Labour and its
minority backers. Heath et. al. (2013: 10) describes this as follows:
Most notably, the Labour Party’s early espousal of ethnic minority concerns
over inequality of opportunity, and the succession of Acts passed by Labour
governments to outlaw racial discrimination (with Acts in 1965, 1968, 1976 and
2000 as well as the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006) established
Labour as ‘the’ party of minorities just as Labour used to be ‘the’ party of the
working class.
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have fewer British natives as friends and they also tend to live in neighbourhoods with
higher concentrations of Poles (Luthra et. al., 2014).
But these aspects of integration are all dwarfed by the influence of employment.
Those in work after migrating all report much higher levels of positive identification
with Britain and lower levels of perceived hostility. And there are also spillover effects
in terms of the perceptions of these migrants by natives and the migrant’s own sense
of wellbeing.
The political ramifications of the new migration waves are significant in several
respects. For one thing, EU migration has highlighted, per force, the economic and
social implications of the free movement of labour that accompanies the creation of a
single European market. In Britain’s case, these overlap with and fuel underlying anti-
EU public sentiment. In addition, pressures from global migration exacerbate this.
Whereas London’s economy has a partial fit with the global supply of mobile, high
skilled labour, it is much less obvious that this model applies to the country as a whole.
The upshot is a non-alignment of interests between the capital and the South East on
the one hand and much of the country on the other. In these circumstances, it is easy
to see London’s elected Mayor championing a more flexible approach to national
immigration priorities and  being adopted as a national champion for such an outlook.
Electoral dynamics
The electoral behavior of British black and Asian voters has long displayed a major
preference for the Labour Party over its rivals. In all general elections going back to
the mid 1970s, of those minorities eligible and registered to vote, between two-thirds
and four-fifths have backed Labour. This is an impressive majority by any standards
and has ensured that Labour enjoys a vital insurance against wholesale desertion. It
is effectively an ‘iron law’ of British voting patterns - the attraction of Labour appears
to cut across social class lines in a way that is relatively scarce among white voters.
This creates many problems and dilemmas. The most obvious is that in reputational
terms, black and Asian communities are typically seen as a safe constituency for
Labour. The Labour Party may feel that the support it enjoys can be taken for grant-
ed internally and is thus devalued in its strategic significance. And externally among
Labour’s opponents, there is relatively little incentive to compete for voters who
appear distant and perhaps hostile. 
The latter is precisely the debate that has been raging in the Conservative Party since
Mr Cameron’s adoption as party leader in 2005. Modernist, reform-minded voices
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Labour electoral strongholds, allowing opponents to take a relaxed or resigned view
of the value of appealing to these electors. But this has also been accompanied by
geographic internal mobility with second generation, socially aspiring minority groups
such as Indians gradually spreading out into constituencies that are more naturally
Tory battlegrounds (Warren, 2014). 
Secondly, the past decade has seen substantial internal change within the
Conservative Party. This formally gained pace following Mr Cameron’s accession to
the leadership in 2005 and was preceded by senior figures such as Theresa May (now
Conservative Home Secretary) publicly warning in 2002 that the Tories were seen as
“the nasty party”. Granted, the party leadership has principally focused its mod-
ernisaton efforts on improving its number of female elected representatives. Analysis
commissioned by Lord Ashcroft has highlighted both the value of courting minority
supporters in pivotal constituencies as well as the fears and concerns about Tory moti-
vations held by many within this electorate sub-group. It is obviously too early to pass
full judgment on these modernization efforts and there has been a number of contro-
versies along the way. In summer 2014 for instance, Baroness Warsi, a former Party
Chairman under the personal patronage of the Prime Minister, resigned spectacular-
ly from the Coalition administration complaining bitterly of the party’s inadequate com-
mitment to embrace the concerns and interests of minority electors.
Finally, there is also evidence to question older assumptions about a racist majority
society and electorate. The British Social Attitudes survey has collected findings over
30 years on the degree to which the white public does or might resent members of a
black or Asian minority marrying into their family. This is dubbed as a form of social
distance between ethnic groups, and recent analysis by Ford (2014) highlights the
spectacular decline in such opposition: in 1989 this stood at 50 per cent and fell back
to 35 per cent by 1996, and by 2013 this had shrunk further to 24 per cent. A halving
in hardline oppositional sentiment in a generation is substantial by any standards. The
change is attributable to two forces: first, the effects of intergenerational replacement
-  older, less accepting white generations have ebbed away and been replaced by
their younger grandchildren who have become accustomed to a multicultural society
from an early age; and second, the slow burn effects of rising educational levels, and
particularly the spinoff effects of a large expansion of participation in higher education.
Public policy challenges
The steady growth in tolerant attitudes means that it is much harder for political par-
ties to exploit latent hostility to minorities. It also means that voters are less likely to
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This creates an awkward landscape for active political campaigning and disputes over
issues. For instance, in terms of foreign affairs, Britain’s relations with specific over-
seas nations, and its stance towards various global conflicts have all been cited as
significant concerns for first generation black and Asian migrants. What is more sur-
prising perhaps is how these issues have moved to the front burner among second
and third generation groups, particularly those with origins in the Indian sub-continent.
The Iraq War has undoubtedly inflicted electoral damage on the Labour Party but this
has mostly been limited to the 2005 election and the success of the Respect Party as
a de facto single issue protest party. And on the Conservative side, the 2012 and 2014
surges in open Israeli-Palestinian conflict have threatened the party’s already weak
profile particularly among British Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens.
Thus far, other issues associated with social and economic problems facing ethnic
minorities have generally failed to make any mark in party-specific terms. This is
chiefly because, whilst the effects of say the 2008-13 economic recession have dif-
fered between whites and most ethnic minority groups, these impacts have been indi-
rectly felt. It is thus hard to perceive these day-to-day political issues in openly ethnic
terms. But other social problems may prove different. For instance, national concerns
over organized child sexual exploitation have in the past few years given rise to alle-
gations of the disproportionate involvement of Pakistani men in particular. This con-
cern has inevitably been amplified by far right and anti-immigrant political groups such
as the English Defence League, but it is possible that the major parties will develop a
contrasting narrative around the causes and implications of this emerging problem.
A generation ago electoral analysts mostly wrote in downbeat terms about the overall
prospects for ethnic minorities gaining attention and muscle in the British political sys-
tem (Crewe, 1983). This view held that there remained too few such minorities, that
they were too concentrated in Labour strongholds, and that major parties would
remain shy at best in wooing such voters for fear of alienating white, racist voters.
That orthodoxy now appears dated at best and questionable on several important
fronts.
First, the intervening period has witnessed substantial growth in the absolute numbers
of black and Asian Britons, with their younger profile and fertility rates. One set of esti-
mates based on the UK Household Longitudinal Study suggests that by the mid-point
of the 21st Century, the offspring of these two New Commonwealth-derived groups
will account for one in three Britons. That is a far cry from the one in 20 or one in 10
proportions that applied through much of the period of first generation settlement
(Policy Exchange, 2014). The bulk of the earlier settlement was concentrated in
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acies and prosecutions appear to be disproportionally greater than for the broader
male population – but this has not been irrefutably established. These and other
examples of uneven patterns of behaviour and experiences across different ethnic
groups, can all too easily give rise to social stereotypes about the reputation of groups
generally. Significantly, these disproportionalities are not just found in respect of dys-
functional or unacceptable behaviours but are also evident in outcomes that com-
mand social esteem such as higher educational attainment rates (Indians and
Chinese) and parity of earnings with whites (Indians).
Thus far, the patterns of settlement and integration experienced by eastern European
migrants remain embryonic. It is hard to tell whether or how far certain sub-groups
may be encountering barriers of a long-term structural nature. Some will undoubted-
ly progress further and more rapidly than others, as well as in relation to the indige-
nous white majority. Internal differentiation of this kind is distinct from a layer of set-
tled disadvantage and alienation that is embedded and self-generating in its effects
on individual motivation and social stigmatising by others.
The policy priorities introduced with the waves of  recent, more European migrants are
likely to focus on mechanisms to strengthen and accelerate social integration. Active
integration measures of this kind were curiously absent in the case of earlier New
Commonwealth immigration. It is difficult to piece together a convincing analysis to
demonstrate the direct impact of those more limited integration policies, particularly in
education and language fluency (Saggar and Somerville, 2012). In the case of recent
migrants, the role of employment is likely to overshadow many other factors as a driv-
er of both economic and social integration. This then underlines the importance of
employment readiness for on-going and future flows of EU migrants in particular.
Concluding thoughts: London and national political priorities
This chapter has examined a number of key features of the national political context
and consequences of mass immigration. This national picture gives rise to a frame-
work for thinking about historic and even more recent forms of migration that are very
familiar in the country’s political traditions and in the lexicon of everyday political
debate. For instance, Britain is a much more relaxed and tolerant society than it once
was in terms of its responses to black and Asian migrant settlement. Older campaigns
to resist and resent that migration have tended to give way to a more inclusive, liber-
al tone. Equally, some groups of settled migrants, but by no means all, have become
indelibly linked, in political and public discourse, with serious social problems that are
mostly resistant to modern policy interventions.
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directly punish parties that embrace minority interests and would-be representatives.
Indeed the locus of political debate has also shifted away from explicit proposals to
target such groups through public policy and towards larger, mainstream policy initia-
tives that can be calibrated to have larger or smaller disproportionate impacts on par-
ticular population sub-groups.
The rise of a multi-ethnic society and on-going mass immigration has meanwhile
spawned a number of policy dilemmas and tensions. For the large part these have
resulted in piecemeal adaptations to policy interventions in schools, hospitals, plan-
ning, prisons and so forth. State maintained schools have developed teaching and
curricula to accommodate the needs of non-English speaking migrant children.
Hospital wards have made use of translation services so as to respond to medical
care needs. And prisons provide Halal and vegetarian food for relevant inmates.
These are all examples of policy sensitisation whereby adjustments are made to
implementation to maximise the chances of policy take up and positive outcomes.
But key challenges remain that are not so easily managed by a regime of policy sen-
sitisation. Aspects of these are likely to expose differences between the position and
interests of the capital city as against those of the country at large.
The most pressing challenge stems from the long-term picture of settled disadvantage
among certain settled minority communities. Nationally this is found in the Pakistani
and black Caribbean groups in particular, but it is clear that the former is largely con-
centrated in the Midlands and northern England while the latter is heavily concentrat-
ed in London and parts of the West Midlands. The Indian group, previously highlight-
ed for their higher levels of achievement and progression, are notably concentrated in
London and the South East. As that region’s overall economic buoyancy recovers
from the recent long recession, certain sub-groups are well positioned to enjoy the
indirect benefits of higher labour market demand. Conversely, Pakistanis located far
from such buoyancy are unlikely to gain such indirect advantages.
Settled disadvantage also carries risks of more serious social alienation and the
potential for oppositional cultures to take root. In the case of black Caribbean and
black African communities, considerable tensions and conflicts have arisen over many
years in police-community relations stemming from disproportionally higher street
searches carried out on these groups. For all minority groups in traditional profes-
sions, evidence points to disproportionally higher rates of disciplinary investigations
by professional standards bodies and independent regulators. As previously men-
tioned, the rates of Pakistani male involvement in organised sexual grooming conspir-
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The national framework shapes priorities broadly but involves some areas of poor fit
with the outlook and concerns of the capital city and its people. The first of these is
that London has and will continue to have a more substantial appetite for high and low
skilled migrants than Britain at large. This affects the orientation of key sectors and
professions and ensures that business leadership is generally hostile to the current
Coalition government’s attempts to control the pace of migrant inflows and monitor
migrants’ status.
Another point of difference with the rest of the country is reflected in the younger, bet-
ter educated and more affluent characteristics of the city’s population. Each of these
is a factor in softer public attitudes towards immigration. Key sectors such as culture,
fashion, media and cuisine directly thrive on a fulsome supply of newcomers and out-
sider influences, and this has some purchase in shaping the growth of new jobs in
parts of the city. The middle and low skilled service industries in the capital have also
attracted large numbers of newer migrants, in part through the need for and supply of
part-time, flexible labour.
Finally, migrants – old and new – combine with native communities in London to pro-
duce the clear outlines of a new identity that is informed and nourished by the immi-
grant experience. This is something that is only very loosely visible at a national level.
London’s push for, and embrace of, its own distinct model of cosmopolitanism means
that one-dimensional identities and identity politics have much less traction than it
might elsewhere.
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The impact of migrants on London politics
Tony Travers
Greater London has been a politically plural city since its creation as a unit of govern-
ment in the 1960s. From the first borough and Greater London Council elections in
1964, the Conservatives and Labour have both won substantial numbers of seats in
most parts of the city. The major parties have seen their fortunes vary with the normal
flow of democratic change. The Liberal Democrats and ‘Others’ have gradually
increased their share since the 1970s.  In the 2014 borough elections, Labour and the
Conservatives won almost 90 per cent of the seats, albeit on a vote share close to or
under 70 per cent (GLA, 2014).  For much of the period from 1955 to 1997, general
election vote shares in the capital were remarkably similar to those in the rest of the
country, though since 1997 Labour has performed slightly better in London than its UK
vote share and the Conservatives rather below their national share. Against this
recent history of electoral pluralism, London has moved from being a largely ‘white
British’ city to one with a majority ‘non-white British’ population.  The effects, if any, of
a change in the make-up of the London population would occur against the backdrop
of a city-region where voting broadly mirrored national patterns.  If migrant and/or eth-
nic groups tended to vote in different ways from the original population, this would
show up over time in parts of the city where such migrants were concentrated. 
The sections below look at the scale of in-migration over time and changes in the
make-up of London’s population and its possible effect on the share of votes.   
Immigration trends
London has long been a city of international trade and diplomacy.  Since the Romans,
the movement of people and goods through the Port of London produced a small
number of immigrant settlers in the city. British-born people remained by far the
largest group until at least the arrival in 1948 of the Empire Windrush1 when the city
started to become a city with a visible ‘minority’ population. From this point, a succes-
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1 The SS Empire Windrush brought settlers from the Caribbean, encouraged by the prospect of
employment in services such as London Transport and the newly-created NHS.
from places such as Australia, New Zealand, the Caribbean, India and Pakistan. After
the mid 1990s, the diversity of migrants’ origins widened further coming from several
regions of Africa, European Union accession countries, North America and Latin
America in larger numbers than ever before.
By the 2011 Census, London had emerged as a city where 45 per cent were white
British, and the other 55 per cent varied in terms of their nationality, ethnic origin and
religion. This differentiation gained an additional degree of complexity by devolution
within the UK.  Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were each given devolved gov-
ernments and became, to an extent, federal elements within the UK.  Devolution
heightened awareness of what constituted ‘Britishness’.  Intriguingly, non-white immi-
grant Britons were more likely to define themselves as ‘British’ than white and British-
born citizens (Sunder & Katwala, 2012, p11; The Economist, 25 May 2013).
Geography
Within London, immigrants have both spread out across the city and also settled in
enclaves.  Earlier waves of migrants, from the late-1940s till the 1980s, had largely
stayed within inner London.  Apart from ‘inner outer’ boroughs such as Brent, Ealing
Haringey and Newham, (and to some extent Hounslow) most outer London boroughs
had minority ethnic populations of less than five per cent until the 1980s (Shepherd,
Westaway & Lee, 1974 s4.2).  As recently as 1971, the ‘New Commonwealth’ popu-
lation of Barking & Dagenham was just 2.1 per cent and of Havering 1.1 per cent, with
similar figures in Bexley, Bromley, Hillingdon, Kingston, Richmond and Sutton.   
As London’s migrant population has grown, so overseas-born and minority ethnic
populations have moved outwards. Table 2 shows the minority population of each
London borough in 1971 and 2011. The figures for 1971 are for people living in house-
holds where the head was born in the New Commonwealth, while the 2011 figures are
for the ‘non-white British’ population.  While these definitions are somewhat different,
they reflect both statistical practice and contemporary ways of seeing the changing
‘migrant’ and ‘minority ethnic’ population.
In 1971, the largest concentrations of New Commonwealth (NC) immigrants were in
Haringey, Brent, Hackney, Islington, Lambeth and Ealing, with significant numbers
also in Hammersmith & Fulham, Newham and Wandsworth.  Most outer London bor-
oughs apart from Brent, Ealing, Hounslow and Waltham Forest had relatively few NC
residents. By 2011, 22 boroughs have ‘non-white British’ populations of over 50 per
cent.  Table 2 shows the percentage increase (comparing the percentage in 1971 with
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sion of waves of migration occurred, so that by the early 1990s, over 16 per cent of
the population were defined as ‘New Commonwealth’ immigrants.  In many inner
London boroughs, the proportion was significantly higher.
Following the election of a Labour government in 1997, there was a substantial
increase in immigration.  The combined effect of sustained economic growth, particu-
larly in Greater London, a more relaxed migration policy and the accession of new
countries to the EU led to a sharp rise in international in-migration to London. Table 1
shows the proportion of the London population who were born in the ‘New
Commonwealth’  from 1961-1991 and, from 2001 ‘non-white British’.  By the 2011
Census, 55 per cent of the London population defined themselves as ‘non-white
British’, by far the highest proportion of any UK region.  Over a third of the population
was overseas-born.   According to the 2011 Census, 40 per cent of all non-UK born
residents living in England and Wales lived in London (ONS, 2012).  The London
share would be higher as a proportion of the UK as a whole.
The world in a city
Based on the 1991 Census, the London Research Centre produced a research paper
entitled London’s ethnic minorities: one city many communities (Storkey, Maguire &
Lewis, 1994), which mapped the diversity of the city. By the 2000s, London was one
of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world.  From 1948, in-migration came primarily
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New Commonwealth/Non
White British (%)
1961 3
1971 8
1981 14
1991 16
2001 42
2011 55
Note
1961,1971,1981 and 1991 = New Commonwealth and 2011= Non White British
Sources: Census data
Table 1 London’s changing population
2011) in each borough and also the ‘increase on base’ (showing the 2011 percentage
in relation to the 1971 percentage). The latter comparison shows that the biggest
changes in ‘minority ethnic’ populations occurred in a number of boroughs where the
NC populations were smallest in 1971. Among this latter group, Barking & Dagenham,
Enfield, Greenwich, Harrow, Hillingdon and Redbridge saw not only a big increase
from a very low base, but by 2011 their non-white British populations were close to or
above 50 per cent of the total.
If migration were to have an impact on the political and electoral geography of
London, one might expect the most pronounced effects in parts of the city where there
had been a move away from a low base to a significantly larger proportion.  But to test
this hypothesis, it would be necessary to have some evidence about differential vot-
ing patterns within different ethnic and/or immigrant groups.          
From immigrant to ethnic group and beyond
The above analysis of migration to and within London during the past 40 to 50 years
has mentioned immigrants, the minority ethnic population and the contemporary
Census definition of ‘non-white British’. Public debate about ‘immigration’ often con-
flates different concepts, particularly as time moves on from the original point when a
migrant arrived in the UK. The Caribbeans who arrived on the Empire Windrush in
1948, like the children of immigrants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, by now will
have become British - though they will also be seen as part of an ethnic minority and
probably black or Asian. However, in the past 20 years, immigrants have included
large numbers of people from the European Union, North America and Latin America,
many of whom are white and would not define themselves as part of a minority eth-
nic population. The ‘non-white British’ definition used by the 2011 Census includes
both British minority ethnic citizens and anyone who defines themselves as not
British, of whatever ethnicity. Responses to the Census are self-defined, so those
within a category may vary for any group. 
Any attempt to assess the impact of immigration and ethnicity on politics and voting
in London has to take account of the complex overlaps between ethnicity and migra-
tion.  Other countries, notably Canada, use their census explicitly to measure the eth-
nic or cultural origins of a respondent’s ancestors as opposed to citizenship, national-
ity, language or place of birth (Statistics Canada). The ONS’s reasons for collecting
statistics about ethnicity have the primary aim “of enabling organisations to monitor
equal opportunities and anti-discrimination policies and to allocate government
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Table 2 London’s minority population by borough 1971 and 2011
Sources: 1971 figures [New Commonwealth] Storkey et al, 1997, Table 2.3 and  Morrey, 1978 , Table 2f)  2011
figures (ONS, 2012 Table KS201EW) 
1971 (%) 2011 (%) Increase Increase on base
Camden 7.8 56.0 48.2 7.2
City of London 4.5 42.5 38.0 9.4
Hackney 15.6 63.8 48.2 4.1
Hammersmith & Fulham 11.2 55.1 43.8 4.9
Haringey 18.3 65.3 47.0 3.6
Islington 14.3 52.3 38.3 3.7
Kensington & Chelsea 6.2 60.7 54.5 9.8
Lambeth 13.8 61.0 47.2 4.4
Lewisham 8.9 58.5 49.6 6.6
Newham 10.8 83.3 72.5 7.7
Southwark 8.8 60.3 51.5 6.9
Tower Hamlets 9.4 68.8 59.4 7.3
Wandsworth 10.9 46.7 35.8 4.3
Westminster 6.9 64.8 57.9 9.4
Barking & Dagenham 2.1 50.5 48.4 24.0
Barnet 5.6 54.5 48.9 9.7
Bexley 1.9 22.7 20.8 11.9
Brent 18.0 82.0 64.0 4.5
Bromley 1.9 22.6 20.7 11.9
Croydon 6.1 52.7 46.6 8.6
Ealing 13.6 69.6 56.0 5.1
Enfield 5.4 59.5 54.1 11.0
Greenwich 3.7 47.7 44.0 12.9
Harrow 4.2 69.1 64.9 16.5
Havering 1.1 16.7 15.6 15.1
Hillingdon 2.4 47.8 45.4 19.9
Hounslow 8.2 62.1 53.9 7.6
Kingston 2.1 36.9 34.8 17.6
Merton 5.6 51.6 46.0 9.2
Redbridge 3.7 65.5 61.8 17.7
Richmond 2.2 28.6 264 13.0
Sutton 1.6 29.1 27.5 18.2
Waltham Forest 8.6 64.0 55.4 7.4
London 7.8 55.1 47.3 7.1
achieved lower vote shares in London than the country as a whole in every year
shown, while the Conservatives generally did better than nationally until 1998 and
have thereafter under-performed.  Labour did badly in 1990 but performed better than
the national vote share in each election since.  Others, including UKIP, have over-per-
formed since 1998.
This chart suggests Labour has been achieving relatively larger vote shares com-
pared to the national average since the mid-1990s, and the Conservatives have been
falling back slightly.  This is not to say that London is now a ‘Labour city’  —  a Tory
mayor was elected in 2008 and 2012, after all  —  but that electoral outcomes are tilt-
ing Labour’s way.  How far has ethnicity and thus, over time, immigration affected this
change?               
The university-based British Election Study (BES) looked at the voting behaviour of
different ethnic groups in the 2010 general election.  This research covered the whole
of the country, though its implications are strongest for London. The analysis exam-
ined the propensity of individuals from different ethnic backgrounds to vote for the
major political parties. The results are summarised in Table 3.  40 per cent of white
British voters supported the Conservatives as compared to 29 per cent for Labour.
However, voters with Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean and black
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resources more effectively” rather than to measure ethnicity for less utilitarian reasons
(ONS, 2009).
Voting and immigrants
Very little research has been undertaken about the voting patterns of new immigrants
in London or elsewhere in the UK. Rather, there has been a growing interest in differ-
ential voting patterns among minority ethnic communities. While a proportion of new
international in-migrants will fit within a minority ethnic definition, not all will do so.
Some of those who are omitted from the minority population may nevertheless define
themselves as not being British. The sections below consider the impact of ethnicity
on voting.    
Voting and ethnicity
The changes in London’s demography, outlined above, have been profound and have
occurred since the Second World War, with the pace of change speeding up rapidly
from the mid-1990s. The political and electoral impact of the arrival of millions of new
people has never been researched in depth, though the subject is increasingly attract-
ing attention.
There are London elections for the borough, the Greater London Authority, Parliament
and the European Parliament with all but the UK Parliament taking place on four-year-
ly cycles. Londoners can expect to face perhaps 17 or 18 election days every 20
years. Occasionally, as in 2010, elections for two democratic institutions can take
place on the same day.
As remarked above, the Conservatives and Labour have been the dominant parties
and have remained capable of winning a larger proportion of local government seats
in the capital than across the country as a whole (House of Commons Library, 2014
p6).  However, there is some evidence that since 1994 the Conservatives have per-
formed rather less well in terms of vote share and Labour slightly better than each
party’s respective position in the country as a whole.  
Figure 1 compares the vote share of the major parties and ‘others’ in each of the bor-
ough elections from 1982 to 2010. The numbers on the vertical axis represent the
share of the overall vote by which a party’s share in London exceeds or under-per-
forms the national figure.  The London share is compared to the National Equivalent
Vote Share, which is a calculation of the national vote share for each party adjusting
for the pattern of local elections in a particular year.   The Liberal Democrats have
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Figure 1 London borough vote share compared to national equivalent vote share 
the late-1940s have chosen to vote Labour.  The Conservatives have failed to make
significant in-roads into the minority ethnic or migrant vote.
The large scale of minority ethnic and migrant populations in London means that any
effect observed for the country as a whole is likely to be magnified in the capital.  An
analysis of voting in the London borough elections of 2002 to 2010 suggests “a posi-
tive relationship between increased levels of diversity and increases to the Labour
vote” (Spencer, 2014).  As London’s minority ethnic and immigrant population has rap-
idly increased, the differing propensities of such groups will have impacted on voting.  
Borough effects
A number of outer London authorities have seen the largest increase in their non-
white British residents but it would be simplistic to assume that all such boroughs have
seen a large increase in Labour voting. Indeed, it appears that in some boroughs
Labour may not have been the biggest beneficiary of minority ethnic and immigrant
votes. 
Figures 2,3 and 4 show the vote shares for the major parties in all borough elections
since 1968 in Haringey, Redbridge and Tower Hamlets which are generally in line with
the figures for the city as a whole (figure 1).   Haringey already had a substantial New
Commonwealth population in 1971, and by 2011 over 65 per cent were non-white
British.  Redbridge, by contrast, saw its minority population increase from about five
per cent to 65 per cent.  Tower Hamlets has a surprisingly modest NC population in
1971 but by 2011 the non-white British figure was approaching 70 per cent.  
Figure 2 shows the change in the parties’ vote in Haringey where Labour has over-
performed compared to its London average vote in every election. The Conservatives
performed slightly below their London average vote in elections until the 1990s.
Thereafter their vote collapsed. In the years since the late-1980s, the Liberal
Democrats came to replace the Conservatives as Labour’s key opponent.
Figure 3 considers the same period in Redbridge, where the Conservatives have con-
sistently polled a larger vote share than in London as a whole. But Labour, who used
substantially to under-perform in terms of vote share, has seen its position radically
improve to the point that the party now over-performs its London average. Redbridge
has gone from being a safe Conservative council to one which is very marginal
between the Tories and Labour.  The picture is similar in Croydon. If recent trends
were to continue, Labour might expect to win control in a majority of elections.
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African heritage were significantly more likely to vote Labour than Conservative.
Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were more likely to vote Conservative or Lib
Dem than black Caribbeans or black Africans, but Labour was still well ahead.
A Policy Exchange report, published in 2014, reached similar conclusions: “The
degree to which all BME groups identify with and vote overwhelmingly for the Labour
Party is striking. In the 2010 General Election, almost 70 per cent of minorities voted
for Labour. However, this masks quite different levels of support for the Conservative
party, who are most likely to attract the votes of the Indian community” (Sunak &
Rajeswaran, 2014).  The authors add: “This [the propensity to vote Labour] is the case
regardless of class or association with Conservative policies and holds true even for
recent arrivals”(ibid).   
These analyses point in the same direction: non-white voters are far more likely to
vote Labour than for any other party.  This finding does not, of course, provide evi-
dence about the voting habits of more recent immigrants from the EU and the
Americas.  But there is evidence that anti-immigrant political rhetoric has pushed
some of the larger European migrant groups to vote Labour (Daily Telegraph, 2014).
Overall, it appears that the vast majority of new migrants and their descendents since
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Lab Cons Lib Dem Others N
White British BES 29 40 24 7 2095
Other White BES 21 56 21 3 30
Mixed B/W 66 20 14 0 48
Indian 62 24 13 2 439
Pakistani 60 12 25 3 458
Bangladeshi 73 16 10 1 191
Black Caribbean 79 9 11 1 380
Black African 86 6 7 1 313
All EM 69 15 15 2 1884
Table 3   Voter choice by ethnic group, 2010
Source: Heath et al (2012)
Figure 4 shows the voting trends in Tower Hamlets, which has seen a bigger change
in its minority ethnic population than Haringey, though rather less than in Redbridge.
Here, in the 1960s and 1970s, Labour had a very much larger vote than in London
more generally and the Conservatives had very few votes at all.  But since the 1980s,
Labour’s over-performance has declined while the Liberal Democrats and the
Conservatives have significantly improved their relative vote share.  Latterly, the Lib
Dems have seen their relative vote share collapse.  Tower Hamlets has seen a radi-
cal increase in its minority population, and at the same time, an increase in
Conservative votes.  
Since 1971, Tower Hamlets has changed in many ways in addition to shifts in the eth-
nic and national origins of its residents.  The construction of Canary Wharf and the
wider Docklands developments have brought a far more affluent population than pre-
viously into both Tower Hamlets and parts of Newham.  Moreover, the complexities of
the minority vote in Tower Hamlets have been such that many Bangladeshi voters
have recently voted for either Respect or Tower Hamlets First. The Labour vote has
fragmented, causing the end of the party’s previous dominance. Here, migration and
ethnically-based voting has damaged Labour.   
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Figure 2  Haringey vote per cent  by party, compared to London average
Figure 3    Redbridge vote per cent by party, compared to London average Figure 4 Tower Hamlets vote per cent by party, compared to London average
to the major parties (GLC, 1977). In the 1978 London borough elections, the NF put
up 602 candidates and received over 90,000 votes, about two per cent of the total.  In
parts of Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Newham, the vote shares were far higher (GLC,
1978).  However, the arrival of Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative Government in 1979 her-
alded the end of the National Front as a serious force. 
In the 1980s, partly as a result of the splintering of the former National Front, the
British National Party (BNP) emerged as a new anti-immigration extremist party.  In
1993, at a by-election, a BNP candidate Derek Beackon won a seat from Labour on
Tower Hamlets council.  After a major political mobilisation effort, Beackon was defeat-
ed in the following year’s London-wide elections.  But the BNP took advantage of the
substantial increase in immigration during the late 1990s and early 2000s to win a
number of seats at the 2006 London borough elections.  In Barking & Dagenham, the
party won 12 of the 13 seats it contested, while in neighbouring Redbridge the BNP
won one seat and in nearby Epping Forest on the London border, three (BBC, 2006).
In 2008, the party won a seat on the London Assembly. They went on to win 4.9 per
cent of the vote in London in the 2009 European Parliament election, not far below the
6.2 per cent achieved nationally. 
In the 2010 borough elections, the BNP lost all the borough seats it held in London
and in 2012, its single position on the Assembly was lost.  The rise of UKIP, in partic-
ular, has made it possible for voters to register a protest, particularly about Europe
and immigration, without having to resort to voting for the BNP.  Although UKIP won
a number of seats in the 2014 borough elections, it is significantly more of a main-
stream party than those such as the National Front and BNP which have from time to
time emerged to win votes in response to immigration.
It would appear that London voters are prepared from time to time, though only in a
few places, to vote for extremist parties.  In places where the National Front flourished
in the 1970s, the BNP (or, for that matter, the more mainstream UKIP) would now find
it hard to generate many votes.  Inner London and neighbouring boroughs such as
Newham, Brent, Ealing and Haringey are places where extremist parties now find it
hard to win more than a derisory total of votes. But in some parts of outer London
where immigration and minority ethnic populations are newer, there has been a
propensity for voters from time to time to register a protest.  
With the major increase in immigration since 1997, many parts of London and other
larger English cities found themselves providing homes for new immigrants. The
speed and scale of the change was not signalled by central government which was,
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Boroughs such as Hillingdon, Harrow and Ealing have also seen a move towards a
much larger non-white British population than in the 1960s and 1970s but they have
done so while retaining a relatively strong Conservative presence.  Bexley has not
seen a swing to Labour, although the increase in its minority population has been on
a smaller scale than in most of London.   
Overall, it would appear that a rising minority ethnic and non-white British population
has been associated with a shift of voting from the Conservatives to Labour in a num-
ber of boroughs.  But this phenomenon must be weighed against other factors such
as changes in the relative affluence of a borough’s population and the impact within a
particular borough of new minority voting blocs.  As with any analysis of this kind, the
differences from borough to borough are such that it is impossible to be certain of the
precise impact of an increased immigrant and/or ethnic population.  However, the
British Election Study does suggest that, as a rule, Labour will benefit from the growth
in non-white and immigrant populations and the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats
and UKIP have the most to lose.     
Reponses to immigration and the rise of extremist parties
In the period since the arrival of New Commonwealth immigrants in London and other
British cities, there have been political and electoral reactions to migration on a num-
ber of occasions.  There were race riots in Notting Hill in 1958, and in Brixton and
Tottenham during the 1980s.  Public policy to improve the conditions of migrants and
ethnic minorities started with the 1965 Race Relations Act, and has seen many fur-
ther reforms since. The growth of minority communities in London, Birmingham,
Leicester, Manchester and other cities led to active political responses both to discrim-
ination and the development of racially-based, extremist, politics.
London saw fascist politicians between the 1920s and 1940, notably Sir Oswald
Moseley’s British Union of Fascists. But with the growth of a visible, non-white, minor-
ity population in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s a number of individuals created the
anti-immigration (and pro-repatriation) National Front which grew rapidly after its cre-
ation in 1967 (Taylor, 1982). During the 1970s it won clusters of votes in a number of
London boroughs and in parts of the West Midlands. 
Elections in London during the late 1970s produced a spike in NF voting.  In the 1977
Greater London Council election the NF put up candidates in all but one seat and won
119,060 votes, over five per cent of the total.  In some GLC constituencies in Hackney
and Newham, the party won between 15 and 20 per cent of the vote, causing a shock
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trast, less than one in seven of the Conservative’s votes come from this group.  As a
larger share of the population becomes non-white British, it seems likely that unless
there is a change in the propensity for minority voters to support Labour, the effects
already observed in parts of London will intensify.  
Conclusion
In a 2006 LSE London paper, the authors wrote: 
London seems to have had a reasonable record in assimilating millions of new
overseas-born residents.  However, there have been radical changes in the num-
ber and origins of immigrants in the past decade. 2004 saw the highest level of
net international in-migration ever recorded. Because such a large proportion of
UK international migration is into London, it is inevitable that the global will meet
the local far more frequently and more intensely than in most of the rest of the
country.  The changing numbers and profile of international migrants have led to
intense political pressures on many London boroughs (Gordon & Travers, 2006). 
Looking back on this conclusion eight years later, the challenge of the BNP has reced-
ed and London is, in most ways, a peaceful and successful place.  The remarkable
fact about the mass immigration and changes to the city’s ethnic make-up during the
last 20 years is not the dramatic effect it has had on the city and its people, but rather
the lack of any substantial negative impacts.  
Of course, not everyone is of a similar view.  David Goodhart, in an interview in 2013
for the Evening Standard, commented on the results of the 2011 Census: 
I don’t want to use the phrase ‘white flight’ as it implies a racial element — which
isn’t what it’s mainly about. It’s a desire for familiarity, it’s a desire not to have one’s
world changed too fast, it is flight from diversity…You are used to living in a place
where people like you set the tone. Many, if not most people, would be happy if
there was a significant minority, 20 or 30 per cent — but if you find  yourself living
in a place where you are the minority, a lot of people don’t like that” (Sexton, 2013).
As the population has changed it does appear there have been political and electoral
impacts on the city.  The Labour Party has benefited from the arrival of migrants and
a minority ethnic population, while the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats appear
to have lost vote share.  These impacts will continue to have an effect in the years
ahead as the city’s population becomes less white British.  But other effects may push
in the opposite direction.  Immigration and ethnicity are only one of many factors to
influence the way people vote.
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of course, responsible for the management of the UK border.  Occasional manifesta-
tions of support for extremist parties such as the National Front and the BNP would
appear to be a response to fear of the unknown: places in London where there have
been migrants and minorities for many years are now less prone to resort to vote for
such parties than when the migrants first arrived.  Similarly, very affluent places such
as Westminster, Kensington & Chelsea, Camden and Hammersmith & Fulham have
never shown any willingness to vote for them (UK Polling Report, 2009).  Perceived
competition for public resources and housing in a large and crowded city like London
also appears to have been a starting-point for extremist parties and voting.    
Long-term impact on London politics
In an article on the longer-term implications of immigration for the British political sys-
tem, Trevor Phillips and Richard Webber (2014) conclude that there will be “a rapid
growth in the minority share of the population, from about 14 per cent now to some-
where between 20 per cent and 40 per cent in 2050”, that there is “a persistence of
a strong Labour preference (around 70 per cent) amongst visible minorities” and that
there will be a “moderate dispersal of visible minority families from the inner cities to
the suburbs”.
Phillips and Webber (2014) included a table showing the behaviour of ‘visible minori-
ty’ and white voters in London in the 2014 European elections. Of Labour’s 37 per
cent share of the vote in London, two thirds were minority voters (table 4).  By con-
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Table 4 London Euro-elections 2014: vote shares by ethnicity
% of
total vote
% share of vote
from visible
minority electors
% share of
vote from
White British
electors
% share of
vote from
Other White
electors
Labour 37 26 10 1
Conservative 23 3 18 2
UKIP 21 3 17 1
Others 19 9 9 1
Totals 100 41 54 5
Source: Phillips & Webber (2014) 
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In a competitive democracy, the real challenge to arise from the propensity for new
migrants to be attracted so disproportionately by the Labour Party is for the
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and other parties to become more successful in
winning over these voters. The Conservatives, in particular, have palpably failed to do
this so far.  Many Conservative supporters have voiced such views and it would be
healthier for the democratic system to have relatively plural behaviour by ethnic or
minority groups and also for there to be competition for their votes.  
London remains relatively politically plural and competitive, although a number of bor-
oughs are now ‘one-party states’.  Migration and ethnicity are among the factors which
influence voting.  As the city grows rapidly in the coming years, the quality and com-
petitiveness of its democratic system will be a key contributor to its good government.    
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The impact of immigrants on city politics:
comparing New York and London
John Mollenkopf
Immigrants and their offspring have clearly become a large, growing and permanent
feature of the populations of the major cities of the advanced democracies of western
Europe and North America and indeed in some major cities in the developing world
like Riyadh, Dubai, and Singapore.  New York ranks first among metropolitan areas in
terms of the total number of foreign born residents, and London ranks sixth.  Other
metro areas with a million or more immigrants include Los Angeles, Toronto and Miami
in North America and Paris in Europe (Price and Benton-Short, 2007 p109).  Because
these immigrants come from many parts of the world and in many cases are joining
native born ethnic minority groups, scholars Steven Vertovec and Maurice Crul deem
them ‘hyperdiverse’ or ‘superdiverse’ (Vertovec 2007;  Crul, Schneider, and Lelie
2013).
This massive international migration is rooted in the economic inequalities between
sending and receiving areas, their historical links of trade and colonialism and inten-
sification of transnational activities.  The emergence of large new immigrant minority
communities poses many challenges for both the sending and receiving areas.  In
particular, it has created new and more complex forms of inter-group inequality and
competition in ‘superdiverse’ metropolitan areas, including a cleavage between the
native ‘us’ and the immigrant ‘other.’  Many members of native-born groups see the
new immigrant communities as a burden – reliant on welfare and social provision –
and associate them with poverty and crime, despite the fact that new migrants con-
vey myriad economic benefits, as documented in other parts of this volume.  Just as
the American sociologist, historian, civil rights activist and Pan-Africanist W.E.B. du
Bois described ‘the color-line’ as ‘the problem of the twentieth century,’ at the launch
of his groundbreaking 1903 treatise The Souls of Black Folk,  integrating the rising
201
Tony Travers in this volume, outlines trajectories of immigrant political mobilization in
the UK and London, highlighting how the ‘white British’ who have become a minority
of the city’s population lean toward the Conservative Party, while the growing immi-
grant ethnic minority groups favour Labour, with those of Caribbean and African
ancestry being most pro-Labour.  Though less likely to vote, they are more trusting of
political institutions and more feel ‘British’ than their native white counterparts.  He
cites Greater London Authority statistics for 2010 to show that whites make up 70 per
cent of London’s adult population, but hold 90 per cent of the 73 London-based seats
in Parliament, 84 per cent of the seats on the 1,861 members of various borough
councils, and 85 per cent of the seats on the 25 member London Assembly (GLA,
2012, p4).  In other words, members of black, Asian, and minority ethnic groups make
up 42 per cent of the population, but hold only 16 per cent of the Assembly seats
which is roughly the equivalent of the New York City Council.   In terms of a represen-
tation to population ratio, that would be a value of 0.381.  By comparison, the 51-mem-
ber New York City Council has 26 minority and immigrant members, a representa-
tives-to-population ratio of 0.759.  Interestingly, four of the 25 London Assembly mem-
bers are South Asian, but only one is Caribbean, even though London’s black popu-
lation is somewhat larger than its South Asian population.  Travers concludes that
immigrant voters are indeed having an impact on London and that Labour has bene-
fitted.  Although they are less likely to register and perhaps less likely to turn out, they
are a growing influence, but they may not be so wedded to the Labour Party in the
future, as they become more upwardly and outwardly mobile.
So what can we say about how the progress of immigrant political mobilization and
incorporation in New York City stacks up against that of London?  Does the fact that
New York City’s minority representation ratio is twice that of London’s mean it has
made more progress?  Certainly, there are many steps between the presence of a
population group and the election to local office of people who come from that group.
Age, citizenship, voter registration, methods of representation, party identification,
party competition, population concentration versus diffusion, and many other factors
may affect this relationship.  And what might account for any marked differences
between the two that we conclude are significant?  For example, Shamit Saggar tells
us in his accompanying essay of an ‘iron law’ of immigrant politics, in which ethnicity
trumps class.  So might a difference between London and New York lie in differences
in ethnic composition, differences in the ways parties or representation systems mobi-
lize or demobilize voters along ethnic boundaries, or in differences in political geogra-
phy?  This short exposition will not be able to answer such questions, but it may be
able to set out some ideas about how to explore them.
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new immigrant ethnic groups into our cities today is the civil rights challenge of the
21st century city.
Scholars and policy analysts have paid a great deal of attention to the economic,
social and cultural dimensions of integrating these new immigrant communities, but
much less to their political integration, which is arguably central to the whole process.
For the receiving cities, the rise of these new immigrant minority communities poses
acute questions of inclusion, membership, citizenship, and political influence.  On the
one side, the systematic exclusion or subordination of these groups would be deeply
antithetical to our democratic (and sometimes social democratic) values.  On the
other, the newcomers have sufficiently different class positions, cultures, values, and
everyday practices than the native born mainstream that the former sometimes won-
der whether they actually want to integrate while the latter sometimes question
whether they ever can.  Yet, on the whole, despite substantial impediments and con-
siderable variation across groups and contexts of reception, the new immigrant com-
munities are melding into and contributing to their new neighborhoods, cities, and
countries.
Given that the dilemma of the political inclusion of new immigrant minorities is posed
most acutely in large multi-cultural cities like London and New York, their experiences
shed important light on first attempts to “bring the outsiders in.’  They allow us to
measure our progress and to begin to draw conclusions about what works best under
which circumstances.  The two cities are quite comparable in many respects.  In 2013,
London’s population was estimated at 8.43 million, while New York’s was 8.41 million.
Minority groups (termed ‘black, Asian and minority ethnic groups’ or BAME by the
Greater London Authority) made up 41.8 per cent of London’s population, while they
make up 67.2 per cent of New York City’s residents.  London’s population was 36.7
per cent foreign born in the 2011 UK Census, while New York City’s was 37.2 per cent
in that same year.  Both cities draw their immigrants from a wide range of sources,
although each has a distinct mix. London, for example, does not have a large Hispanic
immigrant population.  The two cities have similar economic structures and labour
markets.  At the same time, their political structures, cultures, and dynamics are quite
different, allowing us to make some tentative inferences about how different systems
of political representation and competition may influence the progress of immigrant
minorities.  This makes the comparative study of immigrant political incorporation in
London and New York an important focal point for social scientists from an analytic as
well as from moral and practical standpoints.
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and the broad industrial prosperity of the 1950s created a major demand for labour
that was not fully fed by the children of the upwardly mobile European immigrant
groups of the previous period – although New York still had plenty of Irish cops, Italian
construction workers, Jewish social workers and teachers and German brewers and
bakers.  As wartime prosperity rekindled labour demand in the 1940s and prosperity
expanded it in the 1950s, large scale African American and then Puerto Rican migra-
tion flowed into the city, triggering a new process of racial and ethnic succession.
These new groups entered an environment that was undergoing a policy-driven tran-
sition from a white, ethnic, blue collar industrial city into a multi-racial, white collar and
service sector post-industrial city. The period from the mid-1950s to about 1980 was
one of racial and ethnic conflict, white flight, deindustrialization, disinvestment and
abandonment, and fiscal crisis.  While the white ethnic succession process of the pre-
vious century was certainly conflictual, it took place in the context of overall econom-
ic growth and upward mobility, the Depression notwithstanding. The racial succession
taking place from 1950 to 1980 occurred during a period of wrenching economic
change and the decline of many sectors that had previously absorbed immigrant
workers. It produced a considerable amount of latent and overt conflict.  Demands for
civil rights and minority empowerment were more racially charged than the succes-
sive attempts of the Irish, German, Italian, and Jewish communities to gain power.
Measured by jobs, income, and population trends, as well as the near-bankruptcy of
city government, the 1970s were the worst decade in New York City’s history.  
African Americans and Puerto Ricans made a considerable amount of political
advancement in local legislative offices between 1941 - when Adam Clayton Powell
was elected the first black member of the New York City Council -  and the 1980s but
it was not until 1989 that New York elected its first (and only) black mayor, David
Dinkins.  Before and after him, New York City mayoral politics remained dominated by
an electoral and governing coalition largely based on votes from non-Hispanic whites
who had reacted in relatively conservative directions to the racial turmoil and urban
discontents of the 1970s and 1980s.  Mayor Edward I. Koch, a conservative Democrat
in office between 1978 and 1989, was a proponent of fiscal balance and an opponent
of public employee unions, minority politicians and their base in social service pro-
grammes.  Republican Rudolf W. Giuliani, mayor between 1994 and 2001, prioritised
fighting crime and disorder and sought to lower taxes and reduce social programmes.
His sometime-Republican successor Michael Bloomberg, between 2002 and 2013,
was more liberal in some respects, but also stressed data-driven management
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As Saggar reminds us in his essay, history is important.  One can almost think of the
ethnic dimension of political representation as a sedimentary rock formation, one eth-
nic layer slowly being laid down after another, sometimes deformed by the volcanic
action of political eruptions. This has occurred in a number of politico-geologic epochs
in New York City.  From the early 19th century to 1898, New York consisted of the
island of Manhattan and its northern offshoot, the Bronx. Brooklyn was a separate city,
Queens was filled with small hamlets, and Staten Island was farm land.  The city grew
rapidly as commercial growth attracted immigrants not just from the surrounding areas
but first from Ireland and Germany (in mid-century) and then from Italy and the Jewish
and other communities of central and eastern Europe at the end of the century.  By
the time ‘Greater New York’ brought the five boroughs together in one jurisdiction in
1898, New York was a heavily immigrant city with an Irish-dominated Democratic
party political machine, the fabled Tammany Hall which controlled Democratic Party
nominations and political patronage in Manhattan from the mayoral victory of
Fernando Wood in 1854 through to the election of John P. O’Brien in 1932. It was
countered from time to time by reform efforts driven by middle class professionals,
often with white Protestant roots.  The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York was
a prominent institution and various strands of Judaism also exerted influence along-
side the waning, but still influential, Protestant elite.  Facing the Irish hegemony in
Tammany Hall and St. Patrick’s Cathedral, Italians and Jews gravitated to other bor-
oughs, especially Brooklyn, in the early 20th century, where they became the locally
dominant political forces.  African American migration to New York also started on a
small scale in the 1910s and 1920s as World War I created new labour demands.
This period culminated in the tumultuous political changes of the Great Depression,
the New Deal, and the La Guardia administration in the 1930s.  La Guardia was a
Republican reformer associated with the left wing American Labor Party. He was
raised as an Episcopalian but spoke Yiddish and had an Italian surname.  In opposi-
tion to the Irish Democratic establishment, he mobilized not only Jews and Italians to
join with white Protestants, but was also backed by the emerging African American
community and, with help from Franklin D. Roosevelt in the White House and Robert
Wagner in the U.S. Senate, both products of New York politics, he dramatically
expanded the size and scope of city government, in the process providing employ-
ment to many groups shut out by Tammany.
Anti-immigration laws adopted by Congress in the 1920s, the Depression, and World
War II severely reduced international migration to New York between the mid-1920s
and the mid-1960s.  Nevertheless, the war-fueled economic recovery of the 1940s
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rose from 1 to 4. Two new groups gained representation, including two Chinese
Council members and one of Mexican immigrant origin.  A candidate from a Greek
Cypriot immigrant background also won election.  More importantly, the powerful
council speakership shifted in 2014 from white Democrats affiliated with county party
organizations to a Puerto Rican woman member backed by the progressive caucus,
which counts many of the new immigrant council members in its fold.  Finally, immi-
grant voters and their native born adult children, who now make up 48 per cent of the
city’s electorate, joined native minority and white liberal voters to elect a reform
Democrat mayor, Bill de Blasio, in November 2013, completing a long effort to put
someone in that office who relied heavily on minority voters to get there.  While he is
a non-Hispanic white with Italian and German ethnic roots, his spouse is a second
generation West Indian.
The current demographic breakdown of the broad electorate is given in Table 1.  This
is drawn from a federal survey, the Current Population Survey that samples approxi-
mately 3,500 people monthly in New York City.  Each November in an even numbered
year, the survey asks respondents whether they were registered to vote and cast a
ballot in the federal election - but not for whom they voted.  The survey also collects
demographic data, including age, citizenship status, place of birth, and parents’ place
of birth.  This allows us to construct a detailed breakdown of the voters and turnout as
a per cent of potentially eligible voters among voting age citizens, with a high degree
of reliability.  As Table 1 shows, native stock non-Hispanic whites, i.e. people born in
the U.S. to two parents also born in the U.S. account for less than one in five of New
York City’s residents but this population is older, and tends to have higher socio-eco-
nomic positions and therefore higher political engagement which means that they cast
24.8 per cent of the presidential vote in November 2012.  The table also makes the
point that immigrants and their children not only make up almost two-thirds of the
city’s population, they also make up almost half of its actual voters.
As in London, immigrant minority groups lean more towards the Democrats than
native born non-Hispanic whites that overwhelmingly dominated New York City poli-
tics until recent decades.  Table 2 presents results from a multiple regression equa-
tion estimating the Obama vote share as a function of each group’s share of the total
population in a given Census tract or enumeration district (of which there are about
2,200 in New York City).  The equation is weighted by tract population, so that dense
areas are counted more heavily than sparsely populated tracts. The non-Hispanic
white population is excluded from the equation, which estimates that areas made up
solely of this group would give 55 per cent of their support to Barack Obama.  Since
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approaches, keeping crime rates low, and promoting investment.  Still, minority repre-
sentation within the city council and the New York City delegations to the State
Assembly, State Senate, and U.S. Congress grew slowly but steadily, despite the fail-
ure of minority and white liberal voters to coalesce around and elect a Democratic
mayoral candidate.
Remarkably, perhaps in part because a relatively conservative governing coalition
remained in power, New York City survived and prospered in the face of forces that
ravaged other old industrial cities like Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis after the late
1960s.  Indeed, after losing one-eighth of its population between 1970 and 1980,
falling to 7 million, NYC’s population rebounded to 8.4 million by 2014, a record
unmatched by any other old city in the north.  International migration was a key fac-
tor in this remarkable rebound.  In the contemporary period, African Americans and
Puerto Ricans joined the gradual population decline that started among native non-
Hispanic whites.  Supplanting them was not only the Asian (Chinese, Korean, Indian,
Bangladeshi, and Pakistani) and Latino (Dominican, Mexican, Ecuadoran,
Columbian, and Peruvian) migration common to other parts of the U.S., but also black
immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa and white immigrants from the former
Soviet Union.  
These new population streams softened and complicated some of the hard edges of
black-white conflict from the earlier period, while taking place in a context of persist-
ently high residential segregation between whites and blacks (and to a lesser degree
between whites and Latinos or Asians). Demands for minority empowerment shifted
from native born groups like African Americans and Puerto Ricans, who had won
nearly every constituency where minority groups constituted a majority of the popula-
tion, to immigrant-origin minority groups like Dominicans, West Indians, Haitians,
Chinese, Koreans, South Asians, and Russians, and now Mexicans, the most recent
large immigrant group to emerge in New York City.  Their advent was eased by the
enlargement of the New York City Council from 35 seats to 51 seats in 1990, with new
districts being designated in 1991 to provide opportunities for minority advancement.
The first West Indian and Dominican candidates won Council seats in 1991 - along
with 11 African Americans and 8 Puerto Ricans.
Between that first election to the enlarged city council in 1991 and the current mem-
bership in 2014, minority representation has gone up somewhat, from 22 to 26, but
the composition has changed even more.  African American representation has fallen
from 11 to 9, while West Indian and Haitian representation has risen from 1 to 4.
Puerto Rican representation has fallen from 8 to 6, while Dominican representation
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Obama won 78.6 per cent of the overall vote, these whites were clearly much less
supportive than the various minority groups, although they still gave him a majority of
their votes.  The equation suggests that almost all of the native and immigrant minor-
ity groups lean more towards the Democratic Party than whites, except for voters in
Arabic-speaking neighborhoods and Pakistani neighborhoods.  The equation sug-
gests for each group that a one per cent increase in population share will increase the
Obama vote share by the fraction indicated in the relevant row.  While we lack exit
polling data that might allow us to decipher why voters in Arabic-speaking and
Pakistani neighborhoods were so negative towards Obama, the war on terror and
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq probably account for this.
209
Immigrants and New York city politics 
208
Migration and London’s growth
Table 1 Population, Voting Age Citizens, and Voters by Immigrant Origin, New York
City, 2012
Source: 2012 Current Population Survey November Election Supplement.  
FB = Foreign Born, 2G = native born with 1 or 2 FB parents, NS = native born with two native born
parents. 
*Combined FB and 2G population.  West Indian are Anglophone islands plus Guyana, but not Haiti
Italicized groups are included in the preceding totals.  All Hispanics are grouped together, regard-
less of race, and are not included in the white, black, or Asian categories.
Constant 55.06
B
African American per cent .526
Afro-Caribbean per cent .440
Arabic speaking per cent -.353
Puerto Rican per cent .436
Dominican per cent .493
Colombian, Ecuadoran,
Peruvian per cent .438
Mexican per cent .468
Indian per cent .572
Pakistani per cent -.681
Bangladeshi per cent .719
Chinese per cent .186
Korean per cent .493
Largest
migrant
groups
Population % of Population
Voting 
Age Citizens
% 
of
VAC
Votes 
Cast
% of
VC
Turnout
VC/VAC
White FB 659,584 8.0 424,101 8.6 211,210 7.1 49.8
White 2G 445,932 5.4 318,009 6.3 193,598 6.5 60.9
White NS 1,522,157 18.4 1,252,893 24.9 737,916 24.8 58.9
Ex-USSR* 132,900 4.5
Black FB 751,790 9.1 470,332 9.4 333,167 11.2 70.8
Black 2G 405,902 4.9 168,270 3.4 106,765 3.2 63.4
Black NS 810,728 9.8 635,180 12.6 471,132 15.9 74.2
West Indian* 340,302 11.4
Hispanic FB 948,838 11.5 301,186 6.0 170,601 5.7 56.6
Hispanic 2G 682,815 8.3 282,060 5.6 153,968 5.2 54.6
Hispanic NS 655,794 7.9 473,993 9.4 311,511 10.5 65.7
Dominican* 134,855 4.5
Asian FB 785,483 9.5 383,630 7.6 166,456 5.6 43.4
Asian 2G 450,625 5.5 226,068 4.5 64,333 2.2 28.5
Asian NS 54,254 0.7 21,518 0.4 9,141 0.3 42.5
Chinese* 65,661 2.0
Total FB 3,181,362 38.5 1,613,502 32.1 891,707 30.0 55.3
Total 2G 1,993,808 24.1 1.002,937 20.0 530,188 17.9 52.9
Total NS 3,083,200 37.3 2,406,340 47.9 1,555,317 52.0 64.6
City Total 8,258,370 100 5,025,779 100 2,972,222 100 59.1
Table 2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Obama Vote Share, 2012 General Election,
New York City (Unit of analysis = Census Tract)
All variables significant at .003; adjusted R squared .630; weighted by tract population.
Source: American Community Survey combined file 2007-2011 for demographic vari-
ables; New York City Board of Elections for votes cast.
als from immigrant and native minority backgrounds to significant positions within his
administration.  The city has adopted new legislation on paid sick days that will help
low wage workers, many of whom are immigrants, and it is taking measures to raise
the wage floor in firms that receive government benefits.  It has also vowed to
increase the supply of affordable housing, a key problem facing immigrant communi-
ties.  Finally, it is sensitive to language access, immigrant enforcement, and other
issues specifically relevant to immigrant communities.  For example, the city will issue
an identity card to all city residents, including those without legal authorization, which
can be used to access city services as well as prove identity in interactions with law
enforcement agencies.  While previous mayors have also taken a generally pro-immi-
grant tack in their rhetoric and policies, these go beyond what came before.
If we take as one basic measure of immigrant and minority empowerment the ratio of
the share of elected officials to the share of population, New York seems to be doing
substantially better than London.  This no doubt reflects the far longer struggle for
minority empowerment, which is at least seven decades old in New York, as well as
the larger minority share of the population – and now electorate – that has been
around for longer periods.  Moreover, ethnicity is a primary organizing factor in New
York City and American politics, as contrasted with the formerly more class-oriented
political alignments of the UK, which might impede this form of organization in
London. New York has been integrating immigrant groups into its political system
since the early part of the 19th century.  Indeed some observers have concluded that
the ethnic division of the spoils is mainly what New York City politics is all about.  This
surely overstates the matter, because ideology, lifestyle, family form, class, education,
and many other distinctions also play an important part in New York City politics.  
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As Travers suggests for London, the different immigrant and native born minority
groups vary somewhat in their intensity of Democratic support.  Blacks are more
Democratic leaning than Latinos, who are in turn more Democratic than the Asian
groups in this election.  Within these broad groups, African Americans favoured
Obama even more heavily than Afro-Caribbeans, but the immigrant Latino groups
were more heavily Democratic than Puerto Ricans, except for voters in neighbor-
hoods with a preponderance of immigrants from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, who
tend to have higher incomes, somewhat more education, and lighter phenotypes than
migrants from the Dominican Republic.  Voters in Mexican immigrant neighborhoods,
like those in Dominican neighborhoods, are particularly Democratic-leaning.  Finally,
as in London, the Asian groups differ, with voters in Chinese neighborhoods being
least supportive of Obama and those in Bangladeshi neighborhoods the most.
These figures are for the last presidential election, which draws the largest turnout of
any type of election.  Turnout is much lower for mayoral elections, which do not coin-
cide with national or state elections.  And voting is much lighter in Democratic may-
oral primaries, which choose the nominee who tends to win the general election, given
that 69 per cent of New York City’s voters are registered Democrats.  Participation
rates in these different types of elections vary across racial and ethnic groups, with
the Democratic primary being more weighted to minority groups.  At the same time,
the (white) candidate favoured by the Republicans won office in every mayoral elec-
tion between 1993 and 2009, so the Democratic mayoral nominee has generally not
won in this context. This is due to the defection of white Democrats from party nomi-
nees favoured by minority Democratic voters as well as a lack of alignment between
white liberal Democrats, black Democrats, and Hispanic Democrats.  Mayor
Bloomberg proved particularly adept at winning a share of the vote from these differ-
ent groups.  This makes the de Blasio victory in 2013 all the more remarkable.
Conclusions
This short overview of how the rise of immigrant minority communities has influenced
political outcomes in New York City concludes with some brief reflections on the dif-
ference which the rising influence of these groups might make on public policies that
are relevant to these communities and the possible reasons for the different patterns
of outcomes observed in London and New York.
The de Blasio administration is just getting under way, but there are strong indicators
that in partnership with the new progressive majority in the City Council, it will adopt
policies favourable to these communities.  The mayor has appointed many individu-
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Conclusions
Ian Gordon, Ben Kochan, Tony Travers and Christine Whitehead 
London’s population is growing rapidly in sharp contrast to the decline during the first
four post-war decades and it is projected to increase further in the years ahead.
International migration has been a major factor in this expansion, both directly among
the working age population and indirectly, with the children of earlier migrants boost-
ing the natural increase. It has also transformed the population mix, with the capital
increasingly a city of minorities and the mix of migrant and minority groups also
becoming  much more diverse. This transformation of London's population seems to
be having a number of effects. It is generating additional economic growth and greater
investment, but at the same time putting increasing pressure on public services and
housing - and, for some, making living in London a tougher experience.  
If there is a single message from this book it is that discussion of, and responses to,
migration and its impact within the London region need to be less based on broad gen-
eralisations and stereotypes than has been the case up to now. A more nuanced under-
standing of the different impacts of specific categories of migrants; migrants  from rich
and poor countries, highly skilled migrants, well established migrant groups and new
arrivals, is absolutely necessary for London to reap the benefits and alleviate the costs
of migration. This is also true if credible responses are to be made to those Londoners
who feel that more migration has negatively affected their life chances. 
In drawing together some of the threads from the contributions in this book, we focus
particularly on issues which are contested and areas where the evidence still needs
to be strengthened. We start with the impact of immigration on London's economic
growth. Our earlier work stressed that, at least when they first arrive, migrants are
often overqualified for the jobs that they can access, and are mostly young and with
few dependants, they put relatively little pressure on public services. So if the jobs are
there - and Jonathan Portes’s chapter suggests that a job is created for each one
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growing rapidly and is projected to continue to do so - and the benefits are dispropor-
tionately generated in London. The mix of nationalities and the future demand for one
of our strongest sectors could be adversely affected by increased visa controls and
the often noted perception by students that they are made to feel unwelcome. The
restrictions on the rights of non EU students to obtain post-study work experience, to
build international networks and to strengthen relationships with London business are
also seen as potentially highly damaging. Competition from rival higher education sys-
tems across the globe could attract students away from London. At an immediately
practical level, working with the new regulations and maintaining student numbers has
imposed significant costs on the institutions and little is being done to streamline pro-
cedures and make them more user-friendly.  
Within the labour market, migrants appear strongly polarised; there are a large num-
ber of very rich and far more very poor, at least in their early years here.  London
attracts nearly half of all the skilled migrants admitted to the UK under Tier 2 of the
points-based system. It is also where relatively less skilled migrants and their depend-
ents help to fill the large numbers of service jobs necessary for the health of the
London economy. It is doubtful whether London could function effectively without
either of these migrant groups.  
At the local level, the proportion of migrants in an area was once seen as a strong
indicator of deprivation in that area but this relationship has become far weaker.  At
one extreme, there are migrants from rich countries, who are part of the global finan-
cial services employment market.  Other groups who start  poor when they first arrive,
especially in the second or third generations, progress to better homes and neigh-
bourhoods. But there are also groups who remain impoverished, less able to access
decent jobs and who live in poor quality, overcrowded and expensive housing. 
London, the South East and the East are effectively integrated in housing and labour
market terms. The different groups of migrants have spread across London and the
wider south east as part of a process of integration/settlement but also simply to find
more affordable housing.   Within London, some boroughs have received large num-
bers of migrants who are being displaced from central London. And increasingly
London’s poorer households, whether migrant or local, have little choice but to live in
more crowded conditions in the private rented sector or to move further out.  
Migrants from both poor and rich countries are also increasingly moving to towns
beyond London’s green belt. This all strengthens the argument for greater coordina-
tion across the regions. The Mayor’s London Plan continues to emphasise that
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occupied by a new migrant - working migrants are currently usually net contributors to
the Exchequer and help the economy to grow. Clearly this position changes over time
as those who remain in the country become more like the local population of similar
age and type in terms of their socio-economic position and their demand for housing
and other services.  In relation to the labour market this means that the contribution
of the stayers to value-added in the city should grow, while their crowding in the lower
end of the jobs market should be relieved. This is straightforwardly good news. In rela-
tion to the housing market, overcrowding among those migrants who stay should
wane, but the effective demand for housing space in London and neighbouring
regions could increase significantly.  This will be less welcome to those seeking afford-
able homes and those with responsibilities for developing policies and strategies to
meet London’s housing needs. This simply reflects the normal additional housing
requirements for the city's population which plans need to accommodate.
With these delayed effects and the evolving position of various groups within a diverse
migrant population, a crucial element in improving the assessment of the impact of
migration is to gain a better understanding of turnover. That is: who stays, for how long
and who moves on out of the country. We know that migrants from poorer countries
are more likely to stay longer, potentially putting some pressure on the Exchequer
over the long run. The detail is still very imprecise; for example we do not know who
is likely to remain into older age and be in need of support. This is particularly impor-
tant when the social and physical infrastructure requirements of the growing popula-
tion are being considered.
Many of the contributions to this book highlight the particular roles which migrants play
in London’s growth, innovation and economic structures. At the very least, migrants
fill skill shortages in sectors that routinely experience large fluctuations in labour
requirements or have rapidly increasing demands (eg for IT specialists). There are
expectations, mainly based on the US experience  - and there is  some UK evidence
-  that immigration has added to London’s entrepreneurial capacity, so contributing to
its role as a global city. With government seeking to restrict immigration and questions
being raised about the UK’s continuing EU membership, new research and evidence
on the value of different types of migrants to the London economy, and the UK as a
whole, would make an important contribution to the debate. 
Equally the impact of immigration controls on foreign students studying in London -
both on the funding of higher education institutions and on the students’ career paths
-  deserves further research.  This is clearly an important area of opportunity as high-
er education makes a very significant contribution to the UK economy. It has been
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Migration has become a frightening issue within British politics. Opinion polling sug-
gests that many people want much reduced levels of migrants coming to the country
although this feeling is less strong in London, partly because many more residents
here are either migrants or the children of migrant communities and partly because
living together is the norm. There is a temptation for politicians,  finding it hard in this
context to make the case for immigration to Britain, to respond simply by professing
support for this popular view.  But there is evidence that public concerns are driven at
least as much by frustration with politicians making unrealistic promises about cut-
backs in levels of immigration – which they duly fail to deliver – as by any direct reac-
tions to actual levels of inflow and the impacts of these on survey respondents. 
This book does not suggest international in-migration is necessarily good of itself.  A
number of the authors are actually sceptical about the virtues of the scale and man-
agement of migration that has been experienced in recent years.  And, while there is
evidence that many Londoners benefit from migration, not all do, and some of the
least advantaged seem to have lost out the most during the years of rising inflows.
Rapid changes in the make-up of the city have also clearly been disconcerting for
some established residents.  Other commentators believe international in-migration is
necessary and desirable to provide skills and simple growth in the workforce and
because it makes for a more vibrant community for the 21st century. Short-term migra-
tion, by students and others, can  directly boost demand, exports and service output. 
Academics are naturally fond of saying both that ‘more research is needed’ and that
more efforts should be made to disseminate what is already known much more wide-
ly. But, international migration is undoubtedly one area where both of these are true.
One reason is because migrants are diverse and impacts are both much more com-
plex and uneven in their incidence than is commonly recognised, either by the public
or by policy-makers.  Another is that myths are rife, and need to be scotched. One oft
quoted boast is that London is now effectively the fifth or sixth largest 'French' conur-
bation, with the number of French nationals living there, implying that 800,000 French
nationals lived in London, ten times more than the actual 2011 Census figure.
A third reason for the need for more research and wider dissemination of existing
information is because confidence in the political classes, their judgements and poli-
cy decisions and public willingness to trust politicians’ judgements appears increas-
ingly limited. Public statements about the likely impacts of migration and of migration
management rarely reflect solidly evidence-based analyses. This book is a modest
contribution to the cause of disseminating more of the existing research base and
stimulating demand for further work to enrich that base, and publicise its implications. 
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London should accommodate its own growth – though what this really means is com-
pletely unclear. However the objective is defined, it is increasingly unlikely to be
achieved, and spatial, land use and density planning should take place across a much
broader area than solely Greater London. Yet, equally, inside the space-constrained
market of Greater London, a carefully detailed and integrated approach remains of
particular importance, given the competition between land uses and the need for con-
tinuing infrastructure investment. 
There is an  increasing need for services and the public finances to provide them, but
the uncertainty about the likely levels of migration makes detailed planning difficult.
This underlines the importance of understanding the factors which affect longer term
migration trends. Politicians at a national and local level must take account of the local
implications of national border control policies and their impacts both on both econom-
ic growth and public infrastructure requirements. 
Understanding and addressing population changes, driven in part by migration, is par-
ticularly important if public policy is to limit impacts on established citizens. If London’s
population continues to grow faster than homes are built and the necessary infrastruc-
ture and services are not provided, the pressures on established communities will be
increased.  Existing populations may feel they face unfair competition from newcom-
ers for jobs and services. 
Many people also feel uncomfortable because of the rapidity of demographic change
in their neighbourhoods.  This can be reinforced by a sense of alienation with the loss
of a ‘British’ identity – and by an apparent failure among a liberal establishment to
recognise that there are negative effects, primarily among people already in weak
social and economic positions.  Yet  evidence suggests  that such concerns do not all
relate to local experience and are actually more strongly felt in parts of the UK where
proportions of migrants are much lower and the lived experience of migration and its
impacts is less. In London, there is evidence that areas where migrants and minority
populations have long lived together are less likely to vote for extreme political parties
than they were 30 or 40 years ago when migrants were new to such places.
A cosmopolitan identity has emerged as London has become a global city with,
arguably, more and deeper connections to other major cities across the world than to
much of the rest of the UK.  It is therefore vital that not just the economic but also the
social and other impacts – the broader benefits from migrants as well as  the poten-
tial costs and how they might be offset - are better understood and addressed.  In this
context it is important not just to concentrate on London but to understand better how
the impacts on other parts of the country can be made more positive.   
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